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Thesis Summary 
Aircraft structural maintenance is one of the critical operational activities to sustain continued 
airworthiness. It also contributes a significant proportion of the total life-cycle cost. From a 
system engineering perspective, a maintenance strategy is essential to be developed in design 
phase. Currently, the MSG-3 document and deterministic methodologies are widely applied as 
guidance to develop scheduled maintenance tasks. However, there are two fundamental 
shortcomings. First, the MSG-3 analysis largely relies on engineering experience without a 
consideration of various practical data, which is not suitable for new design aircraft without 
prototype. Secondly, they fail to cater for emerging technologies such as advanced composite 
structures and Structural Health Monitoring (SHM).  
The objective of this thesis is to determine flexible and cost-effective maintenance schedule for 
aircraft structures subject to acceptable safety levels. Two key parameters in scheduled 
maintenance are considered: the inspection interval and the repair/replace threshold. Composite 
airframes are particularly investigated and damage characteristics are obtained. Considering the 
existence of uncertainty throughout the aircraft life-cycle, non-deterministic methodologies are 
proposed to optimize maintenance tasks. The integration of SHM in scheduled maintenance is 
investigated to determine the influence on safety as well as maintenance cost. The structure of 
this thesis is organized in 8 chapters addressing the following topics: 
Chapter 3: Starting from the inspection interval determined from MSG-3 analysis, an intelligent 
rating system is proposed to assess accidental damage of aircraft structures. A back-propagation 
network (BPN) was created with a powerful learning ability and a flexible data fusion capability, 
which can assist in determining inspection intervals for new aircraft structures with limited 
experience. 
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Chapter 4: The research then focuses on the increased use of composite materials in aircraft 
structures. A new fault tree was established to synthesize systematically various damage modes 
and causes. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses were performed to obtain the main 
influence factors of the damage. This FTA provides an intuitive and systematic approach to 
describe the complex damages in aircraft composite structures, which facilitates the following 
studies. 
Chapter 5 and 6: Considering the drawbacks of traditional deterministic methods and the 
insufficient MSG-3 analysis for composite structures, a probabilistic approach is proposed to 
address uncertainty. It combines a data-driven technique and a specific physical model. The 
residual strength variation of a composite structure during an operational life-cycle is simulated 
based on the “no-growth” damage tolerant design philosophy. The optimum inspection schedule 
is a compromise between the probability of failure of the structure and maintenance cost. The 
probabilistic approach is further updated by optimizing the repair/replace thresholds with 
assessments of safety and economy to achieve the most effective repair strategy. 
Chapter 7: This chapter discusses the influence of SHM on scheduled maintenance. An integrated 
logic diagram was established incorporating SHM into the current MSG-3 structural analysis, 
based on which four maintenance scenarios with gradual increasing maturity levels of SHM were 
analyzed. The inspection intervals and the repair thresholds are adjusted according to different 
combinations of SHM tasks and scheduled maintenance. This study provides a practical means 
for aircraft manufacturers and operators to consider the feasibility of SHM by examining labor 
work reduction, structural reliability variation as well as maintenance cost savings.   
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the main challenges of maintenance engineering analysis in developing new 
commercial aircraft is presented, followed by a more specific introduction on composite 
structures and the structural health monitoring techniques. 
1.1 Challenges for Modern Developing Commercial Aircraft C919 
In the new millennium, China has grown to be the engine of the world’s economy and is 
embracing an era of mass aviation with accelerating air transport growth thanks to the huge 
investment in aviation infrastructure. During the period of 2001-2012, the aviation passenger 
traffic volume grew 3.6 times, higher than the railway and highway traffic volume [1]. Currently, 
China has become the world’s second largest civil aviation market and it is estimated that more 
than 3000 new aircraft are needed for the domestic market in the next 20 years worthy 
approximately 390 billion dollars, among which 70 percent are single-aisle aircraft of around 150 
seats. By the year of 2032, China is expected to acquire 5373 civil aircraft of over 50 seats and 
the volume of passenger traffic will account for 16 percent of the world’s total, approaching the 
scale of the North America region  [2]. 
To meet the booming civil aviation demand, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China 
(COMAC) was established to design and manufacture home-grown civil aircraft. Two aircraft are 
currently in development: the ARJ21, with about 100 seats, and the C919 with 160-190 seats. The 
first variant of the C919 is a single-aisle aircraft which name has a profound meaning: C 
represents China, 9 has the homophonic allusion as long time in Chinese pronunciation, the last 
two numbers 19 stand for the maximum 190 seats. C919 is designed to be a trunk-line aircraft 
suitable for both domestic service and international short range satisfying high-density and 
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medium-density transport market. Compared to its competing aircraft types, the C919 is aimed to 
be safer, more comfortable as well as more economical [3]. 
 
Figure 1-1 C919 aircraft [3] 
Though aiming high, the difficulties facing in developing the C919 are formidable. One of the 
problems is the lack of engineering experience, especially in making maintenance plans through 
Maintenance Engineering Analysis (MEA). There is no domestic precedent in MEA for civil 
aircraft or even a prototype as a reference. As there is an increasing emphasis on aircraft life-
cycle management, delivery of aircraft to airlines is not the main objective. Moreover, a scientific 
maintenance planning that assures cost-effective aircraft operation is one of the most significant 
motivations for airline customers to make purchase decisions. Therefore, COMAC is exploring 
advanced methodologies in conducting MEA and putting forth efforts to address the realistic 
problems in developing cost-effective maintenance schedules without compromising flight safety. 
1.2 Maintenance Engineering Analysis 
Aircraft maintenance is a complicated system engineering effort. Support and maintenance 
activities contribute to a large part of the total life-cycle cost for a complex engineering system 
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[4]. When looking for the cause and effect relationships, it is often the decisions made for 
maintenance and support during the early planning and design phase that determine a majority of 
the life-cycle cost as shown in Figure 1-2. It is therefore essential to develop maintenance 
scheduling methodologies that can be incorporated in the development phase and are sensitive to 
design decisions including technology selection. The maintenance schedule established for a 
system can significantly affect the overall operational cost. Consequently, logistics and the design 
for supportability should be analyzed in the early design and development phase. 
Design and 
Development 
of System
Production 
and/or 
Construction 
of System
Operation, Utilization, 
and Sustaining Life-
Cycle Maintenance and 
Support of System
Retirement of 
System and 
Disposal of 
Material
Cost
Time
Cumulative Life-
Cycle Cost
Cost-Effectiveness 
Impact Opportunity
 
Figure 1-2 Opportunity for affecting logistics and system effectiveness [4] 
Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) describes all the logistic activities from the time when aircraft 
enters into service to its retirement. In 2005, the Aerospace and Defense Industries Association of 
Europe (ASD) initiated an international specification for Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) titled 
S3000L, which is designed to cover all processes and requirements governing the performance of 
ILS and replaces the old US version MIL-STD-1388-1A and -2B [5]. Its primary objective is to 
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design products for maintainability, reliability, testability and to minimize life-cycle cost. Among 
various LSA programs, maintenance is of utmost importance as it directly relates to aircraft safe 
operation. In order to make proper maintenance tasks, Maintenance Engineering Analysis (MEA) 
is conducted by synthesizing all input resources and performing systematic analyses.  
 
Figure 1-3 General process of MEA [5]  
As shown in Figure 1-3, the main input modules for MEA are Logistic Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (LFMEA), Damage and Special Events Analysis (D&SEA), Scheduled Maintenance 
Analysis (SMA), Logistic Related Operations Analysis (LROA) and Software Support Analysis 
(SSA). The outputs of these analyses are then used as inputs to Maintenance Task Analysis (MTA) 
and Level of Repair Analysis (LORA). The final output is maintenance tasks that identify what to 
do, when to do it and how to do it. It is noted that for the C919, software maintenance is grouped 
into the other four analyses. Maintenance tasks are primarily driven by failures, damages, special 
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events and thresholds together with additional general logistic tasks. The correlation of the event-
driven characteristic is described in Figure 1-4. 
 
Figure 1-4 Event-task correlation [5] 
Generally, maintenance activities can be divided into two categories: scheduled maintenance and 
unscheduled maintenance. Scheduled maintenance is preventative maintenance based on 
predetermined schedules in a product’s life-cycle. It is intended to preclude potential failure 
through systematic inspection, test and trouble-shooting. Maintenance tasks include, for example, 
adjustments, lubrication, regular inspection and necessary repair/replacement, which are derived 
from the SMA. They are initiated at predetermined thresholds which can be time or flight cycle. 
In comparison, with unscheduled maintenance, inspection or repair tasks are conducted according 
to an abnormal state of the product caused by damage, failure or other special events. LFMEA 
and D&SEA are performed to determine unscheduled maintenance tasks. Scheduled maintenance 
depends on predetermined maintenance plans while unscheduled maintenance is the 
complementary of scheduled maintenance in case of any obvious damage. LROA is performed to 
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determine the additional support tasks for both maintenance types. Figure 1-5 displays the 
proportions of the four maintenance tasks sources of MTA.  
 
Figure 1-5 Sources of Maintenance tasks for MTA [6] 
It is shown that more than half of the maintenance tasks derived from LFMEA and D&SEA are 
corrective maintenance whereas the rest of maintenance tasks are preventative maintenance based 
on predetermined schedules, which is the research focus of this thesis. 
As a famous saying goes “nip in the bud.” People are inclined to take measures to avoid any 
potential damage rather than to conduct corrective maintenance after failure. Even sometimes the 
latter option is more convenient. For safety-critical products like aircraft, a small damage may 
cause a great threat to flight safety. Thus, a proper maintenance schedule is of utter importance to 
prevent deterioration of the inherent safety and reliability levels. 
The official documents in guiding the implementation of scheduled maintenance can be traced 
back to 1960s when airlines and manufacturers agreed that a reasonable decision process should 
be developed. In 1968, the handbook “Maintenance Evaluation and Program Development” was 
released as “MSG-1” for the Boeing 747-100 by the Air Transport Association (ATA) 
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Maintenance Steering Group (MSG), which consisted of aircraft manufactures, airlines, U.S. 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representatives, and suppliers. To extend the applicability 
to other aircraft, the airline industry organized the second MSG two years later to develop the 
document “Airline/Manufacturer Maintenance Program Planning”, which is also called “MSG-2”. 
The first aircraft that used MSG-2 were the Lockheed L-1011 and the DC-10. In 1979, driven by 
accumulated experience, an update was conducted and a methodology for designing maintenance 
programs based on tests and proven airline practices was documented by ATA titled 
“Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Development Document”. This methodology 
formed the basis for the current aviation industry standard, MSG-3. Boeing 757 and 767 were the 
first aircraft designed by MSG-3 decision logic [6-9]. 
MSG-1 applied the logic analysis technique to replace the traditional hard time maintenance 
which lasted for half century. This makes MSG-1 the first document using logic decision method 
in guiding maintenance program development. The successful implementation on Boeing 747 led 
to the removal of Boeing 747 terminology from the document to allow application on other new 
commercial aircraft, which generated MSG-2. It was process-oriented by analyzing failure modes 
from the part-level up. The U.S. military used MSG-2 to make equipment maintenance activities 
and modified it as Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM). Three RCM terms “Hard-Time”, 
“On-Condition” and “Condition Monitoring” were defined to describe maintenance tasks. Since 
drawbacks were found over time [10], a system-driven, top-down and task-oriented process was 
reconstructed as MSG-3, in which inspection tasks were formatted in an easier way to avoid 
confusion caused by previous RCM terms. Specifically, MSG-3 has a task –oriented approach to 
analyze failures from a system level. Maintenance tasks are performed considering safe, 
operational and economic consequences, which involve both preventive and failure finding tasks. 
Application on Boeing 757 proved that a 66% decrease could be achieved in C Check flow days 
[8]. 
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Thereafter, through many years revise and update, increasing decision logic analyses have been 
added for coverage of more damage modes, such as Corrosion Prevention and Control Program, 
Enhanced Zonal Analysis, and Lightning/High Intensity Radiated Fields for new generation 
aircraft. Recently, ASD developed a new document named S4000M to address scheduled 
maintenance analysis, the procedure of which is based on ATA MSG-3 but has considerable 
refinement in the methodology and the decision logic focusing on safety, reliability, mission 
accomplishment and ecological aspects at reasonable cost [11]. Particularly, S4000M details the 
analysis procedure for advanced composite structure. In addition to the increasing usage of 
composite materials, another emerging technology is Structural Health Monitoring (SHM). In 
MSG-3 2009 revision, SHM concepts started to be considered in aircraft structural analysis [9]. 
Nowadays, the MSG analysis is still developing to adapt to new technologies. 
1.3 Aircraft Composite Structures 
Composite materials are a kind of new generation materials which are gaining increasing usage in 
aviation industry. Since 1970s, composite materials were first used on non-load bearing structures, 
such as radomes, fairings and inner decoration. Later from 1980s, secondary structures began to 
apply composite materials, but still limited in structures like control surface panels. In the new 
millennium, the usage of composite materials has been shifted from secondary structures to 
primary structures. Typical examples are the world’s largest aircraft Airbus 380 and the most 
advanced aircraft to date Boeing 787. More precisely, the composite structures used in Airbus 
380 weighs more than 30 tones comprising 25 percent of the total airframe weight. The entire 
center wing box is made with composites [12]. Boeing 787 adopts composite materials for the 
whole fuselage. Besides, many components on wing and nacelle widely apply composites, 
making its usage reaching 50 percent [13]. Recently, the first prototype of A350 was 
manufactured and the composites usage rises up to 52 percent [14], which is a very significant 
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progress for Airbus and also for the entire aviation industry. The development of composite 
materials on two main aircraft manufacturers over the last two decades is depicted in Figure 1-6. 
 
Figure 1-6 Composite usage over last two decades 
Composite materials are formed by combing two or more constituent materials with significantly 
different physical or chemical properties to produce an integrated material with characteristics 
different from the individual ingredients [15]. The constituent materials have two main categories: 
matrix and reinforcement. The matrix material surrounds and supports the reinforcement to 
maintain their relative positions. Meanwhile, the reinforcements provide special mechanical and 
physical properties to enhance the overall property. The wide variety of matrix and strengthening 
materials allows structure designers to optimize the combination [16]. 
The matrices can be classified as metals or nonmetals. Aluminum, magnesium and titanium etc. 
are often used as a metallic matrix while resins, ceramics, carbon, etc. are common nonmetallic 
matrices. In terms of reinforced materials, carbon (including graphite), boron, aramid, glass, etc. 
form typical composites like Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic (CFRP), Boron Fiber Reinforced 
12 
 
Plastic (BFRP), Kevlar Fiber Reinforced Plastic (KFRP) and Glass Fiber Reinforced Plastic 
(GFRP) [17]. 
Referring to the development of the current aviation industry, the most widely used composites in 
airframes are CFRP and the second is KFRP. Because of the high price and difficult fabrication 
of BFRP, there is little BFRP usage. Compared to CFRP, GFRP has lower strength and stiffness 
properties and is generally not used for primary load bearing structures, but since it is inexpensive, 
GFRP has applications in many secondary structures in civil aircraft. 
There is another special class of hybrid composite material called sandwich. It is fabricated by 
attaching two thin metal skins to a lightweight but thick core. The hybrid composite structure has 
a high bending stiffness and also offers impact protection with overall low density. 
The reason why composite materials have become attractive for the aviation industry is its unique 
properties, such as high specific strength and stiffness, fatigue resistance, long duration and 
design adaptability to various loading conditions, etc. One of the advantages of composites is the 
reduction of structural weight while maintaining the same loading capacity. This can lead to 
significant savings in life-cycle cost due to reduced fuel consumption. Moreover, due to advanced 
manufacturing processes such as resin transfer molding (RTM), automated tape layup and 
automated fiber placement, the number of joints and assembly parts can be greatly reduced 
through robust fabrication methods. 
However, composite structures, compared to metallic structures, have more complex damage 
modes because of their anisotropic properties. One of the serious disadvantages is the 
susceptibility to accidental impact caused by runway debris, hail, tool dropping, etc. during 
operation. Object impact can cause internal damage such as delamination or debonding requiring 
intrusive inspections and repair activities [18]. Both Boeing and Airbus have placed significant 
emphasis on the usage of composites in design, manufacturing and logistic support. The C919 
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under development in COMAC also intends to apply advanced composites in a high proportion. 
Therefore, how to achieve cost savings over competing aircraft types becomes a big challenge. 
1.4 Structural Health Monitoring 
The development of modern sensor technology, computer power and data processing capability 
has boosted increasing interests in an emerging field, Structural Health Monitoring (SHM). This 
can be reflected by the growing number of research papers published related to SHM, particularly 
in recent five years. The SHM technology can be regarded as one of the many applications of the 
Internet of Things, which was first proposed by Kevin Ashton in 2009 [19]. He made the 
following assessment: 
“Today computers – and, therefore, the Internet – are almost wholly dependent on human beings 
for information. Nearly all the roughly 50 petabytes of data available on the Internet were first 
captured and created by human beings - by typing, pressing a record button, taking a digital 
picture or scanning a bar code. The problem is, people have limited time, attention and accuracy 
– all of which means they are not very good at capturing data about things in the real world. And 
that is a big deal. We are physical, and so is out environment ... You cannot eat bits, burn them to 
stay warm or put them in your as tank. Ideas and information are important, but things matter 
much more. Yet today’s information technology is so dependent on data originated by people that 
our computers know more about ideas than things. If we had computers that knew everything 
there was to know about things – using data they gathered without any help from us – we would 
be able to track and count everything, and greatly reduce waste, loss and cost. We would know 
when things needed replacing, repairing or recalling and whether they were fresh or past their 
best. The Internet of Things has the potential to change the world, just as the Internet did maybe 
even more.” 
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Likewise, the fundamental principles of a SHM system work in the following steps: Firstly, 
various sensors are installed onto or embedded in the object of concern. Secondly, mass data 
related to the object’s certain conditions are automatically collected either through wire or 
wireless transmission during normal operation. An information processing system then analyzes 
the collected data and provides intelligent suggestions for maintenance technicians to take certain 
measures. Thus, the two terminals from the ‘informative’ object to the human being are 
connected intuitively through the entire SHM system. 
From a biological point of view, the SHM system is analogous to the nerve system in a human 
body, as shown in Figure 1-7. Specifically, the aircraft structures like panels, stringers, rib, etc. 
can be regarded as skins and bones; various SHM sensors attached to structures are similar to the 
neurons beneath the skins and bones; the data processing terminal is the brain. When damage 
occurs somewhere, the neurons/sensors located in that area will transfer an abnormal signal to the 
brain/analyzing hub of the SHM system and the brain/SHM system will make decisions 
instructing what to do. 
 
Figure 1-7 Analogy of SHM system to human nervous system [20] 
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One of the key elements in the Internet of Things is the big data concept, the essence of which is 
sample equals to population. The SHM system installed in aircraft can facilitate frequent or even 
real-time monitoring of the structural health condition. Compared to discontinued information 
obtained at every predetermined maintenance cycle, the information obtained by the SHM system 
can reflect the real health state of the structure more timely and conveniently. Thus, the 
application of SHM technology has the potential to avoid any unnecessary maintenance and may 
have a profound influence on the existing maintenance policy. Moreover, it is expected that in the 
long term, SHM can exert a positive effect on structural design [21]. 
1.5 Thesis Scope and Objectives 
This thesis addresses problems in scheduled maintenance of aircraft composite structures. Two 
decision variables affect the life-cycle associated with scheduled maintenance: the inspection 
interval and the repair/replacement threshold. The inspection interval indicates the number of 
maintenance cycles during the lifetime operation. The repair/replacement threshold set an 
allowable limit for the damage tolerant structures and thereby determines the number of 
structures being repaired.  In other words, when to inspect and when to repair/replace are the 
main focus of this research, which affect both safety and life-cycle cost of in-service aircraft. 
As shown in Figure 1-8, practicality and emerging technology are also considered. Uncertainty 
exists throughout the aircraft life-cycle, especially in composite structural properties and 
unpredictable damage that may occur during operation. Therefore, in addition to the 
methodologies developed within the MSG-3 concept, this thesis considers non-deterministic 
methodologies beyond MSG-3 to optimize maintenance schedules. Furthermore, since SHM has 
the potential to substitute complicated structural inspection and damage identification tasks by 
autonomous monitoring systems integrated in aircraft, the effects of SHM technology on current 
scheduled maintenance process are investigated. 
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Figure 1-8 Research scope 
The objective of this thesis is to determine flexible and cost-efficient maintenance tasks including 
inspection intervals and repair policies for aircraft composite structures while maintaining an 
acceptable safety level. This main objective can be divided into five sub-objectives with a 
corresponding research question: 
Q1. Since the rating system in MSG-3 is too rigid, how can the current rating system be updated 
to determine more flexible inspection intervals? 
The objective of this research is to develop a new rating system as an intelligent decision-making 
support tool for aircraft engineers to determine appropriate inspection intervals. Considering a 
lack of experience in making inspection intervals for new aircraft, this new method will address 
the ability of incorporating data and experience from different sources and enable flexible 
adjustment of inspection intervals.  
Q2. How can complex damage modes and causes be characterized for aircraft composite 
structures?  
The objective of this research is to determine the importance of the macroscopic damage modes 
and possible damage causes to deepen the understanding and facilitate the subsequent research 
Maintenance 
tasks 
optimization 
When to inspect When to repair/replace 
SHM 
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focusing on the main damage of composites. The approach is intended to synthesize all composite 
damage modes and possible causes in a systematic way with practical data obtained from airline 
surveys. The relative importance of damages will be determined to facilitate subsequent study. 
Q3. Are there other methodologies, beyond the experience-based MSG-3, to optimize the 
inspection interval for composite structures that is more reliable? 
The objective of this research is to seek data-driven approaches to determine inspection intervals 
based on practical maintenance data combined with specific physical models addressing the main 
damage mode in composites.  Since uncertainty exists in every phase of the composite structural 
lifecycle, non-deterministic methodologies are considered which can be able to deal with the 
statistical characteristics in design, manufacturing and operation with an assessment of the 
structural safety level. The inspection intervals will be optimized by balancing both safety and 
economy.  
Q4. How can an appropriate repair/replacement threshold be determined if damage is detected for 
composite structures? 
A concept of repair tolerance was proposed but stays at a qualitative stage. The objective of this 
research is to develop a quantitative method to address the repair tolerance of aircraft composite 
structures. The lower limit as whether to repair or not should be optimized by an index of safety 
while the upper limit as whether to repair or replace should be evaluated by maintenance cost. 
The method is intended to support engineers to develop efficient repair policies. 
Q5. Considering the potential benefits but immaturity of current SHM technologies, what is the 
influence of SHM on scheduled maintenance of aircraft composite structures? 
The objective this research is to propose maintenance scenarios that can synthesize SHM tasks 
with the existing MSG-3 procedures based on different mature levels. The methodologies 
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developed in Q3 and Q4 are inherited and updated to be able to analyze both safety and economic 
influences of SHM on scheduled maintenance. This method is intended to provide a convenient 
means for aircraft engineers to evaluate the cost savings of applying SHM onto composite 
structures in different situations and to promote the combination of SHM with scheduled 
maintenance. 
The investigations into these specific questions are discussed in five main chapters from Chapter 
3 to Chapter 7. The structure of the thesis is presented in the next section. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The structure of the thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 1 presents a comprehensive introduction to the research topic. It starts from the 
promising development of Chinese commercial aviation industry. Then, the basic knowledge of 
Maintenance Engineering Analysis (MEA), the evolution of scheduled maintenance concept, the 
increasing proliferation of composite structures as well as the emerging technology of structural 
health monitoring (SHM) are introduced in sequence, which form the basis of the research scope. 
Research objectives are proposed to address problems found in these areas followed by the thesis 
structure configuration. 
Chapter 2 conducts a detailed literature review from two aspects, i.e. necessary fundamental 
knowledge of relevant topics and research progresses on modeling and methodologies. The 
fundamental knowledge includes maintenance policies classification, aircraft structural analysis 
procedure in MSG-3, composite structural damage and mathematical theories in probability and 
statistics. Deterministic and non-deterministic methodologies in dealing with maintenance 
schedule optimization are both discussed with more emphasis on the latter considering the 
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existence of uncertainty. Extensive literature review then is conducted on various SHM 
technologies together with their potential to affect scheduled maintenance. 
Chapter 3 creates an intelligent rating system based on MSG-3 to determine structural inspection 
intervals. Rating factors of accidental damage (AD) are analyzed according to the requirement of 
MSG-3 and the practical demand of the C919 under development. Back Propagation Network 
(BPN) is selected for its powerful learning ability and data fusion capability to obtain the 
relationship between the rating level and the inspection interval. The parameters in the BPN 
system are optimized for better training results.  
Chapter 4 investigates the complex damage modes and causes of aircraft composite structures 
from a macroscopic point of view. It establishes a novel fault tree to synthesize various damage 
modes of composite structures in operational aircraft and possible damage causes in a hierarchical 
tree structure. Qualitative analysis is then performed including structure importance analysis, 
probability importance analysis and relative probability importance analysis. Quantitative 
analysis is further conducted via a case study as a validation. 
Different from the previous BPN rating system developed based on MSG-3, Chapter 5 proposes a 
probabilistic approach to optimize the inspection interval based on statistical damage data and 
structural life-cycle simulation. This study focuses on the accidental damage dent in damage-
tolerant composite structures. Statistical analysis is performed to obtain random variable 
distributions of damage characteristics and inspection capabilities followed by Monte Carlo 
simulation of the life-cycle strength variation. The probability of failure and maintenance cost are 
quantified to optimize the inspection interval.  
In addition to the inspection interval, the other main problem is the determination of the repair 
and replacement thresholds. The concept of repair tolerance is presented in Chapter 6 by 
identifying two thresholds for composite structures. The lower threshold denotes whether to 
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repair or not while the upper threshold refers to whether to repair or replace. Probabilistic 
approaches are performed to accommodate impact damage resulting in dent and delamination. 
The repair/replacement thresholds are optimized by considering both safety and economic issues.  
Chapter 7 studies the effect of SHM on scheduled maintenance by designing a synthesized logic 
procedure based on MSG-3 structural analysis. Four scenarios of maintenance policy are 
developed: A. scheduled maintenance, B. scheduled SHM, C. scheduled CBM and D. CBM, in 
which SHM tasks are incorporated with increasing maturity level. Based on previous analysis, the 
statistical models and probabilistic approaches are updated to quantitatively examine the labor 
work saving, the safety level as well as the maintenance cost savings of the combined 
maintenance scenarios.  
Chapter 8 makes overall conclusions including research problems, research methodologies 
developed addressing specific research questions, the key research findings as well as their 
potential applications and contributions to the aviation industry. Also, some research limitations 
are discussed followed by recommendations for future work to improve aircraft structural 
maintenance. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Fundamental Knowledge 
2.1.1 The Classification of Maintenance Actions and Policies 
Maintenance is defined as a series of activities performed in a regulated manner in order to 
maintain the serviceable functioning of the product/system [22]. Maintenance actions denote the 
basic maintenance interventions, elementary tasks carried out by maintenance technicians [23], 
which can be classified into three categories. 
Corrective maintenance is performed after damage or failure of the product/system in order to 
recover its function, which can also be called unscheduled maintenance. A typical loop of 
corrective maintenance activities is shown in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1 Typical corrective maintenance activities 
Preventative maintenance is performed before damage or failure of the product in order to reduce 
the probability of failure or to maximize the operating efficiency. General preventative 
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maintenance tasks include replace, renew and overhaul. These tasks are conducted in a fixed time 
which can be operational time (e.g. hours/days/months/years), operational distance (e.g. 
miles/kilometers) or operational frequency (e.g. flight cycles). A typical loop of preventative 
maintenance activities is shown in Figure 2-2.  
 
Figure 2-2 Typical preventative maintenance activities 
Condition monitoring maintenance is carried out at the time of condition change or performance 
degradation exceeding some threshold. Maintenance tasks are initiated according to the practical 
condition of the product/system and do not disturb the normal operation. Only when the initial 
fault is detected, preventative measures are taken. Through state parameters monitoring, the best 
preventative maintenance time can be identified. A typical condition monitoring maintenance 
procedure is shown in Figure 2-3. 
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Figure 2-3 Typical condition monitoring maintenance activities 
Initially only corrective maintenance and preventative maintenance schemes existed, but 
gradually, these maintenance activities exposed shortcomings on safety, operation or economy. 
For corrective maintenance, the component will not be repaired or replaced until failed which 
leads to the maximum life usage. However, the failure may cause severe damage to adjacent 
components in the system and therefore undermine operational safety. Also, regular operation 
may often be interrupted inappropriately leaving operators inconvenience. Alternatively, 
scheduled preventative maintenance may be convenient for maintenance personnel but it 
increases the frequency of the inspections, which increases cost. Moreover, the component may 
be replaced before reaching its end of life. Consequently, driven by safety regulations and 
economic reasons, increasing emphasis has been placed on the third maintenance type: condition 
monitoring maintenance. 
Maintenance policies stand for a set of rules describing the trigger mechanism for the different 
maintenance actions [23], which are classified into four categories: 
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Fault-Based Maintenance (FBM), repair activities will not be carried out until a fault occurs, 
which is a typical maintenance policy associated with corrective maintenance. 
The advantage is that the FBM policy can make the best use of the product’s useful life and can 
achieve the maximum value of the product. 
The disadvantages are: 1) Fault often occurs at an inconvenient time disturbing the normal 
operation; 2) Maintenance activities cannot be planned since it is based on the occurrence of a 
fault; 3) More maintenance resources are consumed; 4) The fault of a component is likely to 
induce secondary damage to other components in the product. 
The maintenance cost analysis illustrates that repair activities after fault/failure usually cost three 
or four times than that of scheduled maintenance activities. 
Therefore, FBM is suitable for two situations: 1) The malfunction does not jeopardize the safety 
of the operator and environment or only has a small impact; 2) There is redundancy or fault 
tolerance. 
Time-Based Maintenance (TBM) belongs to preventative maintenance addressing faults that 
may cause economic loss or influence safe operation. Maintenance activities should be taken 
before the occurrence of the fault. 
Since the primary objective is to reduce the probability of failure and prevent system faults, 
maintenance activities should be carried out based on a fixed time interval, which aims to restore 
the system to its full functioning condition regardless of the current system state. The time 
interval is usually a function of the distribution of time before failure and sometimes can be 
adjusted by users (just like the packaging of maintenance work card by airlines). Herein, time has 
a broad meaning which can indicate hour, year, mile, frequency, etc. as long as the maintenance 
tasks can be scheduled and distributed at each predetermined interval.  
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The advantages of TBM are: 1) Maintenance activities can be planned ahead of time and 
implemented regularly which facilitates logistic support; 2) The cost of production loss and 
indirect damage can be reduced; 3) The system down time (unavailable time) can be reduced; 4) 
Reliability and safety can be enhanced. 
The disadvantages are: 1) TBM does not account for the system state, which may lead to 
unnecessary maintenance; 2) If the maintenance time is longer than the normal off time of the 
system, unavailability will be induced; 3) Not all potential faults can be eliminated and faults not 
dependent on time may not be reduced (like accidental damage);  4) The possibility of faults 
induced by human error increases with more frequent inspections; 5) Components are replaced 
ahead of time to reduce the probability of failure but the service life of the components is not yet 
reached. 
Inspection-Based Maintenance (IBM) can be seen as a mixture of preventative maintenance 
and condition monitoring maintenance. Inspection activities are conducted at fixed time interval 
to examine the condition of the system. If some condition exceeds a predetermined critical 
threshold, preventative activities are initiated; if a fault exists, corrective activities are initiated to 
restore the system. Otherwise, the system stays as it is until the next inspection. Herein, two 
parameters affect IBM most. One is the inspection interval, which is a typical time characteristic 
in preventative maintenance and the other is the critical threshold, which reflects a particular 
health condition or damage degree over which the system needs to be maintained. 
The implementation of IBM can achieve the following benefits: 1) Reduce unscheduled 
downtime, the best maintenance interval can be determined according to the condition of the 
system. Therefore, effective maintenance plans can be worked out to make good use of resources; 
2) Improve reliability and safety of the system, operators and maintenance engineers will be 
altered by potential damage or failure through monitoring the system’s condition at each 
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maintenance interval; 3) The operating life of components in the system can be extended 
compared to TBM so that the system utilization can be increased; 4) Unnecessary maintenance 
activities like hard time replacement can be reduced; 5) Cost saving. 
Obviously, IBM overcomes the defects of FBM and TBM and it is the current scheduled 
maintenance policy for aircraft structures. 
In order to further improve operational safety, availability and economy of the system, great 
demands have been called for developing a more advanced maintenance policy, which is a 
complete Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM). If condition parameters of the system can be 
monitored continuously, and so does the data processing procedure, the operators will be kept 
updated with the health state of the system in real time. If any abnormal information occurs, the 
intelligent analyzing system will inform the operators which component is malfunctioned and 
therefore maintenance measures can be taken accordingly. In that circumstance, the ‘time’ factor 
can be eliminated by the fulfillment of real-time monitoring and processing.  
In a broad perspective, any maintenance work relevant to the system’s condition can be regarded 
as CBM with different technology maturities. The following figure shows the evolution of the 
maintenance actions and maintenance policies. 
 
Figure 2-4 Evolution of maintenance actions and policies 
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Considering the time property, IBM belongs to preventative maintenance. But in terms of the 
condition property, IBM is one of the implementations of condition monitoring maintenance at 
early phase. Thus, IBM is the representation of the transition period from preventative 
maintenance to condition monitoring maintenance, as shown in the dashed block of Figure 2-4. 
2.1.2 MSG-3 Structural Analysis 
MSG-3 presents a means for developing scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals which are 
intended to be accepted by the regulatory authorities, the operators, and the manufacturers [9]. It 
is inherited and evolved from Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) concept and can be 
deemed as a civil aircraft version. The result of MSG-3 analysis constitutes the original 
maintenance programs for the new type of aircraft. An approved document containing the 
selected tasks through MSG-3 process by the aircraft manufacturer is called Maintenance Review 
Board Report (MRBR). This report specifies the initial scheduled maintenance programs and 
another document made by the manufacturer called Maintenance Planning Document (MPD) is 
developed based on MRBR. MPD is then used by the operators to establish their own regulatory 
approved maintenance programs to accommodate their practical situations. 
The essence of MSG-3 is the logic decision approach, which addresses the consequential effects 
of the potential failure taking account of safety, operation and economy. It starts with the 
selection of candidate items. And then the analysis procedure continues through answering yes or 
no questions to dictate analysis flow direction. Lastly, the candidate items are distributed into 
different categories that require specific maintenance tasks and intervals. Thus, all scheduled 
maintenance tasks are developed via the guided logic procedure to become a task-oriented 
program. MSG-3 analysis consists of four sections: aircraft system/power plant analysis, 
structural analysis, zonal analysis and lightning/high intensity radiated field (L/HIRF) analysis. 
The typical logic diagram for aircraft structural analysis is shown in Figure 2-5. 
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Figure 2-5 Structural logic diagram [9] 
In the logic diagram, SSI is defined as any detail, element or assembly, which contributes 
significantly to carrying flight, ground, pressure or control loads, and whose failure could affect 
the structural integrity necessary for the safety of the aircraft. The developed structural 
maintenance should be effective in detecting and preventing structural degradation caused by 
fatigue, environmental deterioration, or accidental damage throughout the aircraft service life. 
Therefore, the assessment of SSI for the selection of maintenance tasks should consider three 
damage sources: 
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Accidental Damage (AD), which is characterized by the occurrence of a random discrete event 
which may reduce the inherent level of residual strength. Sources of such damage include ground 
and cargo handling equipment, foreign objects, erosion from rain, hail, lightning, runway debris, 
spillage, freezing, thawing, etc., and those resulting from human error during aircraft 
manufacture, operation or maintenance that are not included in other damage sources. 
Environmental Deterioration (ED), which is characterized by structural deterioration as a 
result of a chemical interaction with the climate or environment. Assessments are required to 
cover corrosion, including stress corrosion, and deterioration of non-metallic materials. 
Fatigue Damage (FD), which is characterized by the initiation of a crack or cracks due to cyclic 
loading and subsequent propagation. It is a cumulative process with respect to aircraft usage 
(flight cycles or flight hours). 
In addition, a Corrosion Prevention and Control Program (CPCP) is established to maintain the 
aircraft’s resistance to corrosion as a result of systematic deterioration through chemical and/or 
environmental interaction. 
The scheduled structural maintenance tasks and intervals are developed on the basis of 
requirements to assure timely detection of AD, ED and FD. The guidelines for developing 
suitable rating systems are provided accounting for the susceptibility of the SSI to the likely 
source of damage and the likely type of degradation of the SSI due to the damage source. Rating 
systems for AD and ED should be compatible to allow comparative assessments for each group 
of SSIs. Rating systems for FD should only be based on the Damage Tolerant Analysis. Because 
of the different properties between metallic and non-metallic SSIs, their analysis procedures and 
rating systems are considered separately. For detailed guidelines refer to [9]. 
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2.1.3 Basic Probability Measures 
2. 1. 3.1 Probability Axioms 
Let S be the sample space, and E be a subset of S ( E S⊆ ). A probability set function ( )P ⋅ has the 
following properties: 
1. ( ) 1P S = ; 
2. 0 ( ) 1P E≤ ≤ ; 
3. 1 2 1 2( ...) ( ) ( ) ...P E E P E P E∪ ∪ = + + , where the subsets iE  are mutually exclusive; 
4. The conditional probability of 2E  given 1E :  
 2 12 1
1
( )( / )
( )
P E EP E E
P E
∩
=  (2.1) 
where 1E  and 2E  are two subsets of the sample space S; 
5. The law of total probability:  
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 (2.3) 
where E is a subset of union of the iE . 
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The cumulative distribution function (CDF) F  describes the probability that a random variable 
X  has values less than or equal to a certain value x  , which is expressed as: ( ) ( )F x P X x= ≤ . 
The probability density function (PDF) f describes the probability that X  takes on the value x , 
( ) ( )f x P X x= = . 
The PDF has the following properties for discrete variables,  
 ( ) 1
all x
f x =∑  (2.4)    
and for continuous random variables, 
 ( ) 1f x dx
∞
−∞
=∫  (2.5) 
where the PDF is the derivative of the CDF: 
( )( ) F xf x
x
∂
=
∂
. 
The expected value (mean value) of a random variable X  in the discrete case is expressed as: 
 ( ) ( )
all x
E X xf x=∑  (2.6) 
and in the continuous case is given by: 
 ( ) ( )E X xf x dx
∞
−∞
= ∫  (2.7) 
The variance of a random variable X , denoted by 2σ , measures the scatter of values in X  
around the mean value, which is expressed as: 
 2 2( )E Xσ µ= −  (2.8) 
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In discrete case it is calculated as  
 2 2( ) ( )
all x
x f xσ µ= −∑  (2.9) 
and in continuous case, 
 2 2( ) ( )x f x dxσ µ
∞
−∞
= −∫  (2.10) 
The square root of the variance σ is the standard deviation of X . 
The joint CDF of n random variables 1 2, , ... , nX X X (regardless of mutual independency) is 
expressed as 
 
1 1
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( , , ... ) ( , , .. , ) ..
n nx x x
n n nP X x X x X f t t t dt dt dt
−
−∞ −∞ −∞
≤ ≤ = ⋅ ⋅∫ ∫ ∫  (2.11) 
If the n random variables are mutually independent, the joint PDF can be given by 
 1 2
1
( , ,..., ) ( )
n
n i
i
f x x x f x
=
=∏  (2.12) 
The conditional distribution of a random variable Y based on another variable X with a value x  is 
express as:  
 
( , )( / )
'( )
f x yf y X x
f x
= =  (2.13) 
where '( ) ( , )f x f x y dy
∞
−∞
= ∫  
In the discrete case with a sample size n, the sample mean and sample variance are given by 
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1
1 n
i
i
X X
n =
= ∑  (2.14) 
and 
 2 2
1
1 ( )
1
n
i
i
S X X
n =
= −
− ∑  (2.15) 
2. 1. 3. 2 Reliability Measures 
Reliability may be defined in various ways from different aspects, one of the general definitions 
describes reliability as the probability that a system or a product will perform in a satisfactory 
manner under specified conditions over a specified period of time [4]. Four important elements 
are stressed in the definition, probability, satisfactory performance, specified conditions and time 
limit. Mathematically, reliability ( )R t can be expressed as the probability that the system or 
component will be functioning successfully during the time period from 0 to t: 
 ( ) ( ), 0R t P T t t= > ≥  (2.16) 
where T is a random variable representing the time-to-failure or failure time. 
On the contrary, the CDF ( )F t is opposite to ( )R t , which is defined as the probability that the 
system will fail by time t: 
 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ), 0F t R t P T t t= − = ≤ ≥  (2.17) 
( )F t  is the failure distribution function. If the random variable T has a density function ( )f t , 
then 
 ( ) ( )
t
R t f t dt
∞
= ∫  (2.18) 
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Equivalently,  
 [ ]( ) ( )df t R t
dt
= −  (2.19) 
The density function can be interpreted as the probability that the time to failure T occurs between 
the time t  and the next small interval t t+ ∆ , which is expressed as:  
0
lim ( )
t
P t T t t
∆ →
< < + ∆ . 
The conditional probability of failure in the time interval from t  to ( t t+ ∆ ) given that a failure 
has not occurred prior to t  is mathematically described as 
 
( ) ( )( / )
( )
R t R t tP t T t t T t
R t
− + ∆
≤ ≤ + ∆ ≥ =  (2.20) 
The failure rate is defined as the conditional probability of failure per unit of time:  
( ) ( )
( )
R t R t t
R t t
− + ∆
∆
. 
The failure rate function ( )tλ , also known as hazard function ( )h t  is defined as the limit of the 
failure rate as the time interval approaches zero, in other words, is the instantaneous failure rate: 
 
0
( ) ( ) 1 ( )( ) lim [ ( )]
( ) ( ) ( )t
R t R t t d f tt R t
tR t R t dt R t
λ
∆ →
− + ∆
= = − =
∆
 (2.21) 
The failure rate function indicates the change in the failure rate over the life of a population of 
components by plotting their hazard functions on a single axis [24]. 
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2.1.4 Common Probability Distribution Functions 
2.1.4.1 Discrete random variable distributions 
1) Binomial distribution 
Let a random variable X represent the number of successes (or failures) in n independent trials, 
which are referred to as Bernoulli trials. The probability of success (or failure) is p in each trial. 
The PDF of the distribution is expressed as 
 
( ) (1 ) , 0,1, 2,... ,
! ,
!( )!
x n xnP X x p p x n
x
n n
x x n x
− = = − = 
 
 
=  − 
 (2.22) 
where n is the number of trials, x is the number of successes. 
The mean and variance of the binomial distribution are 
 ( ) , ( ) (1 )E X np V X np p= = −  (2.23) 
The binomial distribution is widely used in reliability engineering and quality inspection, in 
which a trial is either a success or a failure. 
2) Poisson distribution 
Similar to binomial distribution, a random variable X represents the number of event occurrences 
(an event occurrence means a success), but Poisson distribution is used to tackle situations with 
an unknown sample size. The PDF of the distribution is given by 
 ( ) , 0,1, 2,...
!
xeP X x x
x
λλ −
= = =  (2.24) 
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where λ  is the constant failure rate, x is the number of event occurrences.  
The Poisson distribution is often used to model a Poisson process that the event occurrences are 
discrete and independent of each other while the interval is continuous. 
3) Geometric distribution 
Let N be a random variable denoting the number of trials required to obtain the first success. The 
probability of success for each trial is p. The distribution has a PDF as 
 1( ) (1 ) , 1, 2,...nP N n p p n−= = − =  (2.25) 
where n is the number of trials until the first success. 
The mean and variance of the geometric distribution are 
 2
1 1( ) , ( ) pE X V X
p p
−
= =  (2.26) 
2.1.4.2 Continuous distributions 
1) Exponential distribution 
The exponential distribution is widely used in reliability engineering because it is the only 
distribution that has a constant failure rate. It has been used to model the lifetimes of many 
components and systems. It is also applicable under a particular assumption that the used system 
or component is always as good as new until failure which is known as the memoryless property.  
The geometric distribution in the discrete case has the same property. 
The PDF of the exponential distribution with a failure rate λ  is given by 
 ( ) , 0tf t e tλλ −= ≥  (2.27) 
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The CDF of the exponential distribution can be derived as 
 
0 0
( ) ( ) 1 , 0
t t
t tF t f t dt e dt e tλ λλ − −= = = − ≥∫ ∫  (2.28) 
Then, the reliability function is 
 ( ) 1 ( ) , 0tR t F t e tλ−= − = ≥  (2.29) 
The constant failure rate (the hazard rate) is calculated as 
 
( )( )
( )
t
t
f t eh t
R t e
λ
λ
λ λ
−
−= = =  (2.30) 
The exponential distribution is closely related to the Poisson distribution. The time between 
failures follows an exponential distribution when the number of failures per unit time is a Poisson 
distribution. 
2) Uniform distribution 
If a random variable X distributes uniformly over the interval (a, b), the PDF of the distribution is 
expressed as 
 
1
( )
0
a x b
f x b a
otherwise
 ≤ ≤= −

 (2.31) 
The mean value and variance are 
 
2( )( ) , ( )
2 12
a b b aE X V X+ −= =  (2.32) 
3) Normal distribution 
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The normal distribution plays the most important role in the entire classical statistics field which 
is also known as Gaussian distribution. It is widely applied to describe fatigue and aging 
problems and to measure external stress/strength of products, etc. in reliability engineering. The 
PDF of the distribution is 
 
21 ( )
21( ) ,
2
t
f t e t
µ
σ
σ π
−
−
= −∞ < < ∞  (2.33) 
where µ  is the mean value and σ  is the standard deviation. Then the CDF is  
 
21 ( )
21( )
2
t t
F t e dt
µ
σ
σ π
−
−
−∞
= ∫  (2.34) 
The reliability function is  
 
21 ( )
21( )
2
t
t
R t e dt
µ
σ
σ π
∞ −
−
= ∫  (2.35) 
There is no close-form solution to the above integrals. But tables for the standard normal density 
function are available in many statistical books and also many software programs have been 
developed to treat normal data. 
The expected value and variance for a normal random variable T are  
 2( ) , ( )E T V Tµ σ= =  (2.36) 
4) Lognormal distribution 
Let T be a continuous positive random variable and its natural logarithm is normally distributed. 
Then T follows a lognormal distribution. This distribution is very flexible and can fit many types 
of failure data in reliability engineering, such as the fatigue life of metals, the compressive 
strength of cubes, the failure rate information, repair times, etc. The PDF of the lognormal 
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distribution is 
 
21 ln( )
21( ) , 0
2
t
f t e t
t
µ
σ
σ π
−
−
= ≥  (2.37) 
where µ  and σ  are parameters such that µ−∞ < < ∞  and 0σ > . 
Similar to the normal distribution, solutions can be obtained by specific software analysis 
programs. 
Define a random variable lnX T= , the mean value and variance is  
 2( ) (ln ) , ( ) (ln )E X E T V T V Tµ σ= = = =  (2.38) 
5) Weibull distribution 
The Weibull distribution was proposed by Waloddi Weibull in 1951 [25]. It has wide engineering 
application and is extremely useful in modeling component lifetimes with fluctuating failure rate 
functions such as bearings, cables, compressors, wheels, etc. [26]. The three parameter PDF is 
expressed as 
 
1 ( )( )( ) , 0
ttf t e t
βγβ
θ
β
β γ γ
θ
−− −−
= ≥ ≥  (2.39) 
where θ  and β  are scale and shape parameters, respectively, and γ  is the location parameter. 
By changing the parameter β , this PDF can follow various distributions such as the exponential 
distribution and the normal distribution and the parameter values are listed in Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-1 Distribution with different values of β  
β  Remark 
1 Identical to exponential 
2 Identical to Rayleigh 
2.5 Approximates lognormal 
3.6 Approximates normal 
 
The flexible matching with other distributions makes Weibull distribution a robust tool to deal 
with maintenance problems on troubleshooting in corrective maintenance and inspection 
activities in preventative maintenance [27], etc. 
The Weibull reliability function is 
 
( )
( ) , 0, 0, 0
t
R t e t
βγ
θ γ β θ
−
−
= > > > >  (2.40) 
6) Gamma distribution 
Like the Weibull distribution, a wide range of other distributions can be derived from the gamma 
distribution by changing the shape parameter. The PDF of the gamma distribution is given by 
 
1
( ) , 0, , 0
( )
ttf t e t
α
β
α α ββ α
− −
= ≥ >
Γ
 (2.41) 
where α  is the shape parameter and β  is the scale parameter. ( )αΓ is the gamma function 
defined as 
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 1
0
( ) , 0tt e dtαα α
∞
− −Γ = >∫  (2.42) 
The gamma distribution can be used to model system lifetime with a good fit to some sets of 
failure data, i.e. time between maintenance that a system requires maintenance after a number of 
operations. It is related to the exponential distribution under the condition that if an event occurs 
after n events with exponential distributions occurring sequentially, the resulted random variable 
follows a gamma distribution. 
2.2 Methodologies within MSG-3 Analysis 
MSG-3 provides a logic decision analysis procedure for developing scheduled maintenance tasks 
and intervals for civil aircraft. For a specific type of aircraft, a Maintenance Program 
Development Policy and Procedure Handbook (PPH) needs to be developed, which serves as a 
user guide for developing and accepting the initial minimum scheduled maintenance requirements 
for that aircraft type. The structural part of four PPHs was investigated for the Airbus 320, 380, 
Boeing 737NG, 787 [28-31]. The Airbus 380 and the Boeing 787 are the state-of-art aircraft, 
while the Airbus 320 and Boeing 737NG are considered as similar to the C919.  
According to the MSG-3 logic, aircraft structures are divided into Structural Significant Items 
(SSI) and other structures. All SSIs are then divided as damage tolerant items and safe life items. 
Further, each damage tolerant item will go through analysis considering three damage sources 
AD, ED and FD. The fatigue issue mainly relies on obtaining the fatigue curve by conducting 
sufficient experiments, but is outside the scope of this thesis. The detailed analysis procedures on 
AD and ED are examined in the next section. 
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2.2.1 Comparisons between Airbus and Boeing on AD/ED Analysis 
2.2.1.1 AD analysis 
The difference between Airbus’ and Boeing’s procedure is whether or not AD is performed 
independently. Airbus treats AD as one of the influencing factors when dealing with ED and FD. 
For example, in ED analysis, AD is considered together with Environmental Rating and 
Protection Rating; in FD analysis, AD is considered for initial fatigue cracks. On the contrary, 
Boeing takes care of AD alone, rating AD and ED separately. 
Airbus AD analysis procedure for metallic SSI: 
1) Assessing the susceptibility of the SSI to the various forms of accidental damage; 2) Assessing 
whether or not the accidental damage is covered by another SSI; 3) Estimating the expected 
damage type, location and size; 4) Taking account in the environmental impact if deterioration 
occurs; the fatigue impact if initial crack occurs. 
Airbus AD analysis procedure for non-metallic SSI: 
1) Selecting accidental damage sources; 2) Determining severity of damage for each selected 
damage source; 3) Selecting appropriate inspection level for most severe damage sources; 4) 
Determining the static strength reduction and associated inspection interval for the selected 
damage sources. 
Reassessment of the severity is required if damage is likely to occur more than once during the 
basic inspection interval. 
Four factors are considered in Boeing AD analysis for metallic SSI: 1) SSI visibility during 
scheduled maintenance; 2) Sensitivity to damage growth; 3) Estimated residual strength after AD; 
4) Likelihood of AD. 
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The AD rating is equal to the sum of the timely detection value, the susceptibility and the residual 
strength value. The timely detection value is obtained from a matrix comparing the visibility for 
the SSI during scheduled maintenance and the SSI’s sensitivity to damage growth. The 
susceptibility and residual strength value is obtained from a matrix comparing the SSI’s estimated 
residual strength after damage and the SSI’s likelihood of AD. The levels identified above are 
based on manufacturer and operator’s experience, which is a key ingredient in the evaluation. 
For non-metallic SSI, the likelihood of damage sources is the only consideration, including: 
ground and cargo handling equipment, foreign objects, erosion, hail, lightning, runway debris, 
spillage, water entrapment, and human error during aircraft operation or maintenance. The lowest 
rating value is selected as the final AD level. 
2.2.1.2. ED analysis for metallic SSI 
Airbus and Boeing share the same rating process in general: factors rating; integrated factors 
rating; determination of inspection intervals; determination of final intervals and tasks given 
CPCP.  Differences exist in specific steps as shown in Table 2-2: 
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Table 2-2 Comparison between Airbus and Boeing on ED analysis for Metallic SSI 
Analysis Steps Airbus Boeing 
1 
Selection of 
material and 
corrosion type 
Select from Intergranular 
corrosion, Pitting corrosion, 
Uniform corrosion, Galvanic 
corrosion, Crevice corrosion, 
Microbiological corrosion, 
Filiform corrosion, Fretting 
corrosion 
-- 
2 Factors rating 
Potential type of corrosion, Stress 
corrosion, Environmental rating, 
Protection rating 
SSI visibility, Sensitivity to 
damage size, Environmental 
protection, Exposure to adverse 
environment 
3 Rating methods 
Rate successively and compare 
with each other based on 
engineering experience 
Establish two integrated matrixes 
4 Integrated rating Rating levels are denoted as 1, 2, 3 
Sum the rating value and 0~8 
levels are given 
5 
ED inspection 
levels and 
intervals 
Select corresponding inspection 
levels according to 9 corrosion 
types. Inspection thresholds and 
intervals are given by judging 
whether corrosion is systematic 
Unit: calendar year. 
Internal and external inspection 
intervals are given according to 
EDR 
Unit: days/months/flight cycles 
6 CPCP tasks 
Compare with the result of ED, 
inspection levels, thresholds and 
repeat intervals are given finally 
Combine the CPCP requirements, 
7 CPCP tasks and inspection levels 
are given in parallel 
 
2.2.1.3 ED analysis for non-metallic SSI: 
The Environmental Deterioration is no longer referred to as corrosion. It is more generic that 
deterioration occurs after a period of time due to specific environmental factors. Four kinds of 
composites are mainly used in aircraft structures, including honeycomb sandwich, Aramid Fiber 
Reinforced Plastic (AFRP, also known as Kevlar), Glass Fiber Reinforced Plastic (GFRP) and 
Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic (CFRP). Their deterioration characteristics are as follows: 
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Honeycomb sandwich configurations are susceptible to moisture ingress than other laminates. 
AFRP is sensitive to UltraViolet (UV) light, moisture and other fluids, when directly exposed. 
GFRP may undergo long term degradation when directly exposed to UV light, but otherwise has 
low sensitivity to the environment. CFRP has low sensitivity to the environment. 
Though Airbus considers three deterioration factors involving loading parameter, environmental 
parameter and in-service aging, no significant evidence of deterioration has been reported to date 
according to years’ operation. Therefore, Airbus gives simple ED analysis for non-metallic SSI. 
Likewise, Boeing also shows an obscure attitude to ED analysis for non-metallic SSI, which 
mainly considers aging problems for some type of composites under certain circumstances. 
2.2.2 Research Methodologies Review 
In aircraft structural analysis section, the essence of the analysis procedure is designed to relate 
the scheduled maintenance tasks to the consequences of structural damage remaining undetected. 
As part of the scheduled structural maintenance development, it is necessary to develop a proper 
rating system to perform risk analysis by assessing each SSI’s resistance to the three damage 
sources. The detailed review for AD/ED analysis in PPH indicates a large amount of influencing 
factors to be considered.  The methodologies in both official documents and research publications 
for developing the rating system are summarized hereafter. 
The matrix chart is one of the implementations of risk analysis, which is the most widely used 
method in current aviation industry, i.e. Boeing and Airbus have applied this method in their 
PPHs. The risk matrix is developed through the establishment of consequence severity and 
likelihood (frequency), etc. which can be used in the MRB process to support the MSG-3 analysis 
[32], Matrix Diagram describes factors’ correlations by the form of a mathematical matrix, which 
can deal with multi-variant problems.  
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For developing new aircraft, the matrix chart should be updated to satisfy specific requirements, 
in which both the factors and the factors’ correlations need to be re-considered. Limited research 
papers have been found addressing the weight of the factors due to difficulties in risk analysis 
during the initial maintenance program development [33]. Back in 2003, Wang [34] introduced 
the form of eigenvector to describe the rating factors of Boeing’s rating system. The weight of 
each factor was dealt with simply by engineering experience. This article was dedicated to 
designing an expert system for AD/ED rating as computer aided analysis. Later years, taking 
advantage of the ARJ21 MRBR project in China, a research group led by Zuo and also several 
other researchers were dedicated in analyzing Boeing and Airbus’s PPHs and developing new 
rating methods. Algorithms of rating integration, including mean value rating, lowest rating, 
weighted rating, multi-level rating, matrix rating, and transition level rating were summarized by 
Zuo [35]. The researchers all agreed that, the factor’s weight was the key point in the rating 
system as well as in the definition of similarity by Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) method [36-45]. 
Reasonable weights can reflect the real situations and are of practical value.  
As to the rating system of MSG-3, Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is mostly used because it 
can help the decision makers to organize the critical aspects of a problem into a hierarchical 
structure similar to a family tree [46]. AHP has already been used in various maintenance 
selection problems [47-49]. The rough set theory was introduced to avoid the influence of the 
subjective judgment, which applied the information entropy of the decision table attributes to 
reflect the objective situation [37]. Then a fuzzy modification of AHP was applied to deal with 
the uncertain judgment, in which a new fuzzy prioritization was proposed [36]. Comparing the 
two modified methods, the former was totally objective while the latter was still subjective but 
more humanized. Considering the trend of cancelling the letters check, regression functions were 
proposed to realize the level-interval modeling [43]. 
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CBR is an artificial intelligence methodology which solves new problems by referring to episodes 
of prior problems. Since most new products are improved based on previous ones, certain 
similarities remain in their structures, functions, failure mechanisms, etc. Analysts would consult 
the experience of existing products and adapt their solutions to fit new situations [50]. Likewise, 
for new aircraft, if sufficient maintenance data can be collected from existing cases with a high 
degree of similarity, reasonable results can be derived in making new maintenance schedules. A 
multi-stage framework for CBR decision analysis was established to determine maintenance 
intervals, in which nearest-neighbor matching was widely used in the case selection [38, 39, 45]. 
The method was updated to be a fuzzy generalized nearest-neighbor matching (FNN) to retrieve 
the case and fuzzy group making was performed to determine the attributes’ weights in order to 
address the problem of uncertainty [45]. As an extension of CBR, a combined approach of CBR 
and RBR (Rule-Based Reasoning) was proposed for an expert system of civil aircraft zonal 
analysis [42]. Other efforts were paid to reduce the influence of the human subjectivity, i.e. a 
method based on information entropy was proposed by Cai which could obtain weights from data 
of existing cases [39]. A similarity estimation method was presented based on fuzzy theory and 
grey incidence analysis [40]. Liu proposed a method based on similar rough sets in order to select 
and simplify attributes [41]. 
Alireza et al. reviewed the publications in terms of the methodologies in RCM and MSG-3. 
Unfortunately, the development of maintenance programs using MSG-3 receives fewer attentions 
of research projects [51]. This review also points out the major challenges to obtain more 
effective maintenance programs using MSG-3, i.e. develop supporting methodologies and tools 
for convincing risk evaluation and maintenance tasks optimization [52].  
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2.3 Methodologies beyond MSG-3 Analysis 
In deterministic methodologies, maintenance intervals are determined through a qualitative rating 
system which is derived based on massive operational experience in structural loading capacity, 
accidental damage and environmental deterioration. Even though many researchers attempted to 
integrate advanced algorithms into the rating system to make it more flexible and objective, in 
essence, the MSG-3 analysis is an experience and logic decision based methodology without any 
specific physical model and sufficient damage data from operation.  In other words, ‘the evidence 
does not seem that convincing’. Therefore, in addition to the experience-based methods within 
MSG-3, many researchers tend to explore non-deterministic approaches that can incorporate 
design and manufacturing information such as structural properties, mechanical models etc. as 
well as the possible damage characteristics where uncertainty exists throughout the structural life-
cycle. Considering the existence of uncertainty is a significant progress in dealing with large 
complex systems. To achieve an efficient operation with appropriate maintenance schemes, it is 
required to trace back to its design phase as illustrated in Figure 1-2. 
In traditional structural design, safety factors and knockdown factors are appended for loads and 
strength respectively, both of which are derived from previous experience of metallic airframes 
over the past years. 
However, at least two shortcomings exist in traditional design procedures [53]. First, the 
conventional configuration is designed for metallic materials which may difficult to be applied to 
new materials such as advanced composites. Specifically, the large scatter in composite properties, 
different sensitivity to environmental effects and complex damage characteristics, etc. will result 
in a substantial conservative design and lead to an extra weight increase. 
The second problem is the lack of a measurement of safety and reliability. With an increasing 
emphasis on reliability and maintainability for modern aircraft, the traditional method cannot 
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determine the relative importance of various design options on aircraft safety nor can guarantee a 
consistent level of safety and efficiency throughout the aircraft operation. As a result, additional 
weight may be induced without an improvement in reliability and safety.  
Composite materials have been widely used in modern aircraft structures. The complex 
manufacturing process leaves large scatter in structural performance which causes considerable 
uncertainty in various design variables such as fiber & matrix properties, fiber volume, structural 
size, flight loads and environment, etc. Inevitably, it will result in a poor efficient structural 
design by the traditional design approach by a fixed safety factor. In order to address uncertainty, 
probabilistic methodologies have been proposed to quantify structural reliability, which provides 
a measurement of the safety level to enable a cost-effective design.  
The probabilistic methodology development can be traced back to 1942 when Pugsley [54] 
proposed correlating loads and strengths with recorded structural accidents rates. Then 
Freudenthal [55] published “The Safety of Structures” in 1945 which sparked international 
interests in structural risk assessment. The research on structural reliability continued thereafter 
until 1974, the refined method developed by Hasofer and Lind [56, 57] was considered as the 
foundation of probabilistic design theory. Gary pointed out that the principle of the probabilistic 
design approach applied to composite structure is to base design criteria and objective on 
reliability targets instead of factors of safety [58]. 
A myriad of research papers and reports over the last two decades have been found and among 
them, several main probabilistic design methodologies were summarized hereafter. 
2.3.1 Probabilistic Analysis Method 
The basic theories and evaluation of probabilistic analysis in aerospace industry was presented by 
Long [59] including the following steps: 
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Step 1: Identify possible failure modes of the structure under anticipated loadings. 
Step 2: Identify an acceptable probability of failure (reliability) for each failure mode. 
Step 3: Calculate the internal stress and strength under loadings with existing structural analysis 
methods. 
Step 4: Define the influence of the random design variables on both stress and strength 
statistically. 
Step 5: Determine the probability of failure at predetermined locations by probabilistic methods. 
Step 6: Calculate the whole structure’s probability of failure through a function of individual 
location failure probability. 
The general process of the probabilistic analysis method is illustrated in Figure 2-6. 
 
Figure 2-6 Probability analysis method [59] 
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2.3.2 IPACS Method 
NASA Lewis Center proposed a probabilistic method named Integrated Probabilistic Assessment 
of Composite Structures (IPACS) which can obtain the characteristic distribution of the 
composite structural performance effectively and accurately [59, 60]. IPACS considered the 
uncertainty in various design phases including ingredient, ply, lamination, etc. This method also 
applied a comprehensive theories and algorithms such as composite mechanics, laminate theory, 
finite element modeling and Monte Carlo simulation [61]. Further, IPACS integrated the 
probabilistic limit state method and the fast probability integral to save calculation time. The 
general procedure of IPACS is illustrated in Figure 2-7. 
 
Figure 2-7 Procedure of IPACS method [61] 
But the IPASC method does not take the in-service problems into account such as the material 
degradation as well as various potential damages which may undermine the structural strength to 
a considerable extent.  
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2.3.3 LOS Method  
In another report published by NASA one year later, The concept of “Level of Safety” (LOS) was 
presented which is defined as “The compliment of the probability that a flaw size is larger than 
the critical flaw size for residual strength of the structure is incurred, and that the flaw will not be 
detect” [53]. This method is based on the assumption that there is one occurrence of damage per 
inspection trip and the damage does not propagate with time. It is can be seen from the definition 
that LOS places more emphasis on dealing with operational damage information. 
The formula of LOS is expressed as: 
 1 1 ( , 0)cLOS PF P A a C= − = − ≥ =  (2.43) 
 ( )[1 ( )]
c
D
a
PF p a P a da
∞
= −∫  (2.44) 
where A is a random variable of damage size; ca  is the design critical damage size; C denotes 
two situations in which 1 and 0 means that the damage is detected or not, respectively; ( )p a is 
the actual damage probability density function; ( )DP a  is the probability of detection for a 
damage size a  . 
The unknown actual damage density function ( )p a  can be substituted with the known 
probabilities through Bayes’ Law: 
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 (2.45) 
and LOS becomes: 
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Formula (2.46) describes the level of safety when there is only one occurrence of damage in the 
structure. In real situations, multiple damage types may occur in the structure simultaneously and 
each has its specific probability of detection (POD) distributions. Besides, every damage type 
may have different locations in the structure. Consequently, the overall LOS of the entire 
structure is the product of various LOS values for each damage type at each location assuming 
they are independent. The cumulative LOS is therefore given by: 
 
1 1
(1 )
TiL
ij
NN
n
ij
i j
LOS PF
= =
= −∏∏  (2.47) 
where LN  is the number of locations; iTN  is the number of damage types at the 
thi  location; ijn  
is the mean value of damage numbers for thi  damage location and thj  damage type. 
The general procedure of the LOS analysis is illustrated in Figure 2-8 from two aspects: 1) LOS 
evaluation on existing structures, 2) New structural design based on the LOS baseline. 
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Figure 2-8 Procedure of LOS [53] 
Compared to the probabilistic analysis method, the LOS method contains parameters for 
operational damage and detection. This method was used by Cary and Lin to assess the reliability 
of aircraft composite structures subject to accidental damage using in-service damage data [62]. 
Moreover, Bayesian statistics can be applied to update the probability distribution in order to 
reduce the uncertainty in service [63].  
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However, the LOS method can only measure the safety level at a single inspection in a fixed 
location without consideration for other influencing factors such as damage accumulation with 
time, damage locations, multiple damages interaction, etc. 
2.3.4 TsAGI Method 
Under a joint effort between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), USA and the Central 
Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI), Russian Federation, the software named Probabilistic 
Design of Damage Tolerant Composite Structures (ProDeCompoS) was developed, which 
provides the aircraft designers an automatic and uniform methodology to calculate the reliability 
of composite airframes. It also established a database with an extensive investigation on damage 
data from four Russian composite aircraft [64]. Operational experience shows that catastrophic 
failure of composite structures is mainly due to accidental impacts and the damage remains 
undetected. These damages are difficult to discover visually and the probabilistic damage tolerant 
principle should be used to predict the structural durability after damage.  
The initial strength and random variation of strength in operation of a structure was simulated 
with the Monte Carlo (MC) method. The strength critical state was compared with the combined 
stress state of the structure considering random loading conditions, through which local failure 
can be determined. If M failures occurred in N MC simulations to the loading and residual 
strength histories, the probability of failure is given by: 
 
M
N
β =  (2.48) 
Since there exist many designed loading conditions for aircraft structures, only the critical design 
loadings are considered for specific structures and the probability in time t is formulated as: 
56 
 
 
1
1 (1 )
N
i
i
β β
=
= − −∏  (2.49) 
where iβ  is the probability that under the 
thi load, at least one part of the structure fails.  
An example of the strength lifetime simulation is plotted in Figure 2-9. At the instant t0, the initial 
strength followed by the number and sizes of manufacturing defects of all types are generated. 
Then the numbers of operational damage are generated scattered over the life. If no defects and 
damage occur during this life, the maximum loads per life are generated together with random 
temperatures of the structure. For Life 1 Strength, damage occurs at the instant t1 and is fixed at t2, 
the residual strength is corrected depending on the damage size and compared with corresponding 
loads. If the applied loads exceed the strength, failure is recorded. 
 
Figure 2-9 Example of a structural strength lifetime simulation [64] 
 
 
Time 
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2.3.5 NGCAD Method 
The Grumman Corporation proposed a method, which combines the MC simulation and 
numerical integration to calculate the probability of failure [65-67]. When performing MC 
simulation, the influence of random variables such as the gust load, environment and defects are 
considered. The basic function is: 
 ( ) ( )
s
PF f s G s ds
Ω
= ∫  (2.50) 
where PF is the probability of structural failure; ( )f s denotes the PDF of the maximum working 
stress maxσ  per flight under the condition of random selected gust strength; ( )G s  represents the 
CDF of structural strength under the condition of random selected environment and defects; Ω  is 
the structural area where the outer stress applies. The PF mean value is calculated for all 
simulated conditions with the numerical integration as the estimated value of the structural item 
or system’s probability of failure. The general analysis procedure is illustrated in Figure 2-10. 
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Figure 2-10 NGCAD probability design procedure [65] 
Compared with TsAGI, NGCAD does not consider the influence of probability of detection 
which leads to a conservative evaluation on structural design and probability of failure. Moreover, 
NGCAD only performs simulation and analysis once in a life-cycle. Instead, TsAGI repeats 
simulation and analysis for many times in the life-cycle to account for various situations, which is 
more accurate yet time-consuming. 
2.3.6 Cumulative Impact Damage Tolerance Method 
Kan [68] proposed a probabilistic method to calculate the structural reliability of impact damage 
tolerance, in which three main random variables are considered: 
1) Working stress, i.e. stress generated in each component of the structure;  
2) Allowable stress, i.e. the residual compressive strength after impact, which reflects the 
structural loading capacity; 
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3) Impact threat, i.e. the modeling of various random impacts might be encountered during long 
term operation. 
The reliability analysis method [69, 70] was applied to assess the composite structural reliability 
under given impact threats as shown in Figure 2-11. 
 
Figure 2-11 Reliability assessment for cumulative impact damage [68]  
Figure 2-11(a) depicts the post-impact strength reduction against the impact energy. Figure 
2-11(b) uses the double-parameter Weibull distribution to describe the impact threat distribution. 
Figure 2-11(c) combines the residual strength and impact threat to determine the structural 
reliability under the given loading condition. Let ( )p ε  be the structural survival rate under the 
applied stress, which depends on impact energy, residual strength distribution and various impact 
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parameters. Let ( )P E  be the probability of occurrence of energy E. The structural reliability 
after impact is the integral of ( )p ε  and ( )P E  within the impact energy: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )R p P E dEε ε= ∫  (2.51) 
The current structural damage prediction and probability of failure analysis are based on 
empirical data, which are not suitable for new materials and advanced manufacturing process. 
The cumulative impact damage tolerance method for composite structures can analyze the 
structural response to impact under design variables such as damage resistance, damage tolerance 
and reliability sensitivity, etc. and therefore the original evaluation model for damage tolerance 
can be improved. Moreover, the evaluation on manufacturing process is added to reduce the 
independence on empirical data. 
However, impact damage is only an important reason causing the reduction of structural strength, 
there are many other influencing factors such as the material degradation, fatigue crack 
propagation, etc. This method lacks a comprehensive evaluation on various factors exerting on 
the aircraft structure simultaneously and interactively. 
2.3.7 Certification and Verification 
With the fast development of probabilistic design methodologies for composite structures, the 
compliance verification and certification methodologies are developed accordingly. Airbus [71] 
proposed a probabilistic compliance verification method for damage tolerant composite structures. 
The principle is to certify that the inspection schedule can guarantee the structural service 
condition is acceptable in which the applied load is on K LL×  level while the residual strength is 
reduced to K LL×  due to impact damage which has not been detected. Assume the two events 
are independent and according to ACJ25 1309, it should satisfy the following requirement: 
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 9(1 ) 10 /rat at datP P P flight hour
−× × − ≤  (2.52) 
where ratP  is the probability when the applied load exceeds the residual strength; atP  is the 
distribution of impact threat; datP  is the probability of detection . 
An advanced certification methodology for composite structures was proposed by Kan et al. 
addressing the effects of low velocity impact and it can be used to determine the reliability of 
impact damaged structures at any load level and by any impact threat [72]. Later, they updated 
the method to certificate the bonded and concurred composite structures with the same confident 
level as bolted structures [73]. Both certification methods were demonstrated on the F/A-18 inner 
and outer wing, respectively.   
The need for the probabilistic approach had not been realized until the latest engineering advisory 
circular was issued and a typical example is the certification of the outer wing box in ATR72. 
Tropis et al. presented some major certification issues for Aerospatiale’s innovative approach, 
one of which was the development of a probabilistic approach to determine the inspection 
intervals for accidental impacts in damage-tolerance justifications [74]. In terms of the selection 
of inspection intervals, Rouchon illustrated a probabilistic approach shown in Figure 2-12. The 
middle rectangular area is split into two zones by a moveable segment relying on the inspection 
interval. Its implementation requires the establishment of a comprehensive database about the 
probability of impact damage on an aircraft structure under complex operating conditions [75].  
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Figure 2-12 Selection of inspection interval by a probabilistic approach [75] 
2.3.8 Other Probabilistic Methods  
The probabilistic approaches also found its proliferation in composite maintenance field. A 
structural reliability approach was presented by Andrea to address the inspection interval 
optimization by the first and second order reliability method (FORM-SORM) [76]. Based on 
earlier probabilistic damage tolerance methods, Wu proposed an efficient simulation approach for 
inspection optimization and risk or reliability-based maintenance optimization [77, 78]. The 
importance of inspection intervals was also addressed by Lin, in which the damage detection 
capability was studied based on a probabilistic damage tolerance analysis [79]. Except for 
inspection intervals, a risk assessment was proposed by Styuart to optimize maintenance plans 
based on a theory of optimal statistical decisions [80]. Cheung used probabilistic methods with 
damage growth consideration to study the effect of repair quality on reliability of damage tolerant 
composite structures [81]. 
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2.4 Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) 
Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) is defined as the process of implementing a damage 
identification strategy for aerospace, civil and mechanical engineering infrastructure [82, 83]. The 
damage inspection and identification is based on a wide variety of highly effective local non-
destructive evaluation devices. Superficially from the definition, SHM is simply an 
implementation of an advanced monitoring technique by a variety of sensors. But the final 
objective of applying SHM is to realize a complete condition-based maintenance (CBM), in 
which the monitoring process is autonomous and continuous. SHM is thus able to liberate the 
complicated inspection work and reduce the cost involved with aircraft down time during 
maintenance. In the long term, the ultimate goal of SHM is to reduce the requirement for over-
design aircraft structures and increase performance by incorporating reliable SHM systems at the 
design stage. Behind the surface of installing some advanced sensors or even creating some smart 
structures, there is a considerable comprehensive system involving multi-disciplinary 
technologies.  
Recent researches began to recognize that the SHM problem is fundamentally one of statistical 
pattern recognitions, which involves four processes: 1) operational evaluation, 2) data acquisition, 
fusion and cleansing, 3) feature extraction and information condensation, 4) statistical model 
development for feature discrimination. Details can be referred to [82]. From a perspective of 
CBM, it mainly consists of three key steps: 1) data acquisition, to obtain and store data relevant to 
structural health, 2) data processing, to analyze signals or data collected for well interpretation, 
and 3) maintenance decision-making, to recommend effective maintenance policies [84]. Focused 
on composite structures, Krishnaswamy proposed a SHM system which can be outlined in five 
steps: 1) Monitor unanticipated events, 2) Identify location of damage, 3) Image damaged region, 
4) Monitor damage growth, 5) Predict damage growth. The integration of SHM sensor data with 
the damage growth software was working in progress [85]. 
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The past decades have seen a rapid increase in the amount of research related to SHM as 
quantified by the significant escalation in papers published on this subject. Herein, literature 
related to various SHM systems including sensor technologies and data analyses as well as the 
gradual transformation from scheduled maintenance (inspection-based maintenance) to condition-
based maintenance are reviewed. 
2.4.1 Sensor Technology 
To commercial aircraft, SHM cares for two critical aspects: operational load monitoring and 
damage detection [86]. Operational load monitoring is used to support the assessment of 
structural fatigue life by measuring the local stresses either directly or indirectly [87, 88]. 
Electrical strain gauges can be considered as the most mature tool for load monitoring. Back in 
1960s, there were studies on the usage of calibrated strain gauges for flight load determination 
[89]. An explicit calibration for flight loads using various strain gauges on aircraft wings and tails 
were summarized in a NASA report, in which the calibration of fifteen aircraft structures were 
examined during the past four decades [90]. Another effective tool is the accelerometer, which is 
often used to measure the motion and vibration of a structure. Typical examples of applying 
piezoelectric accelerometers to measure the dynamic response of structures can be found in [91]. 
Although both strain gauges and accelerometer are relatively mature, they need own dedicated 
wires which bring challenges for deployment with limited number of points being monitored.  
Operational load monitoring is applied widely to different types of aircrafts for evaluation of 
accumulated fatigue damages and remaining structural life. But it cannot provide direct damage 
information such as metallic corrosion and composite’s delamination. Therefore, the other 
important aspect, damage detection is required which allows the direct measurement of potential 
damage onto or into aircraft structural components. Ultrasonic/acoustic non-destructive 
technology is the current proven method for damage detection [92]. The ultrasonic detection is 
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based on actuation-sensing process, where the actuators and sensors are made of piezoelectric 
(PZT) materials, and thereby adding weight and cost for wires and heavy shields to avoid 
interference, which may share the same problem as strain gauges [93]. The worst thing is that 
aircraft has to be stopped at scheduled maintenance intervals to receive manual checks with 
complicated instruments or portable devices. Furthermore, some significant structures need to go 
through a disassemble-inspection-assemble procedure which is not only time and cost consuming 
but also might induce undesirable human errors to the structure.  
Alternatively, fiber optic strain sensors have the advantage of multiplexing in a single optical 
fiber and remote monitoring potentially. Compared to conventional sensors, fiber optic sensors 
can achieve the multifunctional measurement capability in an integrated system, which can 
significantly simplify the complexity of SHM systems. Over decades, intensive researches into 
various fiber optic sensor approaches were published [94], among which Fiber Bragg Gratings 
(FBG) received wider attention in both research and development fields and was deemed as the 
most promising tool for the development of SHM system [95, 96]. FBG technology was 
summarized in some review papers [93, 97-100] including fundamental principles and various 
applications.  
2.4.2 Data Analysis Capability 
After the collection of data via various sensors, a complete SHM system should be capable of 
performing diagnosis and prognosis functions based on data analysis. There have been a variety 
of models, algorithms and tools in the literature.  
One of the most popular approaches is the data fusion with an increasing trend of multi-sensor 
usage, which incorporates many techniques common with disciplines such as resource 
management, sensor management, correlation and data mining [101]. For example, a conceptual 
condition monitoring framework was established by Paul and Dominic through a knowledge 
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driven approach. Data fusion was particularly studied and a fuzzy decision making process was 
used on aircraft landing gear actuators [102]. Distributed sensor networks are emerging as a 
critical technical driver for monitoring large structures. Wang et al. looked into this technique by 
the application of multilevel decision fusion [103]. Multi-sensor data fusion technique was also 
developed by incorporating advanced signal processing and pattern recognition such as discrete 
wavelet transform and support vector machine [104]. A prototype structural neural system was 
proposed which has the potential to greatly simplify the acoustic emission used in on-board SHM 
[105]. In addition, some other data analysis methods are presented for interesting readers. A two 
dimensional Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) algorithm was proposed by Kevin to deal with the 
local data management as part of an effort to develop smart composite materials by embedded 
micro-sensors and network communication nodes [106]. Hidden Markov model (HMM) and 
proportional hazards model (PHM) are appropriate candidates for analyzing event and condition 
monitoring data together [107, 108]. 
2.4.3 SHM Application and Review 
The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) market is booming with both military and civil applications 
[109]. SHM techniques have been gradually applied to UAV and some of them have become 
important considerations as structural design criteria [110]. Just to name a few, Jane reviewed 
researches on impact location detection for structures and proposed impact identification 
algorithms for composite UAV wing box structures [111]. Chan et al. introduced a SHM project 
for UAV wing structures in Korea through an overview and evaluation tests [112]. 
Structural health monitoring can also play an important role in guiding composite repair issues. 
The Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization (DSTO) proposed methodologies 
to simulate SHM systems for adhesively bonded composite repairs for Australian military aircraft 
[113]. Both the analytical estimate and the finite element (FE) model of typical composite joints 
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were conducted [114]. In experimental phase, FBG technique was used as the embedded optical 
fiber sensors for optimal SHM system response [115]. The structural life extension objective was 
demonstrated through experiments on the interrogation strategy and embedding techniques. 
It is unrealistic to list all literature relevant to SHM. Fortunately, there are review papers to 
facilitate a quick understanding of SHM general development. Research into SHM from 1996 to 
2001 was comprehensively reviewed in Los Alamos National Laboratory report. The authors 
considered the SHM problem as fundamentally one of statistical pattern recognition [82]. Charles 
and Keith hold the same idea in an introduction to SHM [83] followed by many other researchers. 
Andrew et al. summarized and reviewed recent developments in diagnostics and prognostics 
implementing CBM and focused on models, algorithms and technologies for data processing and 
maintenance decision making [84]. Since 1990, Chinese researchers have been studying SHM 
technologies for aerospace applications. Qing et al. presented some typical researches and 
developments in SHM especially technologies based on piezoelectric sensors [116]. Ou and Li 
summarized recent progress in SHM technology achieved in mainland China and raised 
challenges and development in the future [117]. In Europe, Holger and Henrik compared the non-
destructive inspection (NDI) and SHM technologies and introduced intelligent airframe 
philosophy of airbus [20]. An European project called ‘Aircraft Integrated Health Assessment 
(AISHA)’ was introduced, in which a health monitoring system based on ultrasonic Lamb waves 
was established [118], In 2012, an extensive survey was conducted by FAA demonstrating the 
industry’s strong interests in SHM and they were dedicated to the development of an SHM 
Research and Development Roadmap [119].  
2.4.4 IBM to CBM via SHM 
However, two remaining obstacles hinder the industrial implementation of SHM: technical 
maturation and acceptance by end-users [20]. Currently, another research branch has been 
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emerging as to seek for effective ways to combine the SHM technology with current maintenance 
philosophy. Beral and Speckmann analyzed various factors such as lifecycle cost and aircraft 
weight in comparison of CBM and scheduled maintenance [120]. Fitzwater et al. integrated SHM 
with traditional scheduled maintenance to minimize life-cycle cost of a fighter’s bulkhead [121]. 
Pattabhiraman et al. quantified the savings of different synchronized maintenance philosophies 
over scheduled maintenance for a short range airplane tackling the metallic fatigue problem [122, 
123]. Challenges for SHM systems to be incorporated into commercial airplanes were 
summarized in [83, 124]. Further, Ikegami acknowledged the complexity of applying SHM 
systems on civil aircraft, potential solutions involving predicted technologies were proposed to 
overcome this difficulty in the future [125]. 
SHM also receives attention in some official documents. MSG-3 is one of the current 
maintenance practices that combine more than 40 years’ experience from aircraft manufacturers, 
airlines and regulatory authorities to determine efficient maintenance tasks. In order to keep it up-
to-date to the new technologies, regulations and maintenance processes, it was in the revision 
2009.1 that the MSG-3 document included SHM and Scheduled SHM (S-SHM) concepts for the 
first time but has not designed any explicit logic decision process [9].  
Four years later in 2013, an SAE technical report was published by G11SHM, Structural Health 
Monitoring and Mgmt (AISC) named ARP6461. This document provides key definitions, 
guidelines and examples for civil aerospace airframe structural applications in the development, 
validation, verification and certification of SHM systems [126]. The release of the document 
intends to fulfil at least two purposes: 
Due to the diversity in defining and classifying SHM, ARP6461 can serve as a standard to 
facilitate the standardization and harmonization of understanding about SHM world widely. 
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Due to the immaturity of SHM, ARP6461 can provide information on structural maintenance 
practices and provide guidance on how SHM can be incorporated with or as modifications to 
current maintenance and airworthiness documents. 
The other purposes are out of the research scope of this thesis. Relevant definitions in MSG-3 and 
ARP6461 used in the thesis are listed as follows: 
SHM: The concept of checking or watching a specific structural item, detail, installation or 
assembly using on board mechanical, optical or electronic devices specifically designed for the 
application used (MSG-3); The process of acquiring and analyzing data from on-board sensors 
to determine the health of a structure (ARP6461). 
Scheduled SHM (S-SHM): The act to use/run/read out a SHM device at an interval set at a fixed 
schedule. (MSG-3) 
Automated SHM (A-SHM): Automated SHM is any SHM technology which does not have a pre-
determined interval at which maintenance action must takes places, but instead relies on the 
system to inform maintenance personnel that action must take place. (MSG-3) 
2.5 Publication 
[1] Xi Chen, He Ren, Qi You, Jian Liu, ‘Potential Solutions on Aircraft Structural Rating System 
Construction’, Asset Management and Maintenance Journal, October 2012 Issue, Volume 25, No. 
5, p47, 2012. 
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CHAPTER 3. INTELLIGENT STRUCTURAL RATING 
SYSTEM BASED ON BACK PROPAGATION 
NETWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
Scheduled maintenance belongs to one of the major maintenance strategies: preventative 
maintenance, which is carried out at predetermined intervals to address any potential damage in 
case of failure. In current civil aviation industry, scheduled maintenance programs are developed 
mainly based on MSG-3 logic and the initial maintenance intervals and tasks are specified in the 
Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR), which outlines the minimum scheduled 
maintenance requirements for engines, systems, structures and components of a given aircraft 
type in order to maintain the inherent safety and reliability level [9]. Since most aircraft systems 
are provided by suppliers worldwide together with their specific maintenance criteria, the 
determination of maintenance intervals for aircraft structures is considered as one of the key 
techniques for the aircraft manufacturer at design and manufacturing stage.  
At every maintenance cycle, inspection tasks are performed to detect damage and prevent 
structural degradation due to three damage sources throughout the operational life, i.e. accidental 
damage (AD), fatigue damage (FD) and environmental deterioration (ED). AD is described by 
the occurrence of a random discrete event which may undermine the inherent residual strength 
level. The high random characteristic of AD leads to a great difficulty in assessing the 
susceptibility and detectability for SSIs. According to the requirement in the MSG-3 document, 
rating systems for AD should be established including the following evaluations: 
1) Susceptibility to minor accidental damage based on frequency of exposure to and the location 
of damage from one or more sources; 2) Residual strength after accidental damage normally 
based on the likely size of damage relative to the critical damage size; 3) Timely detection of 
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damage, based on the relative growth rate after damage is sustained and visibility of the SSI for 
inspection. 
The AD sources are either internal or external and can be classified into two categories: 
manufacturing defects introduced during assembly and accidental damage introduced during 
operation and maintenance activities. For manufacturing defects, material properties need to be 
considered, and for accidental damage, structural maintainability and operational environment, 
etc. should be taken into consideration. The selection of rating factors is based on four principles: 
operability, clarity, non-redundancy and comparability [37]. Therefore, four main factors are 
considered in this study as an example to facilitate the following analysis referring to the practice. 
They are visibility, sensitivity to damage propagation, residual strength after damage and 
likelihood of damage. Each main factor successively has several sub-factors, constructing the 
overall AD rating system as shown in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1 Accidental Damage (AD) rating system 
The purpose of the rating system is to make proper AD inspection intervals. There are three 
methodologies including:  
1) The matrix chart, which is developed from MSG-3 analysis and based on abundant practical 
engineering experience;  
2) Modeling based on reliability data, which requires massive data collection on the similar type 
of aircraft; 
3) Case-based reasoning (CBR), which is often applied to new aircraft. It requires tremendous 
data from maintenance cases; the more cases collected, the more accuracy CBR becomes. 
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Airbus Industries and The Boeing Company both apply the matrix chart to determine structural 
AD maintenance intervals. Factors’ correlations are described by the form of mathematical matrix, 
which can deal with multi-variant problems [35]. A typical matrix chart is shown in Table 3-1. L  
and R  are two groups of factors in alignment. The intersections of rows and columns represent 
the relationship of mL  and nR . When the matrix chart is used to determine the inspection interval 
for aircraft structures, the factors may be varied due to different design concept, structural 
diversity and service environment. 
Table 3-1 Rating matrix chart 
 
                   R  
1R  
2R
 
  nR  
L  
1L      
2L      
      
mL
 
    
 
The matrix chart used by Boeing Company and Airbus Industries is based on decades of 
structural experiments and in service experience. For new aircraft, such as the C919 under 
development, there is no original experience-base and a severe lack of information in operation 
and maintenance activities. Therefore, some other methodologies are proposed such as modified 
analytical hierarchy process (AHP) based on rough sets [37] and CBR combined with fuzzy 
generalized nearest-neighbor matching [45]. A modified AHP was aimed at optimizing factors’ 
weights, but it did not make much difference to the final results. The CBR was based on data 
from existing aircraft manufactures which can only be used as a reference to make initial 
maintenance tasks. 
22X
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This chapter proposes a new methodology to simulate the assumed AD rating system based on 
back-propagation network (BPN), which has following advantages: 
1) The rating system can potentially have multiple data sources as input owing to its powerful 
data fusion capability; 
2) This method can also adjust the attributes’ weights so that the factors importance can be 
reflected. 
 3) This method can make predictions on inspection intervals based on similar cases and 
accumulated data from various sources due to its intelligent learning ability. 
3.2 Artificial Neural Network 
3.2.1 Basic Theory 
Inspired by the information learning process in the human brain, the artificial neural network 
(ANN) is a kind of computer model to simulate the human pattern recognition function. An ANN 
is an interconnected group of nodes like the vast network of neurons in a brain. Basically, the 
dendrites of a biological neuron receive inputs from outside; main soma processes the inputs and 
then the axon outputs the result, as shown in Figure 3-2. 
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Figure 3-2 A biological neuron and main functions 
ANNs are numerical structures consisting of massively parallel simple processing units widely 
linked with each other forming a network that can perform parallel processing and non-linear 
transformation to model complex function relationship. They are served as alternative 
mathematical tools in problem resolutions in many fields such as system modeling, forecasting, 
pattern recognition, control and optimization, communication, etc. [127]. The first ANN model 
was proposed in 1943 by Meculloch and Pitts [128], demonstrating that neural-like networks 
could be computed. After many years’ evolution, a general perceptron model with weights and 
bias is shown in Figure 3-3. 
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Figure 3-3 Perceptron model 
The terminology ‘weight’ denotes the strength of the connection between two neurons, i.e. the 
weight of information flowing from neuron to neuron. The first step is a process where the inputs 
1x , 2x , …, nx  multiplied by their respective weights 1w , 2w , … nw  are summed given by: 
 
1
n
i i
i
net w x
=
 
= ⋅ 
 
∑  (3.1) 
The ‘bias’ is used to add or reduce the above summation value according to specific requirements 
expressed by the threshold value b . Then Equation (3.1) is updated as: 
 
1
n
i i
i
net w x b
=
 
= ⋅ + 
 
∑  (3.2) 
A nonlinear activation function is usually included considering the variation of input conditions 
and their effects on the output so that the adequate amplifications can be used wherever necessary 
[129]. The final output of the neuron looks like: 
 ( )y f net=  (3.3) 
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3.2.2 Back-propagation Network 
Among all kinds of ANN, the Back-Propagation Network (BPN) is one of the most mature, 
widely used multilayer feed-forward neural network based on error reverse spread. According to 
statistics, up to 80% of the neural network models apply BPNs or its variant forms, embodying 
the essence of neural networks [130]. A BPN includes at least an input layer, a hidden layer 
(implicit layer) and an output layer with a full connection between different layers but no links to 
neurons in the same layer. The input layer receives and distributes inputs. The hidden layer 
captures the nonlinear relationship of inputs and outputs. The output layer generates the 
calculated results. The BPN is developed on the basis of the back-propagation algorithm proposed 
in [131]. The network training is an unconstrained non-linear minimization issue, and the goal of 
the training process is to adjust weights [127]. Theoretically, networks with biases, a sigmoid 
layer, and a linear output layer are capable of approximating any function with a finite number of 
discontinuities [132]. A hierarchical feed forward BPN frame is depicted in Figure 3-4. 
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. .
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. .
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 .
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Y2
Yn
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Figure 3-4 General structure of BPN 
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A single neuron can be described by the following function: 
1
m
k ik i k
i
Y f w x b
=
 
= + 
 
∑  
The BPN algorithm consists of two parts: information forward propagation and error back 
propagation [133]. Assume p  is the input with r  neurons, 1s  is the number of hidden neurons, 
2s  is the number of output neurons, and t  is the target. 
1)  Information forward propagation  
The output of the thi  neuron in the hidden layer: 
1
1 1 1 1 , 1,2,..., 1
r
i ji j i
j
a f w p b i s
=
 
= + = 
 
∑  
The output of the thk  neuron in the output layer: 
1
1
2 2 2 1 2 , 1,2,..., 2
s
k ik i k
i
a f w a b k s
=
 
= + = 
 
∑  
Error function definition: 
( )
2
2
1
2
2
,1 2
s
k k k k k
k
t a e t aξ
=
= − = −∑  
2) The weights adjust and error back propagation is based on gradient descent 
Weights adjust in the output layer: 
( )22 2 2 1 1
2 2 2
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( )2 2 2ik k k kt a f e fδ ′ ′= − =  
Biases adjust in the output layer: 
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Weights adjust in the hidden layer: 
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Biases adjust in the hidden layer: 
1i jib ηδ∆ =  
The algorithm is based on minimization of errors which are described as difference between the 
expected outputs and actual results. The training process will finish when a certain accuracy level 
is met.  
3.3 Design BPN for AD 
3.3.1 BPN Configuration 
To the problem of AD rating analysis, previous solutions prefer to take it as a linear system, 
whereas in actuality it is a non-linear mapping concept from the influence factors to a decision. 
The four integrated factors mentioned in the Introduction are selected as input and the only output 
is the inspection interval. One hidden layer is defined with n neurons as shown in Figure 3-5. 
Generally speaking, the more complicated the network is, the more hidden neurons are required, 
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but currently there is no universal method. The selection principle of the number of nodes in the 
hidden layer will be addressed in Discussion section. 
Residual 
Strength
Visibility
Sensitivity
Likelihood
. .
 . 
. .
 .
Inspection Interval
Hidden layer
n
4
Input layer
Output layer
1
 
Figure 3-5 Back Propagation Network (BPN) for Accidental Damage (AD) 
One of the advantages is that the BPN configuration fulfills the direct association between the 
rating factors and the final inspection interval, which saves a link in the matrix rating method that 
an intermediate rating score would need. This method considers the middle process as a black box, 
leaving it being processed automatically by the machine learning. As a result, the developed AD 
rating system based on BPN has the potential of making best use of limited data from various 
sources with different formats and criteria. 
3.3.2 Case Study 
Table 3-2 is taken from [134] and lists 20 rating samples either from engineering experience or 
practical data. 
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Table 3-2 Visibility, Sensitivity, Residual Strength and Likelihood decision rating 
U RV RS RRS RL I 
1 0 1 1 0 2000FCs 
2 1 0 0 0 1000FCs 
3 1 1 1 0 4000FCs 
4 1 1 1 1 8000FCs 
5 2 1 2 1 16000FCs 
6 2 2 2 2 16000FCs 
7 2 1 1 1 16000FCs 
8 1 2 2 2 16000FCs 
9 0 2 1 0 4000FCs 
10 0 0 1 0 1000FCs 
11 0 1 1 1 4000FCs 
12 2 1 0 1 8000FCs 
13 1 2 1 0 8000FCs 
14 1 1 0 0 2000FCs 
15 1 2 1 2 16000FCs 
16 2 1 2 2 16000FCs 
17 1 0.5 1.5 1.5 8000FCs 
18 0 2 1 1 8000FCs 
19 1 0 2 2 16000FCs 
20 2 0 1 0 4000FCs 
 
In Table 3-2, RV, RS, RRS, RL stand for Visibility, Sensitivity, Residual Strength and Likelihood 
respectively. Numerical values 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2 represent ‘low’, ‘relatively low’, ‘medium’, 
‘relatively high’, ‘high’ for Visibility and Residual Strength rating criterion, whereas these values 
represent ‘high’, ‘relatively high’, ‘medium’, ‘relatively low’, ‘low’ for Sensitivity and 
Likelihood rating criterion. U denotes the number of samples. In the last column, for example, 
1000FCs means the inspection interval is 1000 flight cycles. 
Because of the incompatible dimension, the samples need to be pretreated. Herein, the sample 
data is normalized to fall in the interval [-1, 1] by using the following formula. The results are 
shown in Table 3-3. 
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 × − = − = … =
 − 
  
where X is the matrix of sample vectors including inputs and targets, and X  is the matrix of 
normalized sample vectors including inputs and targets. 
Table 3-3 Normalization 
U RV RS RRS RL I 
1 -1 0 0 -1 -0.8667 
2 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 
3 0 0 0 -1 -0.6 
4 0 0 0 0 -0.0667 
5 1 0 1 0 1 
6 1 1 1 1 1 
7 1 0 0 0 1 
8 0 1 1 1 1 
9 -1 1 0 -1 -0.6 
10 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 
11 -1 0 0 0 -0.6 
12 1 0 -1 0 -0.0667 
13 0 1 0 -1 -0.0667 
14 0 0 -1 -1 -0.8667 
15 0 1 0 1 1 
16 1 0 1 1 1 
17 0 -0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.0667 
18 -1 1 0 0 -0.0667 
19 0 -1 1 1 1 
20 1 -1 0 -1 -0.6 
 
Three transfer functions are generally used: the hard-limit transfer function, the linear transfer 
function and the sigmoid transfer function which can be subdivided into the log-sigmoid function 
and tan-sigmoid function; see Figure 3-6. 
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Figure 3-6 Commonly used transfer functions of BPN 
According to the normalization, the tan-sigmoid function is selected between the input layer and 
the hidden layer. The linear function ‘purelin’ is set between the hidden layer and the output layer 
without changing the magnitude of any exported value. 
Set the number of hidden layer neurons to 10. The layer ratio of the network becomes 4:10:1.  
This network is trained by MATLAB software. The calculation parameters are set as follows:  
1) Maximum number of training epochs: 1000  
2) Learning rate: 0.01 
3) Performance goal: 10-2  
4) Training function: trainscg 
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84 
 
The problem of over-fitting often occurs during the network training. Sometimes the error may go 
large when new data is applied in the situation that the error in the training set has already drew 
small. Therefore, the network fails to adapt to new data. 
In MATLAB, the default method for improving generalization is ‘early stopping’, which 
automatically divides the available data into three subsets as training, validation and testing. 
Another advanced method is ‘regularization’, which is suitable for cases with a small data set. Its 
essence is to modify the performance function by adding the mean of the sum of weights and 
biases to smooth the network response [132]. However, the outputs in this case study are a series 
of discrete values. Using ‘regularization’ alone may result in a larger error for predicted results. 
The training network needs some criteria to stop the training procedure instead of being devoted 
to obtaining the minimum training error. Therefore, the regularization combined with early 
stopping is applied to improve the performance while controlling the over fitting problem in the 
validation process. The performance ratio in ‘regularization’ is set to 0.6. 
Three structural significant items (SSIs) on the wing (the upper rod, the safety pin and the support 
bar connection) of a certain type of aircraft are selected to perform the prediction. The average 
values of inspection intervals for the three items are obtained by running the program 10 times. 
Details are listed in Table 3-4. 
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Table 3-4 Average inspection intervals and final approximation 
SSI Upper Rod Safety Pin Support Bar Connection 
RV 2 1 1 
RS 2 1.5 0.5 
RRS 1 1 1 
RL 2 1 1.5 
P 16372FCs 9215FCs 8503FCs 
T 16000FCs 8000FCs 8000FCs 
 
P  indicates the average predicted inspection interval by BPN. It should be noticed that the preset 
inspection intervals are the following values: 1000FCs, 2000FCs, 4000FCs, 8000FCs, and 
16000FCs. Therefore, to make a proper approximation, conservative values are selected as the 
final results, denoted as T . 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the BPN method, the SSIs are rated according to the 
requirements in the Maintenance Program Development Policy and Procedures Handbook for 
Boeing 737, since these three structural items are similar cases as those in Boeing 737; see Table 
3-5. 
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Table 3-5 AD rating according to [28] 
SSI Upper Rod Safety Pin Support Bar Connection 
RV 2 1 1 
RS 2 1 1 
RRS 1 1 1 
RL 2 2 2 
∑R 7 5 5 
Inspection 16000FCs 8000FCs 8000FCs 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The inspection intervals are a set of predetermined values, whereas the predicted results are a 
group of detailed data, which needs to be rounded to the nearest conservative values. It turns out 
that the final trimmed results exactly equal to the practical values for these SSIs, which 
demonstrates the applicability of the BPN on the AD rating system. 
The error between the predicted interval and the preset value for safety pin is always larger than 
the upper rod and support bar connection. Firstly it is because of the sample set, in which some 
rating combinations correspond to the same interval. After training, there will be fluctuations 
within an acceptable range. The second reason is the design of the BPN. Trimming can be 
incorporated into the neural network training procedure to make more accurate predictions. 
Usually samples are not used directly for network training due to different dimensions and 
singular values. A preprocessing such as normalization or standardization of samples including 
input data and target data is often required. The objective of the preprocessing is to accelerate the 
convergence of the network training and make it more efficient. For the determination of the AD 
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inspection interval, raw data can come from diverse sources, such as engineering experience, 
structural experiments and in-service reliability data. The advantage of the BPN is that it provides 
a method to fuse raw data from different sources into one network through normalization and 
then perform specific training.  
3.4.1 Selection of Number of Nodes in Hidden Layers and Parameter Ratio 
The selection of number of neurons in hidden layers is a critical step which affects mapping 
capabilities. There is no unanimous method up until now. Several empirical formulas are often 
applied [127, 130]. 
n ml=  
n m l a= + +  
20.43 0.12 2.54 0.77 0.35 0.51n ml l m l= + + + + +  
where n  is the number of nodes in a hidden layer, m  is the number of nodes in an input layer, l  
is the number of nodes in an output layer, and a  is a constant within 1-10. 
In terms of regularization, it is difficult to determine the optimum value for the performance ratio 
parameter r  [132]. From the training window in MATLAB, the regression plot can be accessed, 
the analysis of which is a statistical process for estimating the relationship between the predicted 
value and the target value. The regression plot can be used to validate the network performance. 
The closer to 1 the regression value (R) is, the better the training results are indicated. Since the 
predicted results are all in an acceptable range, the maximization of the regression value of the 
test set is used as the optimization criterion; see Figure 3-7 & Figure 3-8. 
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Figure 3-7 Regression value R  against hidden layer nodes n  and performance ratio r  
 
Figure 3-8 Contour plot of regression value R  
The surface in Figure 3-7 represents the regression value R  against the number of neurons n  in 
the hidden layer ranging from 2 to 14 and the performance ratio r  from 0.2 to 0.8. Each training 
experiment is trained at least 10 times to obtain the average R  due to the variation characteristic 
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introduced by the early stopping. Figure 3-8 is the contour plot of Figure 3-7. It is shown that the 
fitting performs better when r  is between 0.5 and 0.7, and n  is around 8 to 12. The maximum 
R  occurs when 10n =  and 0.6r = . 
Therefore, the BPN for this AD rating system is optimized with three layers structure 4:10:1 and 
the performance ratio 0.6. 
3.4.2 Selection of Training Algorithms 
The core of all the algorithms is the gradient of the performance function to determine how to 
adjust the weights to minimize performance. There are several different training algorithms and 
their applicable problem types are roughly listed in Table 3-6. 
Table 3-6 Training algorithms for two problem types 
Pattern recognition Function approximation 
Resilient backpropagation Levenberg-Marquardt 
Scaled conjugate gradient BFGS quasi-Newton 
Conjugate gradient with Powell/Beale 
restarts Scaled conjugate gradient 
… … 
 
In Table 3-6, BFGS represents Boryden, Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno, the four researchers who 
contribute most to the Quasi-Newton algorithm. In general, for function approximation problems 
and networks with fewer than 100 weights, the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm (trainlm) has the 
fastest convergence but consumes great memory. As the number of weights increases, the 
advantage of trainlm decreases. The BFGS quasi-Newton method (trainbfg) also converges fast 
and requires much memory second to Levenberg-Marquardt. For recognition problems, the 
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Resilient Backpropagation (trainrp) is the fastest, and the memory requirement for this algorithm 
is relatively small compared to the other algorithms. The conjugate gradient algorithm, in 
particular Scaled Conjugate Gradient (trainscg), performs well over a wide variety of problems 
and consumes less memory than trainlm. The network in this study is used to train for function 
approximation with a small number of neurons. ‘Trainlm’ and ‘trainbfg’ converges too fast, thus 
‘trainscg’ is selected. 
Last but not least, another hidden function of the BPN is to determine the attributes’ weights. 
Scientifically speaking, the importance of the four integrated factors can be derivatively 
calculated by the BPN. Then the rating becomes a simple linear problem again after the non-
linear processing. The factors’ weights were obtained by running the program many times in this 
case but it turned out that the values fluctuated due to nonlinearity. As continuing data 
accumulation, weights will be updated every now and then. The final objective is to predict the 
AD inspection intervals and the BPN initially fulfills the objective, leading to the unnecessary 
determination of the factors’ weights. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter proposed an artificial neural network to model the structural Accidental Damage 
(AD) rating system, which is based on the assumption that certain data is available. A Back 
Propagation Network (BPN) for AD is established with four rating factors as inputs and the 
inspection interval as the output. The effectiveness of the new rating system is demonstrated in a 
case study, followed by a particular investigation into the training algorithm and parameters in 
order to achieve the best training result. As data accumulation from various sources becomes 
available and the rating times increase, the attributes’ weights can be dynamically adjusted and 
therefore, the inspection interval can be updated to be more appropriate.  
91 
 
The BPN methodology developed in this chapter can be seen as an update of the structural rating 
system within MSG-3 analysis combining engineering experience and intelligent machine 
learning. The best advantage of the BPN for AD is the powerful, flexible data fusion and learning 
ability, which can be used to help make the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) for new 
aircraft structures when data is insufficient. 
3.6 Publication 
[2] Xi Chen, He Ren, Jian Liu, ‘An Intelligent Structural Rating System Based on Back 
Propagation Network’, Journal of Aircraft, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2013. DOI: 10.2514/1.C032085 
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CHAPTER 4. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR 
COMPOSITE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter deals with the structural accidental damage by establishing an intelligent 
rating system, the essence of which belongs to MSG-3 analysis and it is largely based on 
engineering experience. The following studies intend to develop some data driven methodologies 
in order to optimize maintenance schedules and will focus on aircraft structures made of 
composite materials.  The first step is to investigate their complex damage characteristics.  
In the past decade, the usage of composite materials in commercial aircraft has grown 
significantly. More than 50% of the Boeing 787 and Airbus 350 airframes are made of composite 
materials [13, 14]. The main drive is that composite is a light-weighted material with design 
diversity. By selecting fiber material, fiber orientation, matrix volume, etc., the designer can 
manipulate the local material properties to increase the strength and resistance of the required 
direction [135]. However, such powerful design-ability also has considerable side effects. Various 
combinations and forming processes induce high scatter in material properties and lead to 
complex damage modes, rendering difficulty in fault diagnosis and prognosis.  
Composite structures are usually fatigue and corrosion resistant but are more susceptible to 
impact damage caused by bird strike, hail and tools impact, etc. The fracture of composite 
structures is due to multiple damage modes and their interactions. The damage modes depend on 
various parameters, such as the property of the fiber and matrix, fiber layup, cure procedure, 
environment, temperature, operating conditions, etc. Due to a large scatter in material properties, 
deterministic methodologies may lead to conservative results such as excessive weight and 
frequent inspections without taking account of uncertainties. Alternatively, probabilistic 
methodologies were proposed considering different aspect of the composite damages 
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incorporating cumulative damage, manufacturing defects, operating environment and laminate 
theory, etc. [136, 137]. However, most of the studies are on a microscopic level based on 
experiments, computer modeling or mechanical theory. Various macroscopic damages obtained 
from operational aircraft have not been comprehensively addressed. This study collected typical 
in-service damages occurring in composite airframes via a survey to a Chinese airline 
maintenance department. It is noted that ‘damage mode’ can have different meanings in different 
situations. In this chapter, ‘damage mode’ refers to the superficial damage characteristics that can 
be seen visually or by non-destructive devices. 
Two analytical approaches are candidates for filling the gap: the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and 
Markov Analysis (MA). MA is a stochastic model that satisfies the Markov property, which can 
be used to model a random system that changes states according to a transition rule depending 
only on the current state. MA is not a root cause analysis tool and can easily overlook causes of 
damage. Also, MA can only handle small models based on numerical transition rates [138]. 
Instead, FTA can model root causes and identify the weak links of a large system without 
probabilities which provides more versatility [139]. In this study, various damage modes and 
sources are collected and FTA is selected to analyze composite damages. 
By applying FTA, a variety of damage modes and damage causes can be synthesized in a tree 
structure and analyzed systematically on a macroscopic level. Main damage modes and damage 
causes can be prioritized through qualitative analysis and therefore, this method can be used as a 
diagnostic tool to identify and correct causes of composites failure. It can help promote 
understanding on complex damages and their logic relationship leading to failure more intuitively. 
Also, this method can be used for Monte Carlo simulation and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation if 
detailed damage information is available. Engineers from airlines and manufacturers can evaluate 
the reliability of the structure and the damage severity through extended quantitative analysis. 
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4.2 Basic Principles of FTA 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the most important logic and probabilistic techniques used in 
probabilistic risk assessment and system reliability assessment. It is first developed by American 
Telephone and Telegraph’s Bell Laboratories in 1962. Later in 1974, US Atomic Energy 
Commission published a report on risk assessment of nuclear power stations, in which FTA was 
extensively and effectively used and the development of FTA was promoted greatly since then.  
FTA is a deductive, “top-down” system evaluation process which focuses on one particular 
undesired event and possible causes through a qualitative model. The analysis starts with an 
undesired event with top level hazard and identifies all credible single faults and faults 
combinations at the subsequent level which lead to the top event in a systematic pathway. Then 
the analysis continues through successive levels until a basic cause is unfolded or until the 
specific requirement is met. Basic cause events are such events that cannot be further broken 
down, which may be malfunctioning from the system inside or from external damage [140]. 
In other words, a fault tree is a graphic model of the pathways in a system leading to a foreseeable, 
undesirable fault event. Events and conditions that contribute to the undesirable event are 
interconnected through various logic symbols along the pathways to reflect their cause-and-effect 
relationship. This qualitative model is capable of conducting quantitative evaluations provided 
that numerical probabilities of occurrence are input and propagated throughout.  
4.2.1 Elements of FTA 
Basically, three kinds of event term are used in FTA: 
Basic event: the initiating fault event without further development. 
Intermediate event: a fault resulting from the logical interaction of initiating faults. 
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Top event: the occurrence of an undesired event for the system as a result of the occurrence of 
several intermediate events. Several combinations of initiating faults lead to the event. 
A fault tree is consisted of two kinds of symbols: logic and event. The events are connected by 
various logic symbols representing different relationship. There is no connection within logic 
symbols or events. The general rule of symbols is to keep them simple and clear. Common fault 
tree symbols are listed in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 Fault tree symbols 
Symbol Name Definition 
 
Description Box Description of an output of a logic symbol or an event 
 
AND Gate 
Boolean Logic gate – event 
can occur when all the next 
lower conditions are true 
 
OR Gate 
Boolean Logic gate – event 
can occur if any one or more 
of the next lower conditions 
are true 
 
Priority AND Gate 
Boolean Logic gate – event 
can occur when all the next 
lower conditions occur in a 
specific sequence (sequence is 
usually represented by a 
conditional event) 
 
Inhibit 
Output fault occurs if the 
(single) input fault occurs in 
the presence of an enabling 
conditional event 
 
Transfer Indicates transfer of information 
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Basic Event 
Event which is internal to the 
system under analysis, 
requires no further 
development 
 
House 
Event which is external to the 
system under analysis, it will 
or will not happen (Pf=1 or 
Pf=0) 
 
Conditional Event 
A condition which is 
necessary for a failure mode to 
occur 
 
4.2.2 Boolean Algebra Theorems 
Boolean algebra is used for set operation. Different from the common rule of operation, Boolean 
algebra can be used to analyze faults. In FTA, the occurrence of a top event can be described by 
combinations of occurrences of basic events. The minimal combination of basic events can be 
obtained through Boolean operation. Common Boolean operations are listed in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 Boolean algebra theorems 
Name Theorem description 
Commutative law ,X Y Y X X Y Y X⋅ = ⋅ + = +  
Associative law ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( )X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ + + = + +  
Distributive law ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( )X Y Z X Y X Z X Y Z X Y X Z⋅ + = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = + ⋅ +  
Absorption law ( ) , ( )X X Y X X X Y X⋅ + = + ⋅ =  
Complementation law , ,X X U X X X X+ = ⋅ = Φ =  
Idempotency law ,X X X X X X⋅ = + =  
De Morgan’s law ( ) , ( )X Y X Y X Y X Y⋅ = + + = ⋅  
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       X, Y, Z are sets. 
The general procedure for conducting FTA is as follows: 
Step 1: Be familiar with the system and define the goal and depth of the analysis, i.e. understand 
the system states and various parameters in detail; be specific about the scope and depth of the 
analysis. 
Step 2: Investigate faults, i.e. collect fault cases and conduct statistics to the faults, envisage 
possible faults of the given system. 
Step 3: Define the undesired event, i.e. the top event as the target of the analysis. 
Step 4: Investigate the cause of the undesired event, i.e. analyze the most complete system data 
available and define the possible fault events and event combinations that cause the top event. 
Step 5: Construct the fault tree associated with the undesired event.  
Step 6: Simplify the tree structure through Boolean operation, perform importance analyses and 
summarize results. 
Step 7: Define the probability of every fault event and obtain the probability of the top event. 
4.3 FTA for Composite Damages 
FTA is a deductive, top down approach, which is mainly used to analyze system failures. Most 
researches are in the field of system fault diagnosis and assessment, except for a few studies 
dealing with special cases involving structures. Specifically, a fault tree technique was used to 
examine the static tensile failure of a fibrous composite laminate from a micromechanical aspect 
[141]. In 2010, a fault tree was created to analyze the structural corrosion problem in marine 
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environment [142]. Given complex damage modes for composite airframes, this study applies the 
FTA on composite damages.  
Consider the damage of a composite structure as a system. The failure of the system is defined as 
one or more damages occurring in the structure that the structure has to be repaired or replaced. 
Assume the failure of the system to be the top event which is caused by both external and internal 
damage. Here, ‘external damage’ refers to any surface damage that is visible or barely visible 
whereas ‘internal damage’ denotes any damage occurs inside the structure or throughout the 
structure that is either visible or detectable. External damage and internal damage can be 
subdivided into different damage modes as intermediate events. These intermediate events have 
various root causes as basic events. Two types of logic gates are used to connect different layers 
of the tree: ‘AND’ gate allows the output of the event to occur only if all input events occur, 
which is equivalent to the Boolean symbol ‘·’; ‘OR’ gate allows the output of the event to occur if 
any one or more input events occur, which is equal to the Boolean symbol ‘+’. A hierarchical 
fault tree can be established with proper gates connected. The advantage of this fault tree is that it 
provides an effective approach to synthesize various damage modes and damage causes in a 
systematic manner.  
For this study, a survey was conducted at a Chinese airline maintenance department to collect 
information on in-service damage in composite airframes. A typical composite laminated panel 
made of carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP) was selected as an illustration. The overall 
organization of the fault tree is shown in Figure 4-1. 
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A. Composite 
Laminate Failure
B1. External 
Failure
B2. Internal 
Failure
C5. 
Hole
C1. 
Scratch
C6. 
Delamination
C2. 
Oxidation
C3. 
Dent
C4. 
Erosion
C7. 
Debond
D1 D2 D1
D3 D4
D5
D2
D5
D6
D1 D7
D2 D6 D2
D8
D4 D6
D8
D4 D9
 
D1: Surface Protection; D2: Mishandling; D3: Lightning Strike; D4: Heat; D5: Material Resistance; 
D6: Natural Object Impact; D7: Wind/Sand/Rain Erosion; D8: Manufacturing Defects; D9: Overloading. 
Figure 4-1 Fault tree construction of composite laminate structure 
The top event is the failure of the CFRP laminate panel, followed by external and internal damage 
connected by an AND gate as the first layer of intermediate events. The intermediate events on 
the second layer are various damage modes connected by two OR gates with the upper layer. The 
basic events are all potential damage sources or root causes. Take C3 Dent as an illustration, it is 
caused by both D5 Material Resistance and the other event which is caused by either D2 
Mishandling or D6 Natural Object Impact. According to the survey, C1 to C7 are seven of the 
most frequent damage modes occurred in aircraft composite structures made of CFRP. Crack is 
not listed because the occurrence of several other damage modes such as dent, hole and 
delamination are accompanied by fiber buckling, matrix cracks and even fiber breakage [143]. It 
should be mentioned that moisture and ultraviolet radiation is not included because carbon fiber 
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reinforced plastics have low sensitivity to the environment [9]. If the selected composite panel is 
a honeycomb or is made of Kevlar, moisture ingress and ultraviolet radiation will be significant 
contributors to the damage. Most of the delamination and debonding is not only due to impact 
damage, heat and overloading, but also caused by defects during manufacturing [144]. Therefore, 
manufacturing defect is considered as an important contributor. Impact damage such as dent 
covers a wide variety of events including tool drop, cargo buggy strike, bird strike, etc. For 
simplicity, impact damage sources are divided into two categories, by human errors and by 
natural accidents. Meantime, other damage sources have been simplified to facilitate the 
qualitative analysis.  
In addition to the damage sources, the properties of the composite material and surface protection 
are also taken into account as basic events. Material resistance is one of the inherent properties of 
composite laminates, which is the ability of the material to resist impact damage [145]. The 
higher the resistance, the more reliable the composite laminate becomes. As to surface protection, 
abrasion resistant coatings, anti-erosion coatings, anti-static coatings, etc. can effectively reduce 
the damage caused by scratching, lightning strike, etc. 
4.4 Qualitative Analysis 
The primary step of the qualitative process is to obtain a minimal cut set list which provides key 
qualitative information. Three importance analyses including Structure Importance Analysis, 
Probability Importance Analysis and Relative Probability Importance Analysis are performed 
sequentially on the basis of the minimal cut sets. 
4.4.1 Minimal Cut Sets 
The minimal cut sets for the top event are such group of sets consisting of the smallest 
combinations of basic events which result in the occurrence of the top event. They represent all 
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the ways in which the basic events cause the top event [146]. The equivalent Boolean algebra 
function of Figure 4-1 can be expressed as: 
 
1 2 ( 1 2 3 4) ( 5 6 7)
[ 1 2 1( 3 4) 5( 2 6) 1 7]
[ 5( 2 6) 8( 2 4 6) 8( 4 9)]
A B B C C C C C C C
D D D D D D D D D D
D D D D D D D D D D
= ⋅ = + + + ⋅ + +
= + + + + +
⋅ + + + + + +  (4.1) 
By applying the equivalent Boolean algebra operation, the final Boolean expression of the top 
event can be obtained as below: 
 
( 2 5 5 6) ( 1 2 8 1 4 8)
( 1 3 6 8 1 3 8 9 1 6 7 8 1 7 8 9)
A D D D D D D D D D D
D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D
= + + +
+ + + +  (4.2) 
It can be seen from Equation (4.2) that the top event is composed of 2 second-order minimal cut 
sets: 1 { 2, 5}K D D= , 2 { 5, 6}K D D= ; 2 third-order minimal cut sets: 3 { 1, 2, 8}K D D D= , 
4 { 1, 4, 8}K D D D= ; and 4 forth-order minimal cut sets: { }5 1, 3, 6, 8K D D D D= , 
{ }6 1, 3, 8, 9K D D D D= , { }7 1, 6, 7, 8K D D D D= , 8 { 1, 7, 8, 9}K D D D D= . All the 8 minimal 
cut sets are the premise of the following three importance analyses. 
4.4.2 Structure Importance Analysis 
Structure Importance Analysis is to analyze the degree of importance of every basic event 
influencing the top event, from the perspective of the fault tree structure itself, regardless of the 
probability of the basic event [147]. There are two ways to perform the analysis. One is to 
calculate the structure importance coefficient for every basic event. The other is to estimate the 
importance by minimal cut sets. The complexity of the first method is increased by the growing 
number of basic events, i.e. in this case 29 combination. Therefore, the second method by minimal 
cut sets is applied. The importance coefficient of the basic event iX  is estimated by:  
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 ( ) 1
1
2 i
i j
i n
X K
I −
∈
= ∑  (4.3) 
Where ( )iI  is the estimation value of the structure importance of the basic event iX , i jX K∈  is 
the basic event iX  which belongs to minimal cut set jK , and in  is the number of events in the 
minimal cut set containing iX . Take D6 for example, the minimal cut sets containing D6 are 2K , 
5K , 7K . The number of events in each set is 2, 4 and 4 respectively. Thus, the structure 
importance coefficient (6) 2 1 4 1 4 1
1 1 1 3
2 2 2 4
I − − −= + + = . After calculation, the results are shown in 
Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3 Results of Structure Importance Analysis 
1 Surface Protection (D1) Material Resistance (D5) Manufacturing Defects (D8) 
3/4 Mishandling (D2) Natural Object Impact (D6) 
1/4 Lightning (D3) Heat (D4) Wind Erosion (D7) Overloading (D9) 
 
This table illustrates that Surface Protection (D1), Material Resistance (D5) and Manufacturing 
Defects (D8) play the most important roles. In terms of the accidental damage sources, impact 
damage caused by Mishandling and Natural Object Impact is the main cause. Other damage 
sources are relatively less important. 
4.4.3 Probability Importance Analysis 
According to Zeng et al. [148], probability importance is the derivative of the probability of the 
top event to the basic event, thereby reflecting the influence of the unreliability of the basic event 
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to that of the top event. If the probability of the top event is 1 2( ) ( , , )nP A Q p p p= ⋅⋅⋅ , n N
+∈ , 
the probability importance of the basic event iD  is expressed as: 
 1( , )( ) 1, ,np i
i
Q p pI D i np
∂ ⋅⋅⋅= = ⋅⋅⋅∂  (4.4) 
Let ( )ip X  denote the probability of the basic event iX , then the probability of the top event A is 
calculated as: 
 
8 8 8 8
1 2 3 4
8 8
5 6
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i i j i j k i j k l
i i j i j k i j k l
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i j k l m i j k l m n
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P A p K p K K p K K K p K K K K
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p K K K K K K K p K K K K K K K K
= < = < < = < < < =
< < < < = < < < < < =
< < < < < < =
= − + −
+ −
+ +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑  (4.5) 
where ( )ip K  can be obtained by Equation (4.6): 
 ( ) ( )
i
i i
i K
P K p X
∈
=∏  (4.6) 
where iK is the 
thi  minimal cut set, 1, 2,...,8i = . 
According to the rare event approximation [149], ( )P A  can be approximated to its first item 
8
1
( )i
i
p K
=
∑ . Therefore, the probability importance of each basic event is calculated as below: 
 
( 1) ( 2) ( 8) ( 4) ( 8) ( 3) ( 6) ( 8)
( 3)( 8)( 9) ( 6) ( 7) ( 8) ( 7) ( 8) ( 9)
pI D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D
p D D D p D p D p D p D p D p D
= + +
+ + +   
 ( 2) ( 5) ( 1) ( 8)pI D p D p D p D= +   
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 ( 3) ( 1) ( 6) ( 8) ( 1) ( 8) ( 9)pI D p D p D p D p D p D p D= +   
 ( 4) ( 1) ( 8)pI D p D p D=   
 ( 5) ( 2) ( 6)pI D p D p D= +   
 ( 6) ( 5) ( 1) ( 3) ( 8) ( 1) ( 7) ( 8)pI D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D= + +   
 ( 7) ( 1) ( 6) ( 8) ( 1) ( 8) ( 9)pI D p D p D p D p D p D p D= +   
 
( 8) ( 1) ( 2) ( 1) ( 4) ( 1) ( 3) ( 6)
( 1) ( 3) ( 9) ( 1) ( 6) ( 7) ( 1) ( 7) ( 9)
pI D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D
p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D
= + +
+ + +   
 ( 9) ( 1) ( 3) ( 8) ( 1) ( 7) ( 8)pI D p D p D p D p D p D p D= +   
Except for D1 Surface Protection, D5 Resistance and D8 Manufacturing Defects, all the other 
basic events are in practice small probability events. Thus, it is relatively easy to make qualitative 
comparisons. 
Since  
 ( 3) ( 7) ( 1) ( 8)[ ( 6) ( 9)]p pI D I D p D p D p D p D= = +   
According to the associative law of addition,  
 ( 9) ( 1) ( 8)[ ( 3) ( 7)]pI D p D p D p D p D= +   
Generally, D6 Natural Object Impact is one of the main damage sources with a frequency that is 
much higher than D3 Lightning, D7 Erosion and D9 Overloading. So, 
 ( 6) ( 9) ( 3) ( 7)p D p D p D p D+ > +   
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Thus, 
 ( 3) ( 7) ( 9)p p pI D I D I D= >   
Because of the small probability principle, 
 ( 5) ( 1) ( 8) ( 5) ( 1) ( 8)[ ( 3) ( 7)]p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D+ > + +   
 ( 1) ( 8) ( 1) ( 8)[ ( 6) ( 9)]p D p D p D p D p D p D> +   
Therefore,  
 ( 2) ( 6)p pI D I D>   
 ( 4) ( 3)p pI D I D>   
Since D5 Material Resistance is one of the inherent properties of the composite structure which is 
difficult to be changed. ( 5)p D  is considered as large probability. Then 
 ( 5) ( 1) ( 8)[ ( 3) ( 7)] ( 1) ( 8)p D p D p D p D p D p D p D+ + >   
So,  
 ( 6) ( 4)P PI D I D>   
Finally we obtain the following inequality and the results are shown in Table 4-4. 
 ( 2) ( 6) ( 4) ( 3) ( 7) ( 9)p p p p p pI D I D I D I D I D I D> > > = >  (4.7) 
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Table 4-4 Results of Probability Importance Analysis 
High Mishandling (D2) Natural Object Impact (D6)  
Medium Lightning (D3) Heat (D4) Erosion (D7) 
Low Overloading (D9)   
 
This table suggests that D2 Mishandling and D6 Natural Object Impact are the most critical 
damage sources, followed by D4 Heat, D3 Lightning and D7 Erosion. D9 Overloading ranks the 
least. According to the survey, most mishandlings lead to either apparent damage such as scratch, 
dent or internal damage such as delamination. Natural object impact such as runway debris is less 
likely to happen compared to human error. These two damage categories by human behavior and 
natural accidents are the most severe damages which are of particular concern.  
It should be noted that since D1 Surface Protection, D5 Resistance and D8 Manufacturing 
Defects are inherently related to material properties or manufacturing process. It is difficult to 
define their probabilities and will be discussed separately. 
4.4.4 Relative Probability Importance Analysis 
Probability Importance Analysis determines the influence of the probability change of the basic 
event on that of the top event. But it cannot represent the difficulty of the different basic events’ 
improvement. Relative Probability Importance Analysis is introduced to measure the variation of 
the top event probability from the aspects of sensitivity and probability of the basic event itself 
[150, 151]. 
 1
1
( , )( ) 1, ,
( , )
i n
c i
n i
p Q p pI D i n
Q p p p
∂ ⋅⋅⋅
= ⋅ = ⋅⋅⋅
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∂
 (4.8) 
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From Equation (4.8), the relative probability importance of each basic event is calculated as 
follows: 
 1
( 1) [ ( 1) ( 2) ( 8) ( 1) ( 4) ( 8) ( 1) ( 3) ( 6) ( 8)
( 1) ( 3)( 8)( 9) ( 1) ( 6) ( 7) ( 8)
( 1) ( 7) ( 8) ( 9)] / ( , , )
c
n
I D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D
p D p D D D p D p D p D p D
p D p D p D p D Q p p
= + +
+ +
+ ⋅⋅⋅   
 1( 2) [ ( 2) ( 5) ( 1) ( 2) ( 8)] / ( , , )c nI D p D p D p D p D p D Q p p= + ⋅⋅⋅   
 1( 3) [ ( 1) ( 3) ( 6) ( 8) ( 1) ( 3) ( 8) ( 9)] / ( , , )c nI D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D Q p p= + ⋅⋅⋅   
 1( 4) ( 1) ( 4) ( 8) / ( , , )c nI D p D p D p D Q p p= ⋅⋅⋅   
 1( 5) [ ( 2) ( 5) ( 5) ( 6)] / ( , , )c nI D p D p D p D p D Q p p= + ⋅⋅⋅   
1( 6) [ ( 5) ( 6) ( 1) ( 3) ( 6) ( 8) ( 1) ( 6) ( 7) ( 8)] / ( , , )c nI D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D Q p p= + + ⋅⋅⋅
 
 1( 7) [ ( 1) ( 6) ( 7) ( 8) ( 1) ( 7) ( 8) ( 9)] / ( , , )c nI D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D Q p p= + ⋅⋅⋅   
 1
( 8) [ ( 1) ( 2) ( 8) ( 1) ( 4) ( 8) ( 1) ( 3) ( 6) ( 8)
( 1) ( 3) ( 8) ( 9) ( 1) ( 6) ( 7) ( 8)
( 1) ( 7) ( 8) ( 9)] / ( , , )
c
n
I D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D
p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D
p D p D p D p D Q p p
= + +
+ +
+ ⋅⋅⋅   
 1( 9) [ ( 1) ( 3) ( 8) ( 9) ( 1) ( 7) ( 8) ( 9)] / ( , , )c nI D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D p D Q p p= + ⋅⋅⋅   
Similar comparisons can be made and it is shown that D2 Mishandling and D6 Natural Object 
Impact rank the highest irrespective of the particular group of events mentioned previously (D1, 
D5 and D8). 
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4.5 Quantitative Analysis 
A survey was conducted at a Chinese airline maintenance department in December 2012 to 
collect damage records on aircraft structures made of composite materials. Wing structural 
damages (ATA Chapter 57) for two types of aircraft fleet (21 Boeing 737-800 & 9 Boeing 757-
200, 30 aircraft in total) recorded over a 10-year period were obtained. A breakdown of damage 
categories and their numbers of occurrence on composites made with CFRP are plotted in Figure 
4-2. It is shown that dent is the most frequent damage mode followed by painting peel off. Due to 
the inconsistency of maintenance recording, damages such as dent, scratch, erosion, etc. can all 
lead to the painting peel off. To facilitate the following analysis, painting peel off caused by 
scratch is assumed to take up approximately half of the percentage, rounding to 12%. 
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Figure 4-2 Damage category and occurrence number of CFRP composites 
A statistical analysis was performed aiming at the selected laminated CFRP panel. 12 occurrences 
of the primary damage mode dent were recorded in the CFRP panel in 6 Boeing 737-800 aircraft. 
The design life of Boeing 737-800 is 100,000 flight hours and the composite panel is assumed to 
have the same design life as the aircraft. Therefore, the average number of dent events per flight 
hour is 2e-5. According to the percentage distribution of each damage mode in Figure 4-2, the 
average numbers of occurrence for the seven damage modes per flight hour were calculated with 
some rounding and are shown in Table 4-5. 
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Table 4-5 Probability of occurrence for damage modes 
Damage mode Number of occurrence per flight hour (Probability) 
C1 Scratch 0.6e-5 
C2 Oxidation 0.5e-5 
C3 Dent 2e-5 
C4 Erosion 0.6e-5 
C5 Hole 0.1e-5 
C6 Delamination 0.4e-5 
C7 Debond 0.2e-5 
 
Further, the probability of occurrence for damage modes was distributed to various damage 
causes by engineering experience from the airline. The distribution law is based on the Boolean 
operation in the fault tree structure in Figure 4-1. Take C3 Dent as an illustration, it is caused by 
both D5 Material Resistance and the other intermediate event which is caused by either D2 
Mishandling or D6 Natural Object Impact. Then we have the following relationship:  
 ( 3) ( 5) [ ( 2) ( 6)]P C P D P D P D= × +  (4.9)  
Replacing by numerical values, we obtain the allocated probability of occurrence for every basic 
event in the fault tree as listed in Table 4-6. 
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Table 4-6 Probability of occurrence for damage causes 
Damage cause Number of occurrence per flight hour (Probability) 
D1 Surface Protection 0.05 
D2 Mishandling 1.2e-4 
D3 Lightning Strike 0.5e-4 
D4 Heat 0.5e-4 
D5 Material Resistance 0.1 for dent / 0.005 for hole 
D6 Natural Object Impact 0.8e-4 
D7 Wind Erosion 1.2e-4 
D8 Manufacturing Defects 0.02 
D9 Overloading 0.5e-4 
 
Once the probability distributions were assigned to every basic event, Monte Carlo simulation 
was then conducted as a validation of the previous qualitative analysis. Its principle is to simulate 
the occurrences of the primary events by a random number generator. In each trial, the primary 
event is simulated by generating a random number in the interval [0, 1] and if the number is no 
larger than the probability assigned, the event is reckoned to occur. Then the fault tree is 
evaluated for the top event probability and the contributions of the primary events by a large 
number of trials. In this analysis, the primary concern is the probability importance of every basic 
event instead of the probability of the top event. Setting the number of trials to 1e+6, Monte Carlo 
simulation was performed by the commercial software called OpenFTA [152], a table of the 
failure contribution towards the top event and the importance value of each basic event (damage 
cause) are obtained as below: 
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Table 4-7 Importance of damage causes 
Damage cause Failure contribution Importance 
D1 Surface Protection 5.170e-5 9.66 
D2 Mishandling 3.057e-4 57.10 
D3 Lightning Strike <1.000e-5 0 
D4 Heat 5.170e-5 9.66 
D5 Material Resistance 6.634e-5 123.81 
D6 Natural Object Impact 1.984e-4 37.06 
D7 Wind Erosion <1.000e-5 0 
D8 Manufacturing Defects 4.482e-4 83.71 
D9 Overloading <1.000e-5 0 
 
4.6 Discussion 
For quantitative analysis, current statistical damage data obtained from the survey is still not 
comprehensive. Some data needs to be either idealized or hypothesized based on engineering 
experience, such as the probability distributions of C1 Scratch, D1 Surface Protection, D5 
Material Resistance and D8 Manufacturing Defects. 
Take D5 as an illustration, Material Resistance is one of the inherent properties of composites, its 
resistance to low energy impact causing dent is weak whereas the resistance to large energy 
impact causing hole is relatively strong. Therefore, two discrete values are assigned to D5 for two 
situations.  
After a large number of trials by simulation, the final quantitative results were obtained in Table 
4-7. It should be noted that numerical values of failure contribution less than 1e-5 are neglected 
due to the program precision and thereby the corresponding D3, D7 and D9 with very low 
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importance are set to 0. Overall, the importance ranking of damage causes is 
D5>D8>D2>D6>D4=D1>D3=D7=D9.  
Previous qualitative analyses rank the importance of every basic event from three aspects. 
Structure Importance Analysis is based on the fault tree structure itself. Probability Importance 
Analysis reflects the unreliability of the basic event to the top event. Relative Probability 
Importance Analysis was performed as a supplement measuring sensitivity. Rankings of the 
damage causes were obtained in Table 4-3 and Table 4-4. Compared with the results of the 
numerical example, excluding the particular group (D1, D5 & D8) mentioned in the previous 
section, the importance ranking for the damage causes is D2>D6>D4>D3=D9=D7, which is 
consistent with Inequality (4.7), demonstrating the feasibility of the FTA on composite damages. 
The benefits of the method are concluded as follows: 
1) A wide variety of composite damage modes and damage causes can be synthesized into a tree 
which is intuitive and systematic. 
2) Without sufficient information on damages, qualitative analysis can be performed to identify 
main contributors and then targeted actions and resources can be prioritized. 
3) With sufficient data available, quantitative analysis can be conducted. Either constant 
probabilities or time-related probabilities can be calculated to obtain the top event frequency, 
occurrence rates of damages, damage severity, etc., providing valuable information to 
maintenance and reliability departments. 
However, this method has several shortcomings: 
1) The fault tree constructed in this chapter is relatively a primary static model which cannot 
capture the behavior of damages and their interactions. A dynamic fault tree on composite 
damages can be studied in the future.  
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2) Acquisition of sufficient data on composite damages is always a difficult problem. There is 
limited public database on composite damages. Also, airlines lack an effective system to store and 
manage damage and maintenance information during operation. These result in an obstacle to 
conduct quantitative analysis of practical value. 
4.7 Potential Solutions 
According to both qualitative and quantitative fault tree analyses on CFRP composite damages, 
contributions of various damage causes have been prioritized. This method can be used as a 
proactive tool to prevent the occurrence of the top event from those main contributors. Several 
solutions addressing different damage causes are proposed in order to improve the reliability of 
composite structures. 
4.7.1 Material Design 
To improve the poor material resistance (D5) to impacts, great efforts should be paid to 
developing 3D composites, which can not only enhance through-thickness resistance, but also 
prevent from delamination propagation [145]. Typical examples are Z pinned composite and 3D 
fiber structures as shown in Figure 4-3. However, there is still a long way to go before 3D 
structures are widely used by aircraft industries due to cost and efficiency. Economic 
manufacturing processes and new airworthiness regulations specific to 3D composites should be 
developed at the same time.  
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Figure 4-3 3D fiber structure (left) and Z-pins composite (right) 
4.7.2 Fabrication Process 
Different from traditional metallic components manufacturing, there are various forming 
processes for composites, such as autoclave forming, vacuum bag molding, pultrusion, filament 
winding and resin transfer molding. After forming, machining is applied including cutting, 
trimming, drilling and reaming [153]. Inherent flaws like voids, filament spacing, misalignment, 
imperfect interface bonding, residual stress, etc. are introduced occasionally during the 
fabrication process.  
To reduce the manufacturing defects (D8), more accurate manufacturing process should be 
implemented. New techniques such as a drilling method that can prevent laminate from edge fuzz 
and an exact temperature control in autoclave forming can be developed. Meanwhile, a more 
strict quality certification procedure should be applied to enhance manufacturing quality control. 
4.7.3 Personnel Training 
Since accidental damage from natural sources is hard to predict, great attention should be paid to 
the improvement of technical skills of the operating personnel to reduce the human mishandling 
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(D2). From the previous analysis, human mishandling (D2) makes a significant contribution in 
damage threats such as ground vehicle collisions, tools dropping, etc. The qualification required 
to maintain composites is much higher than that to maintain traditional materials. Targeted 
training procedures should be further studied and implemented. Maintenance workload should be 
reduced and the working environment should be improved to avoid unnecessary mistakes. 
4.7.4 Surface Protection 
Adequate surface protection (D1) is one of the key factors in scheduled maintenance. Efforts 
should be put to investigating main damage causes occurring in different locations of aircraft so 
that targeted protective coating can be applied to effectively reduce specific damages due to 
lightning, erosion or moisture. New coating techniques with multiple protective functions are 
encouraged to be developed.  
4.7.5 Damage Evaluation and Life Prediction 
Except for inherent reasons (D1, D5 & D8), impact damage is the most significant cause of the 
composite structural failure. Compared to the understanding of metal crack propagation due to 
fatigue, the deterioration for composites after impact is yet to be determined. Investigations into 
the mechanisms of composite damage accumulation should be continued to characterize the 
relationship between the size of the impacted area and the residual strength in order to make more 
accurate life prediction. Then, optimized inspection intervals can be determined to monitor the 
composite structural health satisfying both safety and economic requirements. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter proposed a new FTA to model various damages of composite airframes. A typical 
composite panel made of CFRP was selected by identifying multiple damage modes and damage 
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causes. Structural Importance Analysis, Probability Importance Analysis as well as Relative 
Probability Importance Analysis were conducted to rank various damage causes. The 
applicability of the FTA on composites was validated through a numerical example based on 
statistical data and engineering experience from survey. Potential solutions aiming at improving 
the reliability of composite structures were proposed accordingly. 
This study fills the research gap by synthesizing a diversity of damage modes and damage causes 
of the composite airframe in a systematic manner on a macroscopic level. Both advantages and 
disadvantages of the fault tree were outlined at the end of the discussion section. Engineers from 
airlines can apply this method to discover the main damage modes and damage causes for 
different composite structures through operational monitoring so that pertinent preventative 
actions can be performed. Manufacturers can combine this approach with other methodologies 
such as fuzzy comprehensive evaluation, back propagation network, etc. to develop composites’ 
rating system for more efficient maintenance schedules. 
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CHAPTER 5. INSPECTION INTERVAL OPTIMIZATION 
FOR AIRCRAFT COMPOSITE STRUCTURES 
CONSIDERING DENT DAMAGE 
5.1 Introduction 
The next three chapters address the scheduled maintenance optimization problem for aircraft 
composite structures through probabilistic analysis from three different aspects. Chapter 5 focuses 
on the inspection interval optimization. Previous analysis has dealt with this problem within 
MSG-3 analysis. Instead, the inspection interval is optimized based on a combination of statistical 
in-service data and specific physical model. Chapter 6 addresses the repair tolerance issue, which 
denotes two critical thresholds as whether to repair or not and whether to replace or repair. 
Chapter 7 investigates the influence of structural health monitoring (SHM) on scheduled 
maintenance by synchronizing various SHM tasks with traditional scheduled maintenance tasks.  
In this chapter, a comprehensive explanation of the advantages of probabilistic analysis over 
deterministic analysis is provided firstly. Then the current damage tolerance philosophy for 
composite structures is illustrated which has a direct guidance in making maintenance schedules 
for the following studies.   
Currently, aircraft structures are designed based on deterministic approaches which assume a 
worst case scenario and give a factor of safety for the loads and a knockdown factor for the 
strength. One of the fundamental disadvantages is that the deterministic approach is developed 
under conventional configurations, mostly for metallic materials and familiar structural designs. 
The determination of those factors comes from engineering experience for metallic aircraft in the 
past half century. However, new aircraft design philosophies are developing dramatically away 
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from conventional environments. Historical uncertainty factors may not be able to provide 
sufficient safety and reliability. Design to all worst scenarios may result in an unacceptable 
increase in weight. In addition, new materials also bring challenges for the current structural 
design. The usage of composite materials in aircraft structures is growing because of many 
advanced properties, such as high strength/stiffness ratio, low sensitivity to environment, design 
flexibility, etc. But these materials have more intrinsic variables than metals due to heterogeneity 
and they are subjected to more sources of variation in the manufacturing process [59]. The extra 
uncertainties lead to relatively large knockdown factors, which also result in a substantial weight 
increase without a quantifiable increase in structural reliability. 
The other disadvantage of the traditional design approach is a lack of quantifiable measurement 
for safety and reliability. Therefore, it is difficult to select an optimized design approach on 
aircraft safety as designs are growing more critical and competitive. Both military and 
commercial guidance emphasize the importance of reliability as an essential feature. With 
numerical reliability values available during operation, a consistent level of safety and efficiency 
can be ensured throughout the aircraft life-cycle. 
In conclusion, new design philosophies and new materials have induced more uncertainties and 
there is a need for keeping life-cycle efficiency with measureable indexes. Therefore, non-
deterministic design methods rise as an alternative but advanced solution to address uncertainties, 
in other words, to reduce potential risks.  
Risk is defined as the possibility of encountering harm or loss and it exists in all activities [59]. 
People decide to take part in the activity provided that they accept the risk level either 
consciously or subconsciously. For aircraft structures, risks come from various factors from 
design to operation since most of these engineering parameters have random nature, such as 
material properties, working environment, loading, damage, etc. Different from the traditional 
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design analysis that treats them as deterministic values and therefore leaves an unknown 
reliability, probabilistic structural analysis provides a means to quantify the inherent risk of the 
design. 
In terms of aircraft maintenance, pertinent activities are determined mainly based on two factors: 
1) How aircraft is designed and manufactured; 2) the operational conditions. For an aircraft 
structure, the maintenance planner needs to know the load bearing capacity of the structure and 
the structure degradation mechanism to various possible damages during operation. Thus, risks in 
maintenance can also be quantified by probabilistic structural analysis methods, since in addition 
to design variables, damage characteristics and operational environments are probabilistic in 
nature. The   uncertainties exist in almost everywhere during the life-cycle of the aircraft structure. 
The probabilistic analysis intends to address all cases in a practical approach instead of 
considering them in the worst scenarios. With sufficient design and service data available, 
maintenance plans can be optimized by reducing the lifelong cost while maintaining an 
acceptable risk level which is intuitively measurable. 
Currently, the MSG-3 document is the most widely accepted method for making maintenance 
plans and in previous chapters, the MSG-3 method for aircraft structures were investigated in 
detail. However, even though an intelligent rating system was proposed to determine more 
objective inspection intervals, it still largely depends on engineering experience without 
considering a variety of factors from design, manufacturing and operation. Besides, its rating 
ability for new generation materials is relatively limited, which makes it insufficient for new 
aircraft with significant amount of advanced composite structures. 
The probabilistic method developed in this thesis is beyond the scope of the experience-based 
MSG-3 method. Instead, it is data driven combined with specific physical properties, which is 
more convincing in determining optimized inspection intervals for aircraft composite structures. 
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5.2 Damage Tolerance Philosophy of Composite Structures  
5.2.1 Properties of Aircraft Composite Structures 
Composite properties have been discussed in the previous chapters. Because of their anisotropy 
and complicated manufacturing processes which are difficult to control precisely, composite 
structures display more complex damage modes compared with cracks in metallic structures. 
Fortunately, in terms of three damage sources, historic service experience show that composite 
primary structures complied with FAR-25 and JAR-25 requirements such as Boeing 737 
horizontal stabilizer, Boeing 777 and Airbus series empennage, etc. exhibit excellent resistance to 
environmental deterioration and fatigue damage [154-156]. Therefore, for composite primary 
structures such as thick skins, accidental damage becomes the primary concern in damage 
tolerance design and maintenance planning.  
5.2.2 Maintenance Model of Composite Structures 
Generally, metallic materials are homogeneous and have high ductility. A clear fatigue 
characteristic can be obtained and thereby crack propagation in metallic structures can be 
predicted precisely. Though significant advantages over metallic materials, composite materials 
show brittle behavior during failure because of its anisotropy and large scattered properties. From 
previous fault tree analysis, composites are much more sensitive to impact damage [157]. But 
there is no general damage propagation mechanism up till now. Therefore, composite structures 
are designed to preclude detrimental damage growth during normal operation. To be more 
specific, composite structures follow a “no-growth” approach to damage-tolerant design. All 
composite SSIs are certified to meet the no-growth requirements. Damage initiation and 
propagation due to fatigue is not applicable for composites [30, 31]. Damage in composites is 
assumed to stay constant instead of deteriorating with time. A typical figure is shown below [74]. 
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Figure 5-1 Damage tolerance design for metals and composites 
Two kinds of load conditions are defined by FAA [158]:  
1) Limit loads are the maximum loads expected in service and there should be no permanent 
deformation of the structure at limit load. 
2) Ultimate loads are defined as the limit loads times a safety factor. In FAR Part 25 the safety 
factor is specified as 1.5. For different aircraft usage, the safety factor can be adjusted. The 
structure must withstand the ultimate load for at least 3 second without failure. Usually, there are 
two situations where the safety factor is more than 1.5. One is for some very critical load bearing 
components in order to guarantee a high safety level. The other is for structures made of 
composite materials because of their brittle behavior. 
As shown in Figure 5-1 depicted by the yellow curve, assume a crack initiates at time t in a 
metallic structure. The residual strength goes through a degradation process as the crack grows 
with time, once the damage is beyond the allowable size, the structure must be repaired. 
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Otherwise, the strength will further degrade. If the residual strength decreases below the limit 
load level, severe safety problems might be induced. In comparison, assume an impact occurs at 
time t on a composite structure, as depicted by the blue curve. The residual strength immediately 
reduces to a lower level but still stays above the limit load level. According to the “no-growth” 
design philosophy, the damage size will not grow further regardless of the cyclic loading. In this 
situation, it seems that the damage tolerance assumption can always be met without the need for 
repair. However, another hidden but inherent parameter, which is difficult to be measured by 
deterministic methods: the probability of failure of the damaged composite structure, will 
increase as depicted by the shaded area in Figure 5-1. If the damage in the metallic structure is 
detected and repaired timely whereas the damage in the composite structure remains undetected 
or unrepaired for a long time, the composite structure would not be as safe as the metallic one. 
This is why an inspection schedule and a repair policy are necessary under the damage tolerance 
philosophy of composite airframes. Accordingly, the optimization of the inspection interval and 
the repair threshold for aircraft composite structures is studied in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 
separately, based on probabilistic damage-tolerance analysis. 
5.3 Damage Characterization 
The prerequisite of the probabilistic approach is to obtain necessary information in terms of 
composites design properties and actual usage during operation. A survey was conducted at a 
Chinese airline maintenance department to collect damage records on aircraft structures made of 
composite materials. Then statistics were performed to refine valuable information as inputs. 
5.3.1 Data Statistics and Category 
Wing structural damages (ATA Chapter 57) for two types of aircraft fleet (Boeing 737-800 & 
Boeing 757-200) over the past 10 years were obtained. A typical damage category of composite 
124 
 
structures is shown in Figure 5-2. It should be pointed out that although painting peel-off takes a 
large proportion throughout the maintenance records, it is simply a superficial defect which will 
not cause the loss of inherent integrity, thereby not listed. 
 
Figure 5-2 Damage category 
The bar chart illustrates that the impact damage consisting of dent, delamination and hole 
occupies more than 50% of all damages and dent is the primary damage type. Different from the 
internal damages like delamination and hole, dent is commonly caused by various discrete low 
energy impact sources, such as hail, runway debris, tools dropping, etc. This chapter focuses on 
the low energy impact damage resulting in dent, and the effect of dent sizes. 
5.3.2 Damage Size Distribution 
The appearances of the dent can be superficial with a large surface area or deep in the material 
with a small surface area. Statistical analysis was performed on damage area diameter a  and 
depth y . A goodness-of-fit test was performed for several probability models in order to 
determine the best fitness to describe the damage diameter and depth. Results show that the 
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classic Weibull distribution has a good fitness with a correlation coefficient of 0.969 and 0.981 
respectively. The probability distributions for diameter and depth are shown in Figure 5-3 and 
Figure 5-4. 
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Figure 5-3 Damage diameter distribution 
The Weibull expression of the diameter distribution is given by: 
( )1( ; , ) e , 0, 0, 0
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Figure 5-4 Damage depth distribution 
The Weibull expression of the depth distribution is given by: 
( )1( ; , ) e , 0, 0, 0
0.05636, 2.456
y
f y y y
β
β α
β
βα β α β
α
α β
−−= ≥ > >
= =
 
Inspired by Ren [159], who proposed a corrosion-spot index (CSI) to describe the relationship 
between the depth and the area of a corrosion spot, an analogous concept called dent spot index 
(DSI) is proposed which denotes the diameter/depth ratio and is expressed as: 
/a yη =  
Four most likely probability distribution functions (PDFs) were tested and their goodness-of-fit 
are calculated in Figure 5-5. 
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Figure 5-5 Goodness-of-fit test for DSI 
It is resulted from the test that Log-Logistic distribution function is the best PDF with the highest 
coefficient of 0.981. Its scale and location parameters are shown in Figure 5-6. 
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Figure 5-6 Diameter/Depth distribution 
The Loglogistic expression of this DSI distribution is given by: 
1
2
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The Structural Repair Manual (SRM) of the Boeing 737-800 has similar definitions [160]. For 
example, one of the allowable damage limits for a damage area is specified as: /w y  must be 30 
or more at each point along the length of the dent and y  = a maximum of 0.125 inch, where w  = 
minimum width of the dent, y  = depth of the dent where the width is measured. 
DSI may provide more practical values in damage detection and in the subsequent repair policy 
making considering both damage diameter and depth. To the author’s knowledge, there is little 
information on the probability of detection (POD) against DSI. In this case, the PODs for damage 
area diameter and depth are studied and the larger one is selected as the final POD. 
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5.3.3 Probability of Detection (POD) 
It is a time-consuming effort to perform experiments to examine engineers’ possibility to detect 
dent with influencing factors incorporating colors of the composite panel, cleanness, inspection 
duration, brightness, personal eyesight, professional skills, the inspection angles, etc. [161]. 
General visual inspection (GVI) and detailed inspection (DET) are considered as two general 
inspection types in structural maintenance. Under special circumstances, special detailed 
inspection (SDI) is applied to make more detailed examination. In this study, both GVI and DET 
are considered. Previous studies focused on POD for detecting cracks in metal structures and 
composites show the similar results [62], which are demonstrated by some recent experimental 
results on certain composite panels [161]. The POD values are generally follow two distributions 
and their cumulative probability functions: Equation (5.1) and Equation (5.2) can be used as 
approximations in this study without data scale: 
Cumulative Weibull distribution function: 
 
( )
( ) 1
x
F x e
α
β
−
= −  (5.1) 
Cumulative Log-Normal distribution function: 
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+= +
 (5.2) 
In terms of damage area depth, experimental data was obtained for a green panel at 45 degree 
inspection angle by DET [161]. Meanwhile, the POD data for GVI was obtained according to 
engineering experience in the surveyed airline maintenance department. A goodness-of-fit test 
was performed to determine if the Weibull model fits the data better. The POD curves and the 
related parameters are shown in Figure 5-7 and Equation (5.3) & (5.4). 
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Figure 5-7 POD vs. Damage depth (in) 
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In terms of damage area diameter, data is obtained from [64] and it shows that Log-Normal 
model fits the data with a higher regression value. The POD curves and the related parameters are 
shown in Figure 5-8 and Equation (5.5) & (5.6). 
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Figure 5-8 POD vs. Damage diameter (in) 
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5.4 Probabilistic Method 
5.4.1 Reliability Formulation  
One of the objectives of applying probabilistic damage tolerance philosophy is to be able to 
quantify the reliability of the structure. Herein, the assessment of the probability of failure (POF) 
is illustrated as follows:  
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Dent Diameter (in)
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 D
et
ec
tio
n
 
 
GVI
GVI fit
DET
DET fit
132 
 
According to the requirement of damage tolerance philosophy, damage accumulated in service of 
a structure should be detected and repaired before the residual strength degrades beyond some 
predetermined threshold. In this study, the entire service life-cycle of a composite structure is 
considered as a series of discrete activities consisted of damage, inspection, and repair (a life-
cycle denotes the time period from the aircraft entering into service to its retirement). These 
activities exerted from outside can be reflected by the variation of the inherent residual strength 
of the structure. The POF per life-cycle is evaluated by the following formulation: 
 
1
1 [1 ( , )]
N
f i i
i
POF P S t
=
= − −∏  (5.7) 
where it  is the 
thi  time interval between ( 1)thi −  and thi  activity (0 means the initial service 
time), iS  is the 
thi  residual strength between ( 1)thi −  and thi  activity, N  is the number of 
damages occurred in one life-cycle, and ( )fP ⋅  is the probability of failure for each interval with 
constant residual strength. 
Failure occurs when the applied load exceeds the residual strength. Each time interval throughout 
the life-cycle with constant residual strength is assumed in series connection. The cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of the maximum load per it  is expressed as: 
 ( )( , ) i iH S tl i iF S t e
−=  (5.8) 
where ( )H x  is the frequency of the event exceeding the level x .  
A simple numerical example is provided below: 
Assume that a composite panel has a random residual strength history as shown in Figure 5-9. 
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Figure 5-9 Random residual strength history in a life-cycle 
The initial strength is 1.5. An impact damage occurs at the instant t0. The residual strength 
decreases to 1.2 and stays constant until the time t1 when the damage is detected and the strength 
is recovered to its original level immediately. After t1, there is no damage to this structure till the 
end of life. Failure occurs when the random external load exceeds the residual strength. The load 
exceedance curve is assumed in Figure 5-10 and is expressed as: 
10 23.03( ) 10 xH x e−=  
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Figure 5-10 Load exceedance curve 
There are three time intervals it  of with a constant strength iS  as shown in Figure 5-9. Take the 
first time interval [0, 0.4] as example: 
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Likewise, 32 2( , ) 1.988 10fP S t
−= ×  and 63 3( , ) 3.975 10fP S t
−= × . Then the final POF value can 
be obtained by Equation (5.7). 
The calculation of POF depends on a number of random variables such as the number of damage 
occurrence, damage occurrence time, the damage extent, etc. and other factors including loading 
conditions, inspection schedule and residual strength, to name a few. Hereafter, a probabilistic 
simulation procedure based on the Monte Carlo method is proposed incorporating all the 
influencing parameters necessary to evaluate the POF. 
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5.4.2 Monte Carlo Simulation  
Monte Carlo simulation is a computerized mathematical technique that models phenomena with 
significant uncertainty. This method provides an effective means to account for risk in 
quantitative analysis and decision making. It performs risk analysis through building models of 
possible substitution of a range of value sampling from probability distributions, avoiding time 
and cost-consuming experimental repeats [162]. 
Monte Carlo can be used to model both discrete and continuous systems. Take discrete system as 
an illustration. The system state is driven by random events at limited/countable time. The state 
only changes at discrete random time moments and it is assumed that the change is completed 
instantly. 
In order to simulate a discrete system, a simulate clock has to be set, which can forward the time 
from one time instant to another and meanwhile can reflect the current time instant of the system. 
There are two ways to simulate the time forwarding: the next event forwarding and the uniform 
interval forwarding. The next event forwarding is used most commonly, the process of which is 
as follows:  
1) Set the simulate clock to 0;  
2) Jump to the occurrence time of the first event to calculate the system state;  
3) Generate the future event and add it into the queue, jump to the occurrence time of the next 
event to calculate the system state...  
4) Repeat the process until certain requirement is satisfied.  
The simulation flowchart is described in Figure 5-11. 
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Figure 5-11 Simulation flowchart 
The entire life-cycle of a composite structure suffering from low energy impact can be considered 
as a series of discrete activities incorporating damage, inspection and repair. Due to the no-
growth damage tolerance philosophy, the residual strength stays constant until being repaired. 
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Therefore, the residual strength variation in a life-cycle can be considered as a discrete system. 
Monte Carlo simulation has proven to be a robust methodology for such complicated problems 
with discrete random variables [163]. It generally tends to follow a particular pattern:  
1) Define a domain of possible inputs 
2) Design a logic block diagram;  
3) Generate inputs randomly from probability distributions over the domain; 
4) Perform a deterministic computation on the inputs. 
The flowchart of the logic procedure is described in Figure 5-12. 
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Figure 5-12 Simulation flowchart for dent damage 
5.5 Case Study 
5.5.1 Average Damages per Life-cycle (Nd) 
Information on dent was extracted from the maintenance records of the Boeing 757-200 fleet 
wing structures (ATA Chapter 57) from 2002 to 2012. In total 46 occurrences of dent damage 
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were recorded in 6 aircrafts, among which 12 occurred on 4 GFRP panels located near the wing 
leading edge. The design life (life-cycle) of the Boeing 757-200 is 150,000 flight hours and these 
composite panels are assumed to have the same design life. Thus, the number of dent events per 
life-cycle on average (Nd) is 2.5. This is a relatively rare event and Nd is described by a Poisson 
distribution. 
5.5.2 Load Cases 
It is difficult to obtain the specific load exceedance data for certain structures. But for civil 
aircraft, the occurrence of gust load is mainly considered [164]: 
5
9
( ) 2 10 / ,
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Since the probability value under different exceeding conditions changes significantly by the 
power of 10, a Log-linear model is used to describe the load occurrence probability. The load 
exceedance curve is shown in Figure 5-13 and is expressed as:  
lg( ) 8.602 ( ) 8.903rat
LL
P ε ε= − × +  
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Figure 5-13 Load exceedance curve of gust load 
5.5.3 Damage Size and Occurrence Time 
The damage occurrence times are a series of highly random variable throughout the entire service 
life. A uniform generator was used to scatter the operational damage in one life-cycle. Generally, 
we use the damage area diameter and depth to describe a dent. In reality, some damage caused by 
a sharp object may be deep with a small area whereas some damage caused by blunt object may 
be shallow but has a considerable damage area and even delamination. Accordingly it is difficult 
to describe their relationship. Therefore, two generators were used to generate the dent diameter 
and depth obeying the Weibull PDF with separate parameters.  
Theoretically, the damage size is a function of many variables, such as the quality of the 
manufacturing process, the thickness of the laminate, the size of the impact object, impact energy, 
load case, boundary condition, composite design, etc. Many studies have considered different 
decision variables either in theory or by experiments. However, during real operation, the 
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maintenance engineers do not care, for instance, the boundary condition or the impact energy. 
They only work with what they see by eyes or instruments: the damage size. Therefore, this study 
focuses on damage size data including damage diameter and depth and also the DSI. 
5.5.4 Inspection Efficiency 
The inspection efficiency is described by the probability of detection (POD) which was explained 
in the previous section. The inspection interval is preset as T and the random time to detect the 
damage is expressed as:  
t T ξ= × , 
where ξ  is the number of inspection times to detect the damage, which can be generated by a 
geometric distribution [165]. Assume the thj  damage occurs at jt , then it is detected at the 
thξ  
inspection after the damage, which can be expressed as:  
( ) ([ ] )jd
t
t j T
T
ξ= + × , 
where [ ]⋅  is the floor operator. 
5.5.5 Residual Strength Reduction and Recovery 
In order to calculate the probability of failure, the damage size must be converted to the reduction 
of residual strength. For the most severe load case, the compression capacity is mainly considered 
and the damage diameter is used as the decision variable. The relative strength of the damaged 
GFRP panel is described by the following function: 
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 (5.9) 
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where A is the residual strength asymptote; C is the intercept; G and k are the slopes for the two 
curves. The relative strength reduction curve is shown in Figure 5-14. 
 
Figure 5-14 Relative residual strength reduction 
The recovery of the residual strength depends on different repair policies. Once damage is 
detected, engineers should refer to the detailed criteria in the SRM to decide whether or not the 
damage should be repaired or replaced. For simplicity, we assume the following rules: dents with 
diameters less than 1 inch can be allowed whereas larger dents must be repaired to recover to its r% 
strength, where r is the recovery efficiency coefficient described by a uniform distribution within 
the range of 0.85 – 0.95. 
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5.5.6 Other Assumptions and Definitions to Facilitate the Simulation 
The initial strength is described by a Gaussian distribution with the coefficient of variation 5% 
referring to the fact that many strength analysis applying a Gaussian PDF [25]. The initial average 
value of the residual strength is 
1 1.5 1.4 2.1RS f f= × = × = , 
where 1.5f =  is the factor of safety and 1 1.4f =  is the additional margin of safety. 
Environmental factors such as temperature, moisture and ultra-violet may induce composites’ 
degradation. Also, adjacent damage sites in a composite panel may result in additional strength 
reduction. For simplicity, these factors are not considered in this study. Compared to the life-
cycle, the repair duration can be ignored. Three situations are assumed:  
1) Damage is not detected. No repair activity is required;  
2) Damage is detected and within the threshold. No repair activity is initiated;  
3) Damage is detected and beyond the threshold. Repair is required. 
5.6 Results and Discussion 
Set the life-cycle to 1 unit and the inspection interval T = 0.1, the inspection method is GVI. A 
typical example of the residual strength in a random life-cycle is plotted in Figure 5-15. 
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Figure 5-15 Residual strength per life-cycle 
Apparently, there are four damage occurrences on the composite panel in one life-cycle. At the 
instant t1, the panel suffers the first impact but the damage is not detected in the following GVI 
inspections. The second damage occurs at t2 and it is detected and repaired at t3. The third 
damage occurs at t4 which is either undetected or detected but reserved. The last damage occurs 
at t5 but before any inspection started, the structure reaches its end. 
Various life-cycle strength results can occur due to the randomness of the Monte Carlo simulation. 
By taking 1000 samples, we obtain the relationship between the average probability of failure 
(POF) and the inspection interval T by GVI and DET, respectively; see Figure 5-16 (Both axes 
were processed by logarithm, same for Figure 5-17). 
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Figure 5-16 POF VS Inspection interval 
It is shown that fewer inspections result in a higher probability of failure. By assigning each 
inspection interval a risk level, here described by a POF value, airline engineers can determine 
the inspection intervals by assessing the required reliability of the composite structure due to 
different structural configurations in different service situations. For instance, if the required POF 
is no higher than 10-4, the maximum inspection intervals by GVI and DET should be 9600 flight 
hours and 21000 flight hours, respectively. 
Economy is the second important factor next to safety for civil aircraft. The total in-service cost 
for maintenance of the composite structure is classified into three parts:  
1) Routine inspection cost for the structure;  
2) Repair cost of the damage detected in the inspection;  
3) “Penalty cost” due to the structural high failure risk.  
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Assumptions are as follows: set the cost for each inspection by GVI to 1 unit and inspection by 
DET to 5 units; if the damage is detected and repaired, the repair cost is in proportion to the 
reduction of the residual strength; “penalty cost” is induced when the POF is above 10-4 level, 
structures may be severely damaged resulting in additional cost for replacement, spare parts, 
more labor hours, etc. The optimization of the inspection interval against the maintenance cost 
considering both safety and economy is shown in Figure 5-17. 
 
Figure 5-17 Inspection interval optimization 
By setting a POF threshold, the maintenance cost will not always decrease as the inspection 
interval increases. Because if the damage remains for a long time, the risk of failure will be high 
and therefore, the extra maintenance cost is very likely to be induced. It is shown from Figure 
5-17 that the minimum cost for both GVI and DET occur approximately at 15000 flight hours. 
According to the MRBR, the inspection interval for the composite panel is “4C” (16000 flight 
hours) by DET, which is the same level as the simulation result. The advantage of the 
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methodology is that the airline can adjust their inspection intervals dynamically for different 
composite structures in different operational environments by setting an acceptable risk level to 
seek the most economical inspection schedule. 
5.7 Conclusions 
This study combined a data-driven technique with a physical model of a composite structure, and 
applied a probabilistic methodology beyond the limit of MSG-3, which is largely based on 
engineering experience. A probabilistic simulation procedure was established to describe the 
structural strength variation in a life-cycle. The purpose of this study is to optimize the inspection 
intervals in two criteria: maintaining a high structural reliability as well as minimizing the 
maintenance cost. A composite panel made of GFRP from in-service aircraft was selected to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the methodology. 
Distinguishes of the study are as follows: 
(1) Ten years of maintenance records from operational aircraft were obtained in which 
damage data are relatively sufficient for statistics. 
(2) The primary damage type dent was specifically studied to discover the proper 
distributions of both damage area diameter and depth. Also, a dent spot index (DSI) 
denoting the diameter/depth ratio was proposed which can be of more value in measuring 
a dent. 
(3) A comparative probability of detection (POD) mechanism was proposed considering both 
PODs for damage diameter and damage depth. 
(4) A flexible phased repair policy was assumed based on real operation which can make the 
model more practical. 
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(5) Except for the reliability of the structure, a maintenance cost model was incorporated to 
optimize the inspection interval from an economic point of view.  
The contribution of this study is the handling of dent damage in composites taking advantage of 
in-service data. The residual strength of a composite structure susceptible to low energy impact 
over a life-cycle is simulated based on a “no-growth” design philosophy. By assigning each 
inspection interval a structural risk level and a cost factor, engineers from airlines or 
manufacturers can adjust the inspection intervals according to their specific requirements, 
satisfying both safety and economic objectives. Moreover, this method can be extended to include 
more factors such as the impact of temperature, moisture, ultra-violet, etc. provided that sufficient 
data pertinent to the structural degradation mechanism is obtained. Last but not least, the 
probabilistic method developed in this chapter is quite flexible to be used in tackling many other 
problems such as the repair issue as well as the consideration of Structural health monitoring 
(SHM) techniques. Details will be illustrated in the next two chapters.  
5.8 Publication 
[5] Xi Chen, He Ren, Cees Bil, ‘Inspection Intervals Optimization for Aircraft Composite 
Structures Considering Dent Damage’, Journal of Aircraft, Vol. 51, No. 1. DOI: 
10.2514/1.C032377. 
  
148 
 
CHAPTER 6. REPAIR TOLERANCE FOR COMPOSITE 
STRUCTURES USING PROBABILISTIC 
METHODOLOGIES 
6.1 Introduction 
To make an interim summary, Chapter 3 proposed an intelligent rating system in making 
inspection intervals within MSG-3. Chapter 4 investigated the damage characteristics particularly 
for aircraft structures made of composite materials. Chapter 5 optimized the inspection interval 
for composite structures through a probabilistic approach. In scheduled maintenance of aircraft 
structures, there are two key techniques: the determination of the inspection interval and the 
selection of the maintenance task [9]. Previous researches have tackled the first problem, in plain 
English, when to inspect. The other problem can be put simply as when to repair. Specifically, 
during each inspection, damage detected should be evaluated by certain criteria to determine a 
suitable maintenance activity. This chapter intends to deal with the repair issue in scheduled 
maintenance via proposing a concept called repair tolerance.  
6.2 Repair of Composite Structures 
The primary objective of structural repair is to restore the residual strength/stiffness of the 
damaged structure to its service condition in a limited time span and at a low cost [166]. 
Depending on the damage mode, damage location and damage severity, structural repair can have 
different types. Therefore, damage assessment is an important step in selecting a specific repair 
activity. For aircraft composite structures, which are susceptible to impact damage but have good 
resistance to environmental deterioration and fatigue propagation, impact events often cause 
combinations of damage. For example, high energy impact may result in significant fiber 
breakage, matrix cracking, delamination, broken fasteners; low energy impact may include a 
combination of broken fibers, matrix cracks and multiple delaminations. In some cases, damage 
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may appear to be small on the surface but severe inside. Based on the damage tolerance design of 
composite structures for transport category aircraft, the airworthiness requires that catastrophic 
failure due to fatigue, environmental effects, manufacturing defects, or accidental damage should 
be avoided throughout the structural operational life-cycle. Damages in composites are divided 
into the following five categories as depicted in Figure 6-1 [167].  
Design 
Load 
Level
Ultimate
X Factor 
of Safety
Limit
 Maximum load 
per lifetime
Continued safe 
flight
Allowable 
damage limit
Critical damage 
threshold
Damage severity
Category 1 Damage: BVID 
Allowed Mfg. damage
Category 2 Damage: VID 
damage requiring repair per 
normal inspection process
Category 3 Damage: Obvious 
damage requiring repair after it is 
detected within a limited flights
Category 4 Damage: Discrete 
source damage, obvious to flight 
crew requiring repair after flight
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Figure 6-1 Design load levels versus categories of damage severity 
It can be found that except for Category 1 barely visible impact damage (BVID), which can be 
kept as it is, other four damage categories require certain repair activities according to increasing 
damage severity. Category 2 and 3 belong to scheduled maintenance, since it is designed to relate 
the tasks to the consequences of structural damage remaining undetected. The rest two categories 
requiring immediate repair are within the scope of unscheduled maintenance, which have much 
lower probability of occurrence compared to the other categories. 
150 
 
Once the damage is completely characterized, maintenance personnel resort to source 
documentations to check with the criterion. If the damage size is within the allowable limit, only 
simple maintenance work is needed such as surface protection replacement, damage seal, etc. 
Otherwise, the damaged structure needs to go through a complex repair process. Sometimes the 
structure is even discarded and replaced with a new component. A category of various composite 
repair techniques is shown in Figure 6-2 [168].  
 
Figure 6-2 Composite repair techniques 
There are two major repair techniques relying on the specific composite part and damage type: 
bolted repair and bonded repair. The concept of bolted repair is borrowed from conventional 
metal repair but with unique design and process details. Compared with bonded repair, it is 
simple and quick, i.e. bolt a patch over the damage area, which can eliminate many potential 
problems induced in bonded repair. But bolted repair changes the original shape and design of the 
structural component, making it structurally undesirable [169]. Bonded repair is usually more 
reliable than bolted repair since bonding produces no holes and therefore reducing regional stress. 
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Bonded repair contains a series of complex processes and have to be treated by well-trained 
technicians. In addition to the strict in-process control, post-process non-destructive inspection 
(NDI) is necessary to guarantee the quality of the bonded joint.  A general procedure of the repair 
activities for composite structures is described in Figure 6-3. 
Damage 
Identification
Repair design
Damage 
removal
Patch 
selection
Drying
Repair 
material 
preparation
Surface 
preparation 
for bonding 
or curing
Repair layup Curing
Bolted repair
Repair 
verificaiton
Refinishing
 
Figure 6-3 Repair flow chart 
There are many source documents containing information on maintenance, modification and 
repair. One of the most complete maintenance documents in terms of instructions for damage 
disposition, inspection and repair is the Structural Repair Manual (SRM). It provides general 
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airplane data, usual procedure, and repair materials for the repair of the specific type of aircraft. 
Service Bulletins (SB) is the document issued by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that 
shares modifications to previous maintenance instructions which include supplemental inspection, 
rework and repair for a specific component. In some cases, there may be damage caused by 
unanticipated secondary loads. Service newsletters are issued by OEM to assist both users and 
operators aware of any potential damage. Other documents pertinent to maintenance field are 
Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), Component Maintenance Manual (CMM), just to name a 
few. They are referred to as instructions to implement particular repair activities. 
There have been significant research publications in various repair techniques to composite 
structures, but little information is found on under what condition should these repair activities be 
carried out, in other words, the repair threshold. Furthermore, not every damaged structure is 
repairable. One situation is that the damage is too severe to repair. The other situation is that 
considering influencing factors such as time and cost, it is more convenient or economic to 
replace it by a new component instead of repair. Hereafter, a new concept called “repair tolerance” 
is proposed to describe the repair thresholds and this chapter is devoted to the development of a 
probabilistic method to address the repair tolerance problem. 
6.3 Repair Tolerance 
The composite repair issue is a kind of system engineering which contains various parts such as 
damage characteristics, structural properties, damage detection, repair techniques, etc. as 
displayed in Figure 6-4.  
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Figure 6-4 Content of repair tolerance research 
The highlighted rectangular part is the focus of this study in which repair tolerance is determined. 
The concept of repair tolerance was first proposed by Shaojie Chen [168] by defining two 
thresholds as when to repair and when to replace as visualized in Figure 6-5. It is shown that 
repair tolerance is a subset of damage tolerance. Damage tolerance is one of the design 
requirements for structural design, which looks into the residual performance of a damaged 
structure and designs based on it. In comparison, repair tolerance is the measurement for 
structural reparability, which also studies the residual performance after damage based on the 
requirements for structural strength and stiffness. Besides, it should further combine many other 
factors such as the repair technique, human factor, maintenance cost, etc. to determine the 
detailed policy. 
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Figure 6-5 Repair tolerance concept 
Reparability is the degree of difficulty with which the damaged structure can be maintained or 
repaired in order to restore its strength or functionality according to specific requirements by 
referring to the structural repair policy. As a result, the determination of repair tolerance depends 
on the demonstration of the reparability which should consider various influencing factors such as 
damage/defect mode, damage size and degree, repair condition, the qualification of repair 
personnel, economic effectiveness, etc. Theoretically, the parameter that the repair tolerance 
controls directly is the residual strength ratio (residual strength/designed strength). However, in 
practice, damage sizes are more intuitive and the relationship between the residual strength and 
the damage size can be obtained by theoretical calculations or laboratory experiments. For 
simplicity, damage size is used as the independent variable to describe repair tolerance. 
Similar to the damage category for metallic airframes, composite structural damage can be 
classified as allowable damage, repairable damage and un-repairable damage. Corresponding to 
the lower threshold and upper threshold in repair tolerance, the lower limit controls the threshold 
whether the damage is allowable or should be repaired whereas the upper limit controls the 
threshold whether the damage is repairable or un-repairable meaning a replacement is required. If 
the lower threshold is set too low, even minor damage will initiate a repair activity which may be 
unnecessary and costly; if the lower threshold is set too high, the structure may remain in a 
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damaged condition for a long time, which may cause a threat to safety. Therefore, the lower 
threshold has a major influence on safety. As for the upper threshold, since the damaged structure 
is destined to go through certain maintenance work and thereby, the selection of a cost-effective 
maintenance task becomes engineers’ primary concern. Overall, dealing with uncertainty in the 
two thresholds has a significant impact on both safety and economy. 
To the author’s knowledge, only a few studies did some qualitative research into repair tolerance. 
Tong proposed a systematic scheme for repair tolerance and repair process from a perspective of 
engineering application, aiming at a common laminate and stiffened composite panel [170]. 
Another research effort was undertaken by Liang, who simplified the repair tolerance model by  
measuring structural loading capacities [171]. Unfortunately, there is little quantitative 
information on this concept. This study applies a probabilistic method to quantify the repair 
tolerance in two aspects: the uncertainty in the lower threshold is measured by the risk of safety 
and the uncertainty in the upper threshold is assessed by the maintenance cost.  
6.4 Probabilistic method 
The probabilistic approach for the damage-tolerant composite structures is addressed with a 
computer simulation. Many sampling-based probabilistic methods have been proposed such as 
first and second order reliability method, importance sampling method, advanced mean-based 
method and Markov chain analysis [139, 165]. These methods are either based on fast probability 
integration (FPI) which only works well for smooth performance functions or are limited by too 
many assumptions. The task here involves a series of discrete random variables describing the 
accidental damage and maintenance activities for composite airframes in-service. Monte Carlo 
simulation is considered as a viable alternative which can easily handle complex scenarios and is 
proved to be a robust and flexible modeling approach [163]. 
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The realistic conditions for composite structures, incorporating accidental impact, strength 
reduction after impact, periodic inspection and necessary repair or replacement in an operational 
life-cycle, etc. can be simulated in the procedure as shown in Figure 6-6. Because of the random 
behavior of damage, there exists uncertainty from one simulation to another. Therefore, the 
simulation should be conducted many times to tackle the scatter problem. Although time 
consuming, it can provide more accurate and practical results.  
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Figure 6-6 Simulation flowchart 
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The sequence for the simulation procedure is illustrated as follows: 
1) The first step is to generate the initial strength for the composite structure, It is known that 
Gaussian PDF is often used for strength analysis and product quality control [25]. Therefore, the 
strength scatter introduced in the manufacturing process is described by a Gaussian PDF. 
 2) The damages occurring in a composite structure in operational life-cycle are a series of 
discrete and rare events, and are best described by a Poisson distribution. 
3) If the generated number of damage (Nd) is 0, i.e. no damage has occurred, and except for 
scheduled inspection, no maintenance activities are required. Then the probability of failure (POF) 
and maintenance cost can be evaluated, which will be discussed at the end of this section. 
4) If Nd > 0, the damage occurrence time is generated. Since impact damages caused by runway 
debris, hail, human mishandling, etc. are highly random and accidental, a uniform distribution 
generator is used to describe the scattered damages possible to occur at any time throughout the 
service life. 
5) After the generation of damage occurrence time, damage sizes are generated. The distribution 
model can be derived based on damage records statistics from real operational aircraft. 
6) The inspection efficiency is described by the probability of detection (POD). It is a time-
consuming effort to obtain an exact relationship of POD against the damage size. Multiple 
influencing factors should be taken into account, such as colors of the composite panel, cleanness, 
brightness, inspection angles, personal eyesight, professional skills, etc. [161]. Generally there are 
three inspection levels: general visual inspection (GVI), detailed inspection (DET/DI) and special 
detailed inspection (SDI). For structures in different locations, an appropriate inspection level 
should be selected and the corresponding POD can be obtained from a certain probability 
function.  
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7) Since POD is introduced, the time t to detect damage may be delayed to the subsequent 
inspections and is expressed as:  
t T n= × , 
where T is the predetermined inspection interval and n is the number of times to detect the 
damage, which can be generated by a geometric distribution.  
8) Assume that the inspection time and repair time are negligible, the damage occurrence time 
and damage detection time should be ordered in sequence to facilitate the description of residual 
strength variation.  
9) The damage size should be converted to the reduction of residual strength. The relationship of 
residual strength against damage size for a particular composite structure can be obtained by 
experiment or theoretical calculation.  
10) After damage, the following inspection offers a window for damage disposition that whether 
it should be repaired and what repair process should be taken, provided that damage is detected. 
The determination of the repair policy has a direct effect on the probability of failure (POF) and 
the maintenance cost, which is a series of proactive actions after each inspection that can be 
controlled. If the damage has not reached the critical level, no repair is needed or simply basic 
repair is applied to protect and decorate the surface. If the damage is beyond the critical level, two 
types of repair are usually initiated: temporary repair and permanent repair. Specifically, for 
laminates and sandwich panels, there are three basic approaches. First is patch repair, which is 
quick and simple but without a consideration for thickness and weight increases. It belongs to 
temporary repair. The other two are scarf repair and step sanded repair which can provide a 
straighter and stronger load path but requires time and high skill [169]. They are permanent repair.  
If the damage is too severe, replacement may be more efficient instead of repair. 
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11) According to different repair techniques, the residual strength will be recovered to different 
levels. If the structure is repaired, a recovery efficiency coefficient will be appended by a uniform 
distribution within a certain range. If the structure is replaced by a new one, the generation of the 
strength will be described by a Gaussian PDF.  
12) The probability of failure (POF) is calculated by the following formula: 
 
1
1 [1 ( , )]
N
f i i
i
POF P S t
=
= − −∏  (6.1) 
where it  is the 
thi  time interval between ( 1)thi −  and thi  activity (0 means the initial service 
time), iS  is the 
thi  residual strength between ( 1)thi −  and thi  activity, N  is the number of 
damages occurred in one life-cycle, and ( )fP ⋅  is the probability of failure for each interval with 
constant residual strength. 
Failure occurs when the applied load exceeds the residual strength. Each time interval throughout 
the life-cycle with constant residual strength is assumed in series connection. The cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of the maximum load per it  is expressed as: 
 ( )( , ) i iH S tl i iF S t e
−=  (6.2) 
where ( )H x  is the frequency of the event exceeding the level x , which is described by different 
load exceedance curves after load cases are specified. A detailed illustration has been explained 
in Chapter 5. 
13) The last step of the simulation cycle is to calculate the total maintenance cost. The total 
maintenance cost can be expressed as:  
 total inspection repair replace otherC C C C C= + + +  (6.3) 
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where totalC  is the total maintenance cost; inspectionC  is the cost induced by scheduled inspection 
including the labor and equipment cost; repairC  is the repair cost containing labor, material and 
equipment cost; replaceC  is the replacement cost considering labor, equipment and spare part; the 
last otherC  denotes any other cost which may be caused by unscheduled maintenance, flight delay 
or other operational problems. 
Overall, an operational life cycle of a composite structure is simulated by the above 13 steps. In 
order to address the uncertainty, the simulation should be repeated with a large sample to obtain 
the mean value of the POF and the maintenance cost. 
6.5 Case Study 
A survey was conducted to an airline maintenance department to collect damage records in 
aircraft structures made of composite materials. According to statistics, impact damage caused by 
natural object and human mishandling is the most frequent damage type. Therefore, in this study, 
impact damage resulting in dent or delamination was assumed to be the only damage type. A 
GFRP composite wing panel was selected. Statistical input data and related assumptions are listed 
below:  
6.5.1 Load Case 
For civil aircraft structures, gust load is mainly considered as the critical load case [164]: 
5( ) 2 10 /rat LLP P FHε ε
−= > = × ; 
9( ) 1 10 /rat ULP P FHε ε
−= > = ×  
where ε  is the actual load, LLε  is the limit load and ULε  is the ultimate load, 1.5UL LLε ε= . 
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Since the probability value under different exceeding conditions changes significantly by the 
power of 10, a Log-linear model is used to describe the load occurrence probability. The load 
exceedance curve is shown in Figure 6-7.  
 lg( ) 8.602 ( ) 8.903rat
LL
P ε ε= − × +  (6.4) 
 
Figure 6-7 Load exceedance curve 
6.5.2 Average Damage per Life-cycle (Nd) 
Information on dent and delamination was extracted from the maintenance records from 2002 to 
2012 about wing structures of a certain aircraft fleet. In total 19 occurrences of impact damage 
were recorded in four GFPR panels from 12 aircrafts. The design life of the aircraft is 150,000 
flight hours (50 years) and the composite panel is assumed to have the same design life. Thus the 
average number of damage per operational life-cycle is approximately 2.  
6.5.3 Damage Size Distribution 
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
1e-4
1e-2
1e+0
1e+2
1e+4
Load
N
um
be
r o
f e
xc
ee
da
nc
e 
pe
r l
ife
162 
 
Statistical analysis was performed to obtain the probability distribution function (PDF) of the 
damage size. Four most likely PDFs were tested and their goodness-of-fit are shown in Figure 6-8. 
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Figure 6-8 Goodness-of-fit test for damage size 
It is resulted from the test that the Weibull distribution function is the best PDF with the highest 
correlation coefficient of 0.995. The histogram of the damage diameter distribution is plotted in 
Figure 6-9. Note that all the damage sizes in this chapter are in inches. 
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Figure 6-9 Damage diameter distribution 
The Weibull expression of this distribution is given by: 
( )1( ; , ) , 0, 0, 0
3.486, 1.950
d
f d d e d
β
β α
β
βα β α β
α
α β
−−= ≥ > >
= =
 
Therefore, a Weibull generator is used for impact damage sizes. 
6.5.4 Probability of Detection (POD) 
From previous analysis, two cumulative probability functions are used to describe the POD 
against damage size [62, 165]: the Cumulative Weibull distribution function:  
( )
( ) 1
x
F x e
α
β
−
= −  
and the Cumulative Log-Normal distribution function: 
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For the selected composite panel, detailed inspection (DET/DI) level is considered and Log-
Normal model proves to fits the data [64] with a higher regression value compared to Weibull and 
the expression is given below: 
 
Figure 6-10 POD vs. Damage diameter (in) 
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 (6.5) 
6.5.5 Inspection Schedule 
The selection of the inspection interval is based on the real maintenance schedule of the airline 
obtained from Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR). The inspection interval for the 
composite panel is “4C” check, which is 16,000 flight hours by DET. Since the service life is 
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150,000 flight hours, the interval is approximated to 15,000 flight hours (10% of the operational 
life-cycle) to facilitate the calculation in the numerical example.  
6.5.6 Residual Strength Reduction and Recovery 
The relative residual strength of the GFRP composite panel as a function of damage size for 
impact damage is approximated by the following function:  
 
( )
1 , 0 1, 0.05
( )
( ) , 1, 0.46, 2.3189, 0.75
d
G
kd d k
RS d
A C A e d A C G
− < < == 
 + − ≥ = = =
 (6.6) 
where A is the residual strength asymptote; C is the intercept; G and k are the slopes for the 
segmented curve. The relative residual strength against damage size is shown in Figure 6-11. 
 
Figure 6-11 Relative residual strength reduction 
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The recovery of the residual strength depends on different repair policies which will be discussed 
in the next subsection. Generally, the recovery efficiency coefficient is described by a uniform 
distribution within the range of 0.85-0.95. 
6.5.7 Repair Policy 
A simplified model is assumed here for the repair tolerance concept. The lower threshold and 
upper threshold are used as two decision variables which divide the damage degree into three 
intervals as shown in Figure 6-5.  
1) If the damage size is less than the lower threshold, the structure is left as it is;  
2) If the damage size is between the lower threshold and upper threshold, a repair work is 
initiated and considered as permanent repair which does not require a change in the inspection 
schedule;  
3) If the damage size is larger than the upper threshold, the damaged structure is replaced by a 
new spare. 
6.5.8 Factor of Safety 
The scatter of the new strength is described by a Gaussian PDF with a coefficient of variation of 
5%. The mean value of initial strength is calculated as: 
1 1.5 1.4 2.1RS f f= × = × = , 
where 1.5f =  is the factor of safety and 1 1.4f =  is the additional margin of safety. 
Environmental factors such as temperature, moisture and ultra-violet may induce slow 
degradation of composites. Also, adjacent damage may result in additional strength loss. For 
simplicity, these factors are not considered in this study but will be investigated in the future. 
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6.5.9 Probability of Failure (POF) 
The operational life-cycle is set to 1 unit, accordingly the inspection interval T = 0.1. As 
mentioned before, the lower threshold has a direct influence on structural safety, which is 
described by the probability of failure (POF). The upper threshold is fixed at 5 inches as an 
example. Note that the upper threshold can be fixed at any value as long as reasonable because it 
has little effect on structural safety. After taking 1000 samples, the average probability of failure 
(POF) in relation to the lower threshold is obtained and shown in Figure 6-12. 
 
Figure 6-12 POF vs. Lower threshold 
6.5.10 Maintenance Cost 
The maintenance cost consists of four parts: inspection cost, repair cost, replacement cost and risk 
cost. The risk cost is induced by any unpredicted failure when the POF is above a certain level. 
While of the lower threshold affecting safety, the upper threshold plays an important role in the 
maintenance cost. As discussed in the repair tolerance section, various influencing factors should 
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be taken into account, such as damage severity, the repair capability (human and equipment), 
spare parts management and repair duration, etc. Thus, an integrated exponential expression in 
relation to the damage size is assumed based on airline operational experience considering 
multiple factors: 
 21 i
C d
repair basicC C C e= +  (6.7) 
where basicC  is the basic cost for every repair, 1C  and 2C  are coefficients according to practical 
maintenance conditions balancing capability, time, spare parts, etc., id  is the 
thi  damage size.  
In terms of the lower threshold, if it is set too large, the POF may be lower than the required level 
and thereby, resulting in a larger possibility to fail, unscheduled maintenance will then be 
initiated causing more labor work and flight delays. Therefore, a cost of risk is introduced to 
incorporate the lower threshold into the maintenance cost model. 
Values for each cost type are assumed based on airline operational experience shown in Table 6-1. 
Note that the unit is omitted. 
Table 6-1 Cost for each maintenance task 
inspectionC  - 100 
repairC  
basicC  600 
1C  100 
2C  0.6 
replacementC  - 4000 
riskC  If POF>1e-3 10000 
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The range of the lower threshold variable is set to 0.5-2.5 (in) and of the upper threshold variable 
is set to 4.0-7.5 (in), 0.1 (in) a step value. After taking 1000 samples, the average maintenance 
cost against the two thresholds is obtained and shown in Figure 6-13. 
 
Figure 6-13 Maintenance cost vs. Repair tolerance (lower and upper thresholds) 
6.6 Results and Discussion 
It is shown from Figure 6-12 that generally, the probability of failure (POF) follows a monotone 
trend with the lower threshold except for the fluctuation within 0.5-1 inch. This is because the 
residual strength decreases slightly in this range, causing little effect on the load bearing capacity 
of the whole structure as shown in Figure 6-11. By assigning the lower threshold a risk of safety, 
which is described by a POF value, airline engineers can determine the exact lower threshold 
value by assessing the required reliability of the composite structure in different situations. For 
instance, if a requirement for the structural probability of failure is no higher than 10-5, the 
maximum lower threshold should be 2.1 inches, which means any damage within 2.1 inches can 
be kept as it is. 
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Due to the large scatter in each simulation, a large number of samples are required, which is time-
consuming. As reflected in Figure 6-13, the surface of maintenance cost is too variable to 
determine any particular trend and the best value. Consider the maintenance data as signals, a de-
nosing process was implemented by wavelet analysis, which is capable of revealing aspects of 
data like trends, breakdown points, self-similarity, etc. [172]. There are generally two steps for 
de-noising. Firstly, a noisy signal is decomposed, and then the other half of the process is 
reconstructed. A comparison of the maintenance cost before and after wavelet de-noising is 
shown in Figure 6-14. 
 
(a) Before de-noising                                         (b) After de-noising 
Figure 6-14 Maintenance cost wavelet de-noising 
A much smoother surface is obtained on the right-hand graph that shows a relative clear trend of 
the cost variation while keeping an acceptable accuracy level. Therefore, wavelet de-noising 
provides a good balance between simulation time and accuracy. Further, a contour plot 
representation of Figure 6-14 (b) is shown in Figure 6-15.  
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Figure 6-15 Contour map of maintenance cost (optimization of maintenance cost) 
The minimum maintenance cost in Figure 6-15 is highlighted by ‘+’ symbol, approximately 5540. 
Accordingly, the optimized lower threshold and upper threshold in repair tolerance are 1.6 inches 
and 5.5 inches respectively for the selected composite structure. 
The optimization of the lower and upper threshold depends largely on the cost ratio of different 
maintenance tasks as shown in Table 6-1.  Expenditures on scheduled maintenance activities such 
as inspection, repair and replacement vary a lot according to different labor cost, equipment cost 
and spare part management capability of airlines in different regions. So does the risk cost 
induced by unscheduled maintenance and flight delays in case of a high probability of failure. 
The cost ratio variation of maintenance tasks can result in different optimized repair thresholds. 
Other influencing factors are listed as follows: 
1) The design of the composite structure, of which the residual strength decreases differently 
against the damage size; 
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2) Applied load cases, which correspond to different probability of failure; 
3) Inspection schedule, which is undergoing a gradual shift from time-based inspection to 
condition-based inspection with the development of structural health monitoring (SHM) 
techniques. 
4) Operational environment and personal qualification, which has a direct relation with the 
occurrence frequency of the impact damage caused by natural accident and human mishandling. 
Overall, the repair tolerance is not simply a design index like damage tolerance. The 
determination of the repair tolerance should also depend on practical operation as well as 
maintenance situation. It is an integrated index throughout the life-cycle of the aircraft structure. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a concept of repair tolerance was proposed by defining two thresholds for 
damaged composite airframes. The lower threshold denotes whether to repair or not and the upper 
threshold refers to whether to repair or replace. A probabilistic approach was applied to address 
the uncertainty problems in repair tolerance through Monte Carlo (MC) simulation. The 
uncertainty in the lower threshold was assessed by a risk of safety whereas the uncertainty in the 
upper threshold was evaluated by economic and human factors’ considerations. Two optimal 
thresholds in repair tolerance were derived based on large sample iteration in order to minimize 
the total maintenance cost. A typical composite structure from an in-service aircraft type was 
selected as a numerical example to demonstrate the effectiveness of the methodology. 
The significant contribution of this study is the application of a probabilistic method to quantify 
the repair tolerance, combining a data-driven technique with a physical model of a composite 
structure based on “no growth” design philosophy. The two thresholds in repair tolerance were 
optimized considering both safety and economic issues. In addition, multiple influencing factors 
such as the material property, maintenance cost ratio and inspection schedule, etc. were discussed 
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as supplementary. Aircraft manufacturers and operators can use this method to determine better 
repair strategies according to their specific requirements. 
Though this is only an idealized model based on data that is partly based on assumption and 
partly obtained from real in-service aircraft information, the probabilistic method is quite flexible 
and can potentially incorporate more practical modules in the future, e.g., a more detailed repair 
policy and maintenance cost module can be developed. Also, this method can be expanded to 
minimize the life-cycle cost (LCC) by taking design and manufacturing expenses into 
consideration. 
6.8 Publication 
[6] Xi Chen, He Ren, Cees Bil, Jin Cai, ‘Repair Tolerance Analysis for Composite Structures 
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CHAPTER 7. INTEGRATION OF STRUCTURAL 
HEALTH MONITORIING WITH SCHEDULED 
MAINTENANCE OF AIRCRAFT COMPOSITE 
STRUCTURES 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters addressed two key parameters in scheduled maintenance respectively: 
the inspection interval and the repair threshold. Nowadays, the manufacturers are promoting new 
technologies such as structural health monitoring (SHM) to reduce long-term maintenance cost, 
increase aircraft availability and save weight [173]. The current maintenance mode based on 
inspection at predetermined intervals is going through a transform to a more advanced 
maintenance mode based on real-time condition monitoring. Significant efforts are underway to 
investigate hot fields such as networks of integrated sensors, innovative deployment methods and 
data fusion algorithms, etc. Relevant literature was reviewed in Chapter 2 in terms of various 
SHM techniques, some of which have been demonstrated reliably in laboratory environments and 
in several pilot applications. But the commercial implementation of SHM is still immature. 
Recent emphases have been paid to the introduction of SHM to routine aircraft maintenance 
practices for continuous monitoring, inspection and damage detection in order to reduce time-
consuming labor inspections. A general architecture for a complete SHM system and its operation 
within an aircraft maintenance program is described in Figure 7-1.  
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Figure 7-1 The SHM system and operation within aircraft maintenance 
The research into a wide variety of SHM techniques belongs to the upper portion of the diagram. 
The final objective of SHM is to use it to facilitate maintenance activities and further, to improve 
design philosophy. This chapter focuses on the other portion of the diagram and investigates two 
problems:  
1) How to integrate SHM tasks into the current maintenance program? 
2) What is the influence of the combined maintenance policy on current scheduled maintenance? 
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7.2 Integration of SHM with MSG-3 Analysis 
As introduced in Chapter 2, the MSG-3 document is widely adopted in commercial aviation, 
which uses a progressive logic diagram to develop scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals. Its 
primary objective is to maintain the inherent airworthiness throughout the operational life of the 
aircraft in an economic manner. For aircraft structures, the maintenance tasks and intervals are 
based on an assessment of structural design information, fatigue and damage tolerance 
evaluations, service experience with similar structure and pertinent test results. Structures are 
divided as Structural Significant Item (SSI) and Other Structure according to the consequences of 
their failure to aircraft safety. Each SSI will go through the analysis of a series of deterioration 
processes including accidental damage (AD), environmental deterioration (ED), fatigue damage 
(FD) and corrosion and wear. A detailed logic procedure was shown in Figure 2-5 in Chapter 2. 
As an overarching plan of incorporating SHM into current maintenance practices to guide both 
short-term and long-term maintenance activities is significantly required, new documents were 
released to address this problem. Specifically, the Issue Paper 105 was published to modify the 
MSG-3 logic to allow consideration of SHM applications for new design [174, 175]. Recently in 
2013, SAE released the ARP6461 to standardize and harmonize world understanding about SHM 
[126]. Moreover, It was in the revision 2009.1 that the MSG-3 document included SHM and S-
SHM concept for the first time. It pointed out that, emerging technology such as SHM may be an 
option to examine AD, ED and/or FD if demonstrated to be applicable and effective [9]. Based on 
the MSG-3 structural maintenance logic diagram, the updated logic procedure considering 
different SHM tasks is proposed in Figure 7-2. 
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Figure 7-2 MSG-3 logic diagram considering SHM 
Herein, two terms are specified again to facilitate understanding. Scheduled-SHM (S-SHM) 
refers to any SHM system that must be interrogated by maintenance personnel in order to 
function at an interval set at fixed schedule. Automated SHM (A-SHM) is any SHM technology 
which does not have a pre-determined interval at which maintenance action must take place, but 
instead relies on the diagnostic or prognostic information provided by the SHM system as triggers.  
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7.3 Combinations of Maintenance Scenarios 
As shown in Figure 7-2, after the determination of all SSIs’ initial maintenance tasks, feasibility 
and applicability analysis of available SHM systems is performed. If no SHM system is suitable, 
the original scheduled maintenance is applied, which is grouped as scenario A. If an on-board 
SHM system can monitor structural health states continuously and feedback any abnormal 
information whenever abnormality occurs, A-SHM is fully applicable and thus a complete CBM 
can be achieved. Although Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) also includes the maintenance 
based on periodical inspections, in this study CBM only refers to the maintenance based on real-
time health monitoring. Maintenance tasks through A-SHM are grouped as scenario D. A myriad 
of combinations of scheduled maintenance and SHM exist between scenario A and D. Herein, 
two typical combinations are presented in scenario B and C according to different deployments of 
sensor networks. Overall, the updated structural maintenance tasks can be roughly categorized as 
four scenarios: A. Scheduled Maintenance, B. Scheduled SHM, C. Scheduled CBM, D. CBM, 
reflecting three levels of SHM integration.  
7.3.1 Scheduled Maintenance  
Scheduled maintenance is performed at predetermined intervals to address damages remaining 
undetected in normal operations. During scheduled maintenance, aircraft usually stays in a hangar 
and undergoes intensive inspection and necessary repair work. Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) 
is often performed especially to inaccessible areas. However, disassembling and reassembling 
related structural components for inspection are inevitably required. Though time consuming, the 
detailed maintenance activities ensure aircraft safe operation until the next maintenance cycle. A 
typical logic procedure for maintenance of composite panels is shown in Figure 7-3. 
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A
If detected 
damage size > D
Repair is conducted for 
damaged panels size>D
Unnecessary structural 
repair is skipped 
If service 
life ended
Stop
Impact damage 
in service
At the time of scheduled 
maintenance, intensive NDI 
is performed
Yes
No
Yes
No
 
Figure 7-3 Scheduled maintenance procedure 
There are two critical parameters in scheduled maintenance affecting both safety and maintenance 
cost: the inspection interval and the repair threshold (denoted as D). With the integration of SHM 
in the following scenarios, these two parameters will be adjusted dynamically. 
7.3.2 Scheduled SHM 
Only a small fraction of structures undergo repair at each scheduled maintenance cycle while 
every piece of SSI needs to be inspected to preclude any detrimental damages. Most NDI 
techniques for detecting damages such as delamination in composites are labor intensive and 
costly. 
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In this scenario, an on-board SHM sensor system is implemented while the data collection and 
analysis system is ground-based.  The benefit is that the SHM system can detect damage without 
tearing down components and therefore intrusive inspections can be spared. It is noted that the 
inspection interval and repair threshold remain the same as those in scheduled maintenance, i.e. 
the inspection of on-board SHM data is performed at every scheduled maintenance cycle. If 
damage exceeding the threshold is detected, repair activities are immediately initiated. Thus, the 
scheduled SHM can be seen as an updated version of the original scheduled maintenance. A logic 
procedure similar to Scenario A is shown in Figure 7-4. 
B
If detected 
damage size > D
Repair is conducted for 
damaged panels size>D
Detailed NDT and structural 
repair are skipped 
If service 
life ended
Stop
Impact damage 
in service
At the time of scheduled 
inspection, on-board SHM 
is performed
Yes
No
Yes
No
 
Figure 7-4 Scheduled SHM maintenance procedure 
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Though labor saving, the damage detection by the SHM system may not be as reliable as the 
traditional intrusive inspection considering the immaturity of SHM technology and any secondary 
damage to SHM sensors. As a result, this maintenance scenario may lead to a lower safety level 
compared with scheduled maintenance. 
7.3.3 Scheduled CBM 
The alternative combination is designed to be a scheduled CBM maintenance philosophy. With 
increasing maturity of SHM, the data acquisition part is also placed in-situ with the sensor 
network. The electronics has well programmed circuitry for data logging automatically and the 
data is transported to the ground base via manual hook-ups periodically. Therefore, the structure’s 
condition can be monitored more frequently with even lower cost compared with Scenario B. The 
frequency of maintenance tasks in this scenario is assumed to increase by 10 times than that in 
scheduled SHM. The repair threshold should be increased to a certain extent accordingly. This 
additional procedure is called maintenance assessment. In order to maintain the same safety level 
as scheduled maintenance, scheduled SHM is requested at every scheduled maintenance cycle 
just as Scenario B and the threshold is adjusted to the previous damage size. The logic procedure 
of scheduled CBM is shown in Figure 7-5. 
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C
If detected 
damage size > D
Repair is conducted for 
damaged panels size>D
Detailed NDT and structural 
repair are skipped 
If service 
life ended
Stop
Impact damage 
in service
At the time of 
scheduled maintenance 
Yes
No
Yes
No If detected 
damage size > D1
Unscheduled repair is 
conducted for damaged 
panels size>D1
No
Yes
At the time of 
maintenance assessment 
 
Figure 7-5 Scheduled CBM maintenance procedure 
Between every maintenance assessment, unscheduled repair is conducted as long as the damage 
size exceeds the threshold D1 so that the structure can be repaired without waiting for the next 
scheduled maintenance cycle. Otherwise, the structure with a larg damage size will be kept in 
service which may compromise the operational safety. It is noted that unscheduled repair is used 
here to distinguish from the repair performed at current scheduled intervals. However, since the 
threshold D1 in maintenance assessment is larger than D in scheduled maintenance, scheduled 
SHM should be carried out to repair structures with damages larger than D so that the structural 
safety is not impaired in the long term. This maintenance scenario can be seen as a hybrid model 
of scheduled SHM and CBM in order to maintain a high safety level. 
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7.3.4 CBM 
The most advanced scenario is presented to achieve real-time monitoring, which is based on a 
mature on-board SHM system and a well-developed air-ground data link system. Data relevant to 
structural health is collected, transmitted and processed continuously. It is important that the 
maintenance decision-making module can perform autonomously and inform the operator in a 
timely manner when to take maintenance measures. In other words, a complete CBM is realized. 
Since the structural health state can be monitored in real-time, the repair threshold can be also set 
to D1. However, considering the reliability of the SHM system itself, it is necessary to assess the 
system frequently. The CBM logic procedure is shown in Figure 7-6. 
D
Detailed NDT and structural 
repair are skipped 
If service 
life ended
Stop
Impact damage 
in service
SHM system 
assessment
No
Yes
No
On-board SHM 
is performed for 
real time monitoring
If detected 
damage size > D1
Yes
Unscheduled repair is 
conducted for damaged 
panels size>D1  
Figure 7-6 CBM maintenance procedure 
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Overall, with SHM systems applied in the last three scenarios, structural damage can be detected 
by on-board sensors either at every predetermined interval or continuously, which spares 
operators great time and energy from unnecessary intrusive inspections. Theoretically, new 
maintenance procedures incorporating SHM tasks have been developed. Numerical examples will 
be presented in the following sections to quantify the maintenance cost and probability of failure 
for the composite panel.  
7.4 Probabilistic Analysis 
7.4.1 Probabilistic Damage Tolerance Analysis  
The modern damage-tolerance philosophies apply the ‘no-growth’ approach in designing and 
manufacturing aircraft composite structures, which was illustrated in Chapter 5. In this chapter, 
the same issue is discussed from another aspect, i.e. the relationship between the variation of the 
shaded area and the risk of the structural failure, as shown in Figure 7-7. 
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Figure 7-7 Damage tolerance design for metals and composites 
Assume damage initiates or occurs in both metallic and composite structures at time t. The 
residual strength degrades as damage propagates with time in metals until detected and repaired. 
In comparison, the residual strength in composites suffers an immediate decrease once damage 
occurs but remains stable without further growth until repaired. However, the composite structure 
may not be as safe as the metallic one if the shaded area is too large. The shaded rectangular area 
for composites relies on two factors: the inspection interval (length) and the repair threshold 
(width). Specifically, if the inspection interval is long and the threshold size is large, the structure 
may be in operation with a severe damage for a long time which may increase the probability of 
failure. In contrast, if the inspection interval is short and the repair threshold is small, the normal 
operation will be interrupted by frequent inspections and repair activities which will definitely 
lead to a higher maintenance cost. Thus, the inspection interval and repair threshold are the two 
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key factors affecting both safety and economy in current scheduled maintenance of aircraft 
composite structures. 
7.4.2 Probabilistic Simulation Procedure  
Derived from the previous analysis in the last two chapters, the probabilistic simulation diagram 
is shown in Figure 7-8. 
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Figure 7-8 Simulation flowchart of the probabilistic model 
Two main outputs are particularly stressed: the probability of failure (POF) and the maintenance 
cost. The objective of the probabilistic simulation is to achieve the most economic maintenance 
cost while maintaining an acceptable risk level. The detailed procedure was analogous to the 
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simulation illustration in Chapter 6. Particularly, the total maintenance cost includes inspection 
cost, repair cost and also other cost caused by potential special events, which is expressed as: 
 total inspection repair riskC C C C= + +  (7.1) 
where inspectionC  refers to cost induced by each scheduled inspection including consumption of 
manpower and equipment; repairC  is the repair cost considering labor, equipment, material and 
spare part. riskC  denotes cost induced by any special event or severe damage during operation 
having considerable impact on aircraft safety, e.g. a bird strike causing evident structural damage 
so that immediate repair needs to be conducted. In this case, once the POF is above a certain level, 
the risk cost is induced.  
7.4.3 Optimization for Inspection Interval and Repair Threshold 
The subsequent task is to optimize the inspection interval and the repair threshold in scheduled 
maintenance. Pertinent data is obtained from the maintenance records of the Chinese domestic 
airline. Inputs such as load cases, damage distribution, probability of detection, etc. can be 
referred to models in Chapter 6. The result of the optimization is shown in Figure 7-9. 
188 
 
 
Figure 7-9 Optimization of inspection interval and repair threshold 
It is noted that the safety problem is now linked to economic considerations by setting the risk 
cost as discussed in Equation (7.1). When the POF value exceeds a preset threshold, risk cost is 
initiated for handling any undesired emergency. Therefore, the only optimizing target is the 
maintenance cost. The trend in Figure 7-9 shows clearly that the optimized maintenance cost lies 
at the bottom where the inspection interval is around 15,000 flight hours (0.1 T) and the repair 
threshold is approximately 2 inches. Referring to the operational document of this type of aircraft, 
the inspection interval in the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) for the composite 
structure is ‘4C’ (16,000 flight hours) and the allowable limit size in Structural Repair Manual 
(SRM) is exactly 2 inches. The simulated results therefore coincide with the practical situations 
which demonstrate the effectiveness of the probabilistic model. 
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The probabilistic model and the optimized results will be used for the next quantitative analysis 
on the integrated maintenance procedures incorporating SHM. 
7.5 Case Study for Maintenance Scenarios 
Assumptions underpinning the case study are presented as follows: 
A new type of aircraft is assumed to have a composite wing consisting of 10 panels made of 
CFRP and has the same design life as the aircraft in previous survey. Other statistical models 
such as loading cases, damage frequency, damage distribution, etc. were obtained from the survey 
similarly to Chapter 6.  
In current scheduled maintenance, aircraft stays in a hangar to receive extensive inspection and 
maintenance work. To aircraft structures, all inaccessible SSIs have to go through a disassemble-
NDI-assemble procedure to preclude any damage beyond predetermined allowable limit, which is 
time consuming and costly. One benefit of applying SHM is that sensors can be integrated into 
structures to eliminate intrusive inspection and dismounting tasks. A coefficient SHMk  is 
introduced denoting the proportion of inspection cost by SHM in the inspection cost by NDI. The 
more mature the SHM technology becomes, the smaller the coefficient SHMk  can achieve. 
Another benefit of SHM is that current scheduled maintenance can be updated to flexible 
schedules just like Scenario C (Scheduled CBM) and D (CBM) since inspections can be easily 
carried out by on-board sensors. Repair may be initiated right after damage identification at any 
time during the life-cycle. Maintenance resources are usually not prepared for ad hoc 
maintenance and additional cost will be incurred. In this study, any repair cost that is not induced 
in traditional maintenance cycles denotes as unscheduled repair cost and expressed by
_unsched repairC .  
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For Scenario C (Scheduled CBM) and D (CBM), a new threshold D1 is specified for unscheduled 
repair due to more frequent inspections by on-board sensors. Structures with a larger damage size 
can still be acceptable for a short period of time with the same safety level. Therefore, the 
developed probabilistic model can be used provided that the POF in current scheduled 
maintenance is at 10-7 level. Through reverse calculation, a maximum damage size 3.6 inches is 
obtained as the threshold for unscheduled repair. 
One of the impediments for SHM application is the reliability of SHM devices. If any component 
of the SHM system is damaged or fails, how can maintenance personnel rely on the system for 
damage detection? Therefore, maintenance assessment for the SHM system is required at a 
reasonable interval during the operational life-cycle. A uniform reliability of the SHM system is 
assumed to be 80% and maintenance for the SHM system is called SHM assessment in Scenario 
D (CBM). 
Maintenance cost consists of four parts: inspection cost, scheduled repair cost, unscheduled repair 
cost and risk cost, which is calculated by Equation (7.2): 
 _total inspection repair unsched repair riskC C C C C= + + +  (7.2) 
where totalC  is the total maintenance cost; riskC  is any cost once POF exceeds a predetermined 
threshold. 
In terms of repair cost, for Scenario A (Scheduled Maintenance) and B (Scheduled SHM), all 
maintenance tasks including inspection and repair are carried out at every scheduled maintenance 
cycle and thereby repairC  is incurred. For Scenario D (CBM), repair tasks are initiated based on 
the health condition of the monitored structure and therefore, only _unsched repairC  is generated. For 
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Scenario C (Scheduled CBM), both repairC  and _unsched repairC  are incurred since repair can either 
happen at scheduled maintenance or at maintenance assessment time. 
For the last two scenarios, structures are monitored more frequently. In order to improve the 
safety level compared to B (Scheduled SHM), Scenario C (Scheduled CBM) performs 
maintenance assessment every 0.01 life-cycle, which is every 1500 flight hours. A maintenance 
assessment is usually carried out overnight, when the SHM system is checked and structures are 
inspected to fix damages larger than D1. Alternatively, Scenario D (CBM) requires an SHM 
system assessment activity every 150 flight hours in case of any SHM component failure. 
It is difficult to quantify a specific NDI cost for a single panel since panels vary in size and 
location. A total inspection cost by NDI is considered for an aircraft wing. Likewise, repair cost 
for different damages varies. An average value is assumed for each composite panel. 
Assumptions for values of specific cost items are tabulated in Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1 Maintenance items quantification 
Maintenance cost item Value 
inspectionC  200 per aircraft 
repairC  100 per panel per time 
_unsched repairC  200 per panel per time 
riskC  1000 per panel if POF>10-2 
SHMk  0.2 
       Note: units are neglected for simplicity. 
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New logic procedures for synchronizing SHM and scheduled maintenance are designed into the 
probabilistic model. A fleet of 100 aircrafts each having 10 composite wing panels is simulated 
by the Monte Carlo method and outputs are tabulated in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-2 Comparison of four maintenance scenarios 
Scenario 
Percentage of 
panels repaired 
per inspection 
No. of 
unscheduled 
maintenance 
Probability of 
Failure (POF) 
Maintenance 
Cost 
A. Sched-main 0.189 - 1e-7 406000 
B. Sched-SHM 0.158 - 1e-6 344900 
C. Sched-CBM 0.134 636 1e-8 616800 
D. CBM - 718 1e-7 269600 
 
7.6 Discussion 
With an increasing usage of SHM from Scenario A (Scheduled Maintenance) to D (CBM), repair 
work at conventional scheduled maintenance cycle has transferred to unscheduled maintenance 
due to more frequent inspections or even real-time monitoring. Meanwhile, SHM can help skip 
unnecessary time-consuming labor work for NDI. As to safety, the relatively higher probability of 
failure in Scenario B (Scheduled SHM) is because of the consideration of SHM reliability. 
Although SHM can save great manpower, it is less reliable than human intervention at a long 
inspection interval. In comparison, Scenario C (Scheduled CBM) with more frequent inspections 
and smaller repair threshold has the highest safety level. 
In terms of the maintenance cost, distributions of each cost item from Scenario A (Scheduled 
Maintenance) to D (CBM) are shown in Figure 7-10. It is noted that the areas of the pie charts are 
proportional to the total cost and so does each cost item. 
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Figure 7-10 Cost distributions for four maintenance scenarios 
Compare scenario D (CBM) with A (Scheduled Maintenance), CBM can achieve the same POF 
level as traditional scheduled maintenance but reduce the maintenance cost by 33.6%. Inspection 
cost in Scenario A (Scheduled Maintenance) occupies almost half of the total cost. In Scenario D 
(CBM), the unscheduled repair constitutes a major part of the total cost. 
As a simple updated version of scheduled maintenance, traditional scheduled inspection is 
replaced by on-board sensors and ground-based data analysis equipment in Scenario B 
(Scheduled SHM). The maintenance cost can be reduced by 15% by eliminating intrusive NDI. 
However, due to the reliability of the SHM system and infrequent inspections, the aircraft has a 
A. Scheduled Maintenance  B. Scheduled SHM  
C. Scheduled CBM  
D. CBM  
194 
 
higher POF level, which is reflected in the distribution of cost items with a small proportion for 
SHM inspection and a large proportion for risk cost as. It is noted that Scenario C (Scheduled 
CBM) has the largest maintenance cost. The main reason is the introduction of frequent 
maintenance assessment at every 0.01 life-cycle (1500 flight hours) as reflected in Figure 7-10 
Scenario C (Scheduled CBM) that the inspection cost comprises more than half of the total cost. 
In other words, the inspection cost reduced by SHM still cannot neutralize the cost incurred by 
more frequent inspections. However, this could probably be the most suitable integration of SHM 
in today’s practice to maintain a low POF. And that is probably one of the reasons that aviation 
industries are reluctant to apply SHM at present.  
The direct parameter affecting real application is the cost issue, which in this study, is controlled 
by the coefficient SHMk , representing the maturity level of the SHM technology. A sensitivity 
analysis is performed to obtain the relationship between total maintenance cost and SHMk  as 
shown in Figure 7-11. 
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Figure 7-11 Maintenance cost sensitivity analysis 
It is obvious that the total maintenance cost decreases monotonically against SHMk . The dashed 
yellow line represents a threshold cost which is the reference maintenance cost of current 
scheduled maintenance. The threshold corresponds to a specific SHMk  value, below which 
Scenario C (Scheduled CBM) becomes more cost-effective than scheduled maintenance. 
However, it is inevitable that the installation of SHM systems will add additional weight, increase 
aircraft acquisition cost and fuel consumption. Further sensitivity analysis should be performed 
incorporating fuel charges and ownership cost as long as practical data is available in order to 
determine the most effective combination of SHM and scheduled maintenance. 
7.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, an integrated maintenance procedure was established based on MSG-3 
considering the SHM technology. Four scenarios of maintenance policy were further developed 
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as A (Scheduled Maintenance), B (Scheduled SHM), C (Scheduled CBM) and D (CBM), which 
incorporate SHM tasks with increasing maturity. A probabilistic model was developed to 
simulate the structural strength variation in operational life-cycle addressing impact damage in 
assumed composite wing panels. Two objective functions in terms of the probability of failure 
and the maintenance cost were output linking safety and economy. Cost savings were quantified 
through comparisons between four scenarios, accompanied by a sensitivity analysis on SHM 
maturity level. 
Driven by economic benefits, SHM technology is developing rapidly and gaining acceptance in 
commercial aircraft application. The contribution of this study is to address this problem in a 
practical way by integrating SHM into the widely accepted and standard document MSG-3. 
Various combined maintenance scenarios were considered and quantitative analysis was 
performed to deal with damages in specific composite panels. The influence of SHM on 
scheduled maintenance is investigated in terms of the inspection interval, the repair threshold, the 
reliability of the structure as well as the total maintenance cost. The maintenance procedures and 
the probabilistic model developed in this chapter have the potential of assisting aircraft 
manufactures and airlines to determine to what extent SHM can be integrated with scheduled 
maintenance based on their specific situations and thereby, the most cost-effective maintenance 
scenario can be selected while maintaining an acceptable safety level. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
8.1 Research Outcome and Contribution 
This thesis addressed the two key parameters in scheduled maintenance of aircraft structures, i.e. 
the inspection interval and the repair/replacement threshold. The current method in making the 
inspection interval is through MSG-3 analysis, which has been evolved for decades to be a top-
down and logic decisive program. Structural inspection intervals are determined based on a series 
of rating matrixes which are established based on years of engineering experience. For new 
developing aircraft without prototype (such as Chinese new aircraft the C919), it is difficult to 
obtain an effective rating matrix that can reflect reality precisely. Therefore, the initial focus of 
the thesis is to develop a new rating system that can make proper inspection intervals with limited 
information.  
The other problem with MSG-3 is the limited capability in rating new generation structures such 
as advanced composite structures due to the lack of experience. Therefore, the damage 
characteristics of the composite structures were investigated and the main damage modes and 
causes were obtained to facilitate further studies.  
Since MSG-3 analysis is an experience-based logic decision program, the next focus of the thesis 
is to exploit alternative methodology which can be based on practical data. Considering the 
uncertainty in complex system development, a probabilistic approach was proposed incorporating 
various deterministic and random variables. An extensive survey to a Chinese airline was 
conducted and structural maintenance records on certain type of aircraft were obtained to provide 
the probabilistic model with necessary inputs. The most significant advantage over traditional 
deterministic methods is that the probabilistic approach incorporates uncertainties in design, 
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manufacturing as well as life-cycle operation. It treats them in a practical manner instead of 
considering the “worst case” which may result in poor economy or over-design.  
During each scheduled maintenance cycle, extensive inspection tasks are carried out and those 
damages successfully detected should be compared to certain criteria to determine a proper repair 
policy. After the optimization of the inspection interval, attention was given to the optimization of 
the repair/replacement threshold. The probabilistic approach was further updated to quantify the 
two critical thresholds to achieve the most economical repair strategy. 
The emerging SHM technologies provide an innovative way to perform maintenance of aircraft 
structures. With the development of various sensors and data processing technologies, structural 
health information can be obtained more frequently and with much easier access. This definitely 
will bring a profound influence on the current maintenance policy. However, due to technology 
immaturity, SHM is still in its infancy. The last research point of this thesis proposed various 
combinations of SHM with scheduled maintenance and investigated their effects on both 
operational safety and economy.  
A detailed summary of the research outcomes for each research question is provided below: 
Q1. Since the rating system in MSG-3 is too rigid, how can the current rating system be updated 
to determine more flexible inspection intervals? 
An intelligent rating system was proposed based on an artificial neural network, which takes a set 
of rating factors as input and the final inspection interval as the output. A back-propagation (BP) 
algorithm was used to train their interaction mechanism. This method was demonstrated by a case 
study on structural accidental damage (AD). The performance ratio and the number of hidden 
layer neurons were optimized in order to achieve better training results. The best advantage of the 
BP network for AD is the flexible data fusion capability and its power learning ability. It can 
make full use of limited data from different sources and obtain correlations between each factor. 
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Moreover, it provides a means for dynamical adjustment of the rating system with operational 
information feedback. The BP rating method can be used as one of the intelligent decision 
supports to make the Maintenance Review Board Report.  
Q2. How can complex damage modes and causes be characterized for aircraft composite 
structures?  
A novel fault tree was established to analyze the possible reasons of composite structural failure. 
Both external and internal damage modes and causes were collected and synthesized in a 
systematic structure. Qualitative analysis was conducted including structural importance analysis, 
probability importance analysis and relative probability importance analysis. The results were 
demonstrated with further quantitative analysis based on statistics of operational data. This FTA 
on composite damage provides an intuitive and systematic approach to describe a variety of 
complex modes and sources. The main damages and their contributors can be obtained by 
qualitative analysis even if there is insufficient data; with sufficient data, more information such 
as time-related probabilities, occurrence rates, damage severity, etc. can be calculated, which can 
assist maintenance engineers to prioritize pertinent resources and actions in advance. 
Q3. Are there other methodologies, beyond the experience-based MSG-3, to optimize the 
inspection interval for composite structures that is more reliable? 
A probabilistic approach was proposed to tackle the composite primary damage dent. Statistical 
analyses were performed on the in-service data and their probabilistic characteristics were 
obtained. Then a Monte Carlo simulation procedure was developed which includes both 
deterministic variables such as design load case, damage type, residual strength reduction etc. and 
random variables such as damage frequency, damage size distribution, repair efficiency, etc. The 
residual strength variation of the structure during an operational life-cycle was simulated based 
on a “no-growth” assumption in damage tolerant philosophy. The optimum inspection schedule 
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lies in finding an acceptable compromise between the probability of failure of the structure and its 
maintenance cost. The significant contribution of the probabilistic method is that it enables 
composite damage to be assessed quantitatively and allows aircraft manufacturers and operators 
to make inspection intervals for composite structures by practical information from design, 
manufacturing as well as operation. Besides, uncertainty problems can be well handled and 
thereby conservative design and service guidelines can be avoided. 
Q4. How can an appropriate repair/replacement threshold be determined if damage is detected for 
composite structures? 
A concept called repair tolerance was presented by describing two critical limits in composite 
airframe repair policy. The lower limit denotes the threshold whether to repair or not, and the 
upper limit refers to the threshold whether to repair or replace. Aiming at a selected composite 
panel, practical damage information was processed and a specific simulation procedure was 
developed in which the lower threshold was controlled by the assessment of the structural 
probability of failure, while the upper threshold was evaluated by the operational life-cycle cost. 
The contribution of the study is that it provides a nondeterministic method to address the 
important issue of composite repair by quantifying the repair tolerance with risk assessments on 
safety and economy. This method has the potential to assist aircraft engineers to make efficient 
repair policies in Structural Repair Manual. 
Q5. Considering the potential benefits but immaturity of current SHM technologies, what is the 
influence of SHM on scheduled maintenance of aircraft composite structures? 
An integrated logic diagram was established, which incorporated SHM into current MSG-3 
structural analysis. Considering the increasing maturity level of SHM technologies, four 
maintenance scenarios for the composite airframe were developed. Based on the optimization of 
the two key parameters in scheduled maintenance (the inspection interval and the repair 
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threshold), modifications were made in order to be applicable for different scenarios. The 
influence of SHM on scheduled maintenance was examined on labor work savings, probability of 
failure as well as maintenance cost savings for various combination scenarios. It was found out 
that to different degrees they have the potential to lead to the most effective maintenance tasks. 
The contribution of the last research point is that it provides a practical approach for aircraft 
engineers to consider SHM tasks in early maintenance planning phase. Furthermore, due to the 
flexibility of the probabilistic simulation method, maintenance engineers can determine the most 
cost-effective maintenance strategy through detailed comparisons between various combinations 
according to different operational situations. 
8.2 Research Limitations and Future Work 
Throughout the thesis, models and methodologies addressing the scheduled maintenance of 
composite airframes both within and beyond MSG-3 were proposed. Optimized inspection 
intervals and repair/replace thresholds were derived considering uncertainty and the SHM 
technology. But there still exist limitations and shortcomings. 
Firstly, the methods developed in this thesis contain a large variety of variables from design, 
manufacturing as well as operation. Many factors were neglected or replaced by idealized models 
either because they have less influence or they cannot be easily obtained. Some were assumed 
based on engineering experience. Secondly, the proposed probabilistic models have a time span 
of the whole operational life-cycle, which makes it difficult to conduct experiments for validation. 
The optimized results can only be compared with the existing operational situations. Also, it 
relies largely on the integrity and authenticity of maintenance database, which varies in different 
airlines without a uniform system or format. Ignorance and mistakes often occur. 
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The above two shortcomings limit the practical value of the proposed methods and they are part 
of the reason that the aviation industry is reluctant to apply nondeterministic design 
methodologies. 
The future efforts can be a gradual consideration of more factors as an expansion of the primary 
models developed in the thesis, such as temperature, moisture, specific loadings conditions, etc. 
Besides, since there is still a lack of comprehensive understanding on the composite properties 
and behaviors, more investigations aiming at composite structural mechanism should be 
conducted.  
Another problem is the lack of sufficient data, especially for new generation aircraft under 
development without prototype. Currently, there is no uniform format for airlines in making 
maintenance records. Some appear to be explicit while others are incomplete, e.g. damage type 
missing or damage size missing. A recommendation is that the airline should establish a uniform 
maintenance recording system to make sure that the information on every damage detected and 
every maintenance activity can be recorded in a clear and complete manner. Moreover, airlines 
are encouraged to share in-service data with the aircraft manufacturers timely, meanwhile, the 
information obtained by SHM can be used to update the structural condition during the 
synchronization of SHM tasks into scheduled maintenance, which may enable more effective 
maintenance programs or even enhance designs for future aircraft. 
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